Indiana Law Journal
Volume 84

Issue 1

Article 2

Winter 2009

The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State
Bryan T. Camp
Texas Tech University School of Law, bryan.camp@ttu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons

Recommended Citation
Camp, Bryan T. (2009) "The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 84 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol84/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

The Failure of Adversarial Process in the
Administrative Statet
BRYAN T. CAMP*

57
INTRODUCTION ............................................................
58
I. THE CONTEXT OF COLLECTION DUE PROCESS (CDP) ..................................
59
A. TAX DETERMINATION: THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS ..............................
65
B. TAX COLLECTION .....................................................
77
II. THE PROMISE OF CDP ......................................................
78
A. As PROPOSED: THE SENATE VERSION ........................................
79
B. As ENACTED: CONFERENCE COMMITTEE MODIFICATIONS ....................
80
C. AS IMPLEMENTED: How CDP WORKS .......................................
88
Il.THE FAILURE OF CDP ......................................................
89
A. THE THEORY OF CDP FAILURE ............................................
IlI
B. THE STUDY AND ITS RESULTS ........................................................

118
IV. THE RULE OF LAW AND INQUISITORIAL DUE PROCESS ....................................

118
A. RULE OF LAW CLAIM S ..................................................
121
B. REFUTATION OF CLAIMS .................................................
122
C. INQUISITORIAL DUE PROCESS .............................................
128
APPEN DIX................................................................
INTRODUCTION

"Distrustof the bureaucracy is surely one reason for the clamor for adversary
proceedings in the United States. "'
In a series of hearings in 1997 and 1998, Congress heard allegations that the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS or "Service") abused taxpayers during the process of
collecting taxes. 2 The resulting distrust of the tax bureaucracy led Congress to create a
special adversary proceeding providing for judicial review of IRS collection decisions.
The proceeding is beguilingly titled "Collection Due Process" (and commonly referred
to as CDP). My study of CDP's structure, operation, and of 976 court decisions issued
through the end of 2006 demonstrates that CDP has not fulfilled its promise. It is
instead an outstanding regulatory failure. Of the over sixteen million collection
decisions made since 2000, courts have reviewed at most 3,000 and have reversed only
sixteen. That is a reversal rate of about one in a million. Adversary process is not an

t Copyright © 2008 Bryan T. Camp.
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. I am most grateful for the
invaluable research assistance of Lee Franks. I am also grateful for the thoughtful comments I
received on earlier drafts of this article from Les Book, Danshera Cords, Steve Johnson, Kristin
Hickman, Leandra Lederman, Peter McNeilly, and Larry Schattner. I remain responsible for all
errors of commission and omission.
1. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing,123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279-80 (1974).
2. Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as InquisitorialProcessand the PartialParadigm
Shift in the IRS RestructuringandReform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REv. 1 (2004).
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effective regulatory mechanism to check government abuses in the modem
administrative state.
This Article pursues two goals. First, it documents and explains CDP's failure to
provide a meaningful external check on tax collection abuses. In fact, CDP likely hurts
those who most need its promised protection from arbitrary agency action: the working
poor who risk seeing their Earned Income Tax Credit subsidies snatched away by the
over-reaching tax collector. Second, this Article links CDP's failure to larger questions
of the role for adversary process in the administrative state. Some commentators
contend there can be no proper "rule of law" without adversarial process. This study
of CDP proves the opposite claim: adversarial process, used in the wrong place and the
wrong time, becomes a rule of deception rather than a rule of law. CDP is a failure on
many levels, but an instructive failure, for it tells much about the problem of using
adversarial process in the administrative state.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Because administrative law is breathtakingly
parochial, the reader needs to understand the particular context of this regulatory
program in order to understand the larger point it illustrates. Thus, Part I gives the
conceptual overview oftax administration necessary to understand both the evaluation
and critique of CDP. Part II then explains the origins and operations of CDP. Part III
applies the theory of tax administration developed in Part II to larger administrative
law concepts to show how CDP fails to serve its promised purpose, and how it actually
harms both taxpayers and the cause of good tax administration. Part IV explores
whether an inquisitorial administrative process can satisfy "rule of law" values and
sketches out some ideas about how tax collection might be structured along the lines of
what I term "inquisitorial due process."
I.

THE CONTEXT OF COLLECTION DUE PROCESS

(CDP)

"Congressshould know how to levy taxes, andifit doesn't know how to collect them,
then a man is a fool to pay them. "
Historically and conceptually, tax administration divides into two main functions:
determining the correct tax liability and collecting it. 5 As any entrepreneur will tell

3. See, e.g., Leslie Book, The CollectionDue ProcessRights: A Misstep or a Step in the
Right Direction?,41 Hous. L. REv. 1145, 1160-61 (2002) ("[J]udicial review of ...IRS
collection hearings... comprise a step in the progression of the rule of law principles that...
permeate twentieth century legal culture.").
4. GERALD CARSON, THE GOLDEN EGG: THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX WHERE IT CAME

FROM, How IT GREw 119 (1977) (quoting statements J.P. Morgan made in Legal Tax-Dodging

Upheld by Morgan, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1937, at 27). Carson termed this statement "the
indiscretion of a lifetime." Id.
5. Examples of the historical separation of these functions can be found in Camp, supra
note 2; William T. Plumb, Tax Refund Suits Against CollectorsoflnternalRevenue,60 HARV.
L. REv. 685 (1947); Joseph J. Thomdike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A
Comparative History, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 717 (2001). For a defense of the conceptual
separation, see Camp, supra note 2. The separation is not absolute in practice. For example,
collection personnel also perform some liability determination functions in the form of
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you, figuring out what a client owes and then actually collecting it are quite different
tasks. And so it is with tax administration. CDP occurs during the collection process,
but one needs to understand something of both assessment and collection to appreciate
how CDP fits within the tax administration structure,6 which has been based on this
assessment/collection dichotomy since the Civil War.
A. Tax Determination: The Assessment Process
The tax determination process culminates in an "assessment" of tax. Internal
Revenue Code § 6201 authorizes and requires the IRS to "assess" all tax liabilities.
Section 6203 defines "assessment" as "recording the liability of the taxpayer in the
office of the Secretary in accordance with rules or regulations prescribed by the
Secretary.",7 To understand CDP, one must first understand the role of assessments in
tax administration.
An assessment serves two important functions in tax administration. First, it reflects
the IRS's administrative adjudication of a taxpayer's tax liability for a closed set of
past financial transactions. It is not simply a bookkeeping entry but rather represents
the culmination of the tax determination process. Second, it allows the IRS to collect
tax administratively, free ofjudicial supervision, until the assessment is fully paid. As
such, it represents the start of a second process, tax collection. I will briefly discuss
each in turn.
1. Assessment Is an Agency Adjudication
An assessment reflects the IRS'sjudgment about a taxpayer's liability but does not
create the liability. Taxpayers are liable for taxes whether or not the IRS assesses
them. 8 The concept of a tax period is foundational to liability. Liability for income
taxes arises by operation of law at the end of the applicable tax period (usually a year),
at which time all transactions are deemed closed so as to present a discrete set of facts
on which the liability rules operate. 9 An assessment is just the application of liability
investigating and assessing I.R.C. § 6672's Trust Fund Compliance Penalty and investigating
taxpayers who have not filed any returns.
6. See Camp, supra note 2, at 37-53.
7. I.R.C. § 6203 (2000). Unless otherwise noted, all citations to code sections are to the
Internal Revenue Code, beginning at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
8. See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2000) (stating that the IRS must either assess or bring
proceedings in court without assessment within three years after the return is filed); see also
Ewing v. United States, 914 F.2d 499, 502-03 (4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting taxpayer's argument
that, prior to assessment, there can be no tax liability and therefore no "payment" of taxes).
9. See I.R.C. § 441 (2000) ("[T]axable income shall be computed on the basis of the
taxpayer's taxable year."); Healy v. Comm'r, 345 U.S. 278, 281 (1953) ("One of the basic
aspects of the federal income tax is that there be an annual accounting of income. Each item of
income must be reported in the year in which it is properly reportable and in no other.")
(internal footnotes omitted); Edelson v. Comm'r, 829 F.2d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[T]ax
liabilities, though unassessed, are deemed obligations due and owing at the close of the taxable
year."). While CDP affects all types of taxes, this Article will chiefly deal with the taxation of
income, which accounted for forty-four percent of net revenue in fiscal year 2006. I.R.S., DEP'T
OF THE TREAsuRy, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2006, at 3 tbl. 1, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06databk.pdf [hereinafter 2006 DATA BOOK].
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rules to past facts made visible. The liability rules are the familiar rules of inclusions,
exclusions, deductions, and credits found in subtitles A through E of the Internal
Revenue Code ("Tax Code"). The past facts are made visible either by taxpayers
reporting them on their returns or by the IRS discovering them through various types of
audits. Either way, the assessment is distinct from the liability it reflects.' 0
I emphasize "judgment" because an assessment reflects the IRS's (and not the
taxpayer's) judgment of what taxes are owed. Politicians, judges, and commentators
often state that ours is a "self-assessment" system of tax administration. 1 This claim is
false as a matter of law and suspect as a matter of fact, assuming that what it really
means is that taxpayers control the initial calculation of tax.
As a matter of law, assessment of a self reported liability occurs only if and when
the IRS accepts a return as filed and makes the formal recordation of the resulting tax
liability on its books. (These books have been kept electronically on computers since
the early 1960s).12
Given that the IRS processes over 225 million tax returns each year (not including
the over 1.5 billion information returns such as 1099s and W-2s), 13 it should come as
no surprise that the IRS accepts most returns "as filed." That is, it accepts as true the
self report of taxpayers-when made on properly completed forms. This decision to
accept proper forms as a substitute for proper substance might seem to make the
liability assessment the taxpayer's call, as a matter of fact if not of law.
4
But, as a matter of fact, the IRS still makes a judgment of the proper liability. 1
What is misleading is that the judgment is not exercised on an individualized basis.
The decision to accept taxpayer returns "as filed" is an aggregate, or bulk processing,

10. This distinction between assessment and liability is particularly important when a
taxpayer pays the IRS (through withholding, for example) before the assessment period ends,
but the IRS never assesses the liability. See, e.g., Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281,283 (1932)
(holding that expiration of assessment limitations period without assessment being recorded
does not bar the Service from retaining payments already received if they do not exceed the
amount which could have been-but was not-properly assessed within the limitations period).
Amounts paid after the assessment period ends must be returned because they are, by definition,
overpayments. I.R.C. § 6401(a) (2000).
11. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 1, 36 (2004) (Gerber, J., dissenting)
(referring repeatedly to a "self-assessed" tax system); A CloserLook at the Size andSources of
the Tax Gap: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Taxation andIRS Oversight ofthe S. Comm. on
Finance,109th Cong. 480 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Tax Gap Hearings](statement of Raymond
T. Wagner, Jr., Chairman, IRS Oversight Commission) ("The reporting and payment oftaxes by
individuals and corporations is a process that begins with a self-assessment made by the
taxpayer of taxes owed."); Joseph J. Darby, Confidentialityand the Law of Taxation, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. 577, 577 (1998) (stating that the tax system is "based on the principle of voluntary
self-assessment"); Gary Klott, Tax Watch: FightingIRS: Uneven Match, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
1987, at D2 (quoting Michael Graetz, who states that the tax system is "structured as a selfassessment system"). But cf Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 100 n.3 (2004) (noting that the word
"self-assessment" is not a technical term in the Code).
12.

IRS HISTORICAL STUDIEs, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, IRS HISTORICAL FACT BOOK: A

CHRONOLOGY: 1646-1992, at 181 (1993).
13. 2006 DATA BOOK, supra note 9, at 4 tbl.2, 37 tbl.14.

14. It is not necessarily the final judgment. The Tax Code gives the IRS at least three years

to review any particular return. See I.R.C. § 6501 (2000).
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decision because it is a decision about a class of taxpayers, not an individual taxpayer.
That the decision is made on an aggregate basis (treating those who fill out their forms
properly as reporting the correct tax) does not make it any less an IRS decision or
judgment. After all, as former Ambassador John Bolton would be happy to explain,
there is no "IRS" just as there is no "United Nations." 15 In both cases there is a
bureaucracy whose "decisions" are simply the result of processes. 6 At the IRS, those
processes result in aggregate decisions, both from human-human interaction
(development of regulations, for example) and also human-machine interactions (prewritten algorithms kick out "suspect" returns for audit). I shall return to this point when
discussing tax collection.
Nor does the aggregate decision to accept returns "as filed" derive merely from
limited resources or a Pollyanna faith in human nature. The yearly discipline of self
reporting and payment cannot be divorced from the constant coercive threat of
discovery and sanctions resulting from the Orwellian system of third-party information
reporting and Benthamite system of audit selection.' 7 Without these, our tax
administrators could not brag that "most countries would be thrilled to have a
voluntary compliance rate of almost 84 percent.' 8 With them, assessments based on
filed returns make administrative sense. The system is really just trusting that taxpayers
are not fools. J.P. Morgan would approve.

15. In 1994, Bolton said:
The point that I want to leave with you in this very brief presentation is where I
started, is that there is no United Nations.... [I]t would be a real mistake to count
on the United Nations as if it is some disembodied entity out there that can
function on its own.
Democracy Now!, John Bolton in His Own Words: Bush's UN Ambassador Nominee
Condemns
United
Nations,
http://www.democracynow.org/2005/3/3 1/johnbolton in his own words.
16, When asked about this statement in his April 11, 2005, confirmation hearings, Bolton
explained that the U.N. is the product of actions and decisions made by its individual members
and is not an organic entity. Craig Gilbert, U.N. Nominee Hit by a Barrageof Criticism;Bush
Choice Bolton Grilledon PreviousStatements, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 12, 2005, at Al.
People often make the same mistake of thinking of the IRS as a monolithic entity.
17. See MICHEL FOuCAULT, DIscIPLINE AND PUNISH 200-01 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books 1977) (1975) (discussing Bentham's theory underlying the Panopticon and the link
between systems of punishment and internalized individual discipline); Camp, supra note 2, at
8-11 (describing IRS systemic matching program based on third party information returns).
18. 2006 Tax GapHearings,supra note 11, at 160 (statement of Mark J. Mazur, Director,
Research, Analysis, and Statistics, IRS). The point is well illustrated by the statistics:
The IRS has estimated that individuals whose wages are subject to withholding
report 99 percent of their wages for tax purposes. In contrast, self-employed
individuals who formally operate non-farm businesses are estimated to report only
about 68 percent of their income for tax purposes. Even more alarming, selfemployed individuals operating businesses on a cash basis report just 19 percent
of their income to the IRS.
Id. at 95 (statement of J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration)
(footnotes omitted).
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2. Assessment Permits Collection, Precludes Review
An assessment marks the end of one process-tax determination-and the
beginning of another-administrative tax collection. A proper assessment enables the
tax lien created by § 6321 to arise. It allows the IRS to begin seizing taxpayer property
under its levy authority in § 6331. Finally, and most critically, a proper assessment
opens up the § 6502 collection period, which gives the IRS a whopping ten years to
collect the tax administratively. The corollary is that if no proper assessment is made
within the applicable assessment limitations period in § 6501 (generally three years)
the liability itself is extinguished. The assessment limitations period acts as a statute of
repose.' 9
Once an assessment is recorded, it not only permits administrative collection action;
it also bars judicial review of the liability decision until the amount assessed is paid. A
strong pay-first rule has been integral to tax administration since 1867 when Congress
enacted the Anti-Injunction Act to provide that "[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed. ''20 The
Supreme Court has consistently interpreted "the principal purpose of this language to
be the protection of the Government's need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously
as possible with a minimum of preenforcement judicial interference, 'and to require
that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund. ''2' The payfirst rule treats the assessment as a court judgment, as the Supreme Court explained in
1935:

The assessment is given the force of ajudgment, and if the amount assessed is not
paid when due, administrative officials may seize the debtor's property to satisfy
the debt.... Thus, the usual procedure for the recovery of debts is reversed in the
field of taxation. Payment precedes defense, and the burden of proof, normally on
the claimant, is shifted to the taxpayer. The assessment supersedes the pleading,
proof, and judgment necessary in an action at law, and has the force of such a
judgment. The ordinary defendant stands in judgment only after a hearing. The

19. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 59 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted); Ill. Masonic Home v. Comm'r, 93 T.C. 145, 149-50 (1989) (explaining the court's
prior holding that the expiration of the period of limitations on assessment extinguishes
liability). See generally, Bryan T. Camp, Tax Return PreparerFraud and the Assessment

Limitation Period, 116 TAX NomS 687 (2007) (tracing the history of assessment limitation
statutes from 1862 to show their operation as statutes of repose).
20. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2000). The Act plugged a hole in the "pay first, litigate later" regime
created by the administrative reform provisions of the 1866 Revenue Act, ch. 184, 14 Star. 98.
Section 19 of the 1866 Act set up the refund scheme now codified at I.R.C. § 7422 (2000), but
did not prohibit taxpayers from enjoining collection on the ground that the assessment was
wrong. The pay-first rule is carried over into other statutes including, for example, the
Declaratory Judgment Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
21. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974) (quoting Enochs v. Williams
Packaging &Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962)), quoted in Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103
(2004). The Court has upheld the pay-first rule against a due process challenge. Phillips v.
Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
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taxpayer often is afforded his hearing after judgment and after payment, and2 2his
only redress for unjust administrative action is the right to claim restitution.

Before 1924, there was no exception to the Anti-Injunction Act or the strong pay-first
rule it supported. Once the IRS disagreed with a taxpayer's return, there was simply no
recourse to the courts until after the taxpayer paid what the Service demanded, even if
excessive. This rule was widely perceived as unfair. 23 Despite the best efforts of the
IRS and Congress to provide extensive internal review, distrust of the bureaucracy led
to a clamor for adversary process.
In 1924, Congress responded to the clamor by creating a partial exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act for situations where the Service disagreed with the taxpayer's
reported tax liability. This exception allowed taxpayers an adversary procedure in
which to seek pre-assessmentjudicial review in a specialized tribunal-then called the
Board of Tax Appeals and now called the Tax Court-for disagreements between them
and the IRS over the proper tax liability.24 It was called the deficiency procedure.
The deficiency procedure is available only when the IRS determines a "deficiency"
of reported tax. 25 "Deficiency" is a term of art; it is basically the difference between the
proper amount of tax and the tax reported and consented to by the taxpayer. If a
taxpayer fails to report any tax, either by filing a return with zeros or by failing to file a
return, then the reported tax is deemed zero.26
Under the deficiency procedure, the IRS must give taxpayers a notice of the
administrative liability decision through a document called the "Notice of Deficiency."
This document serves multiple purposes: it is the official notice to the taxpayer of the
amount and type of tax owed, it is the necessary and sufficient prerequisite for Tax
Court jurisdiction 28(often called the "ticket to the Tax Court" 27 ), and it frames the issues
subject to review.

22. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 260 (1935); see also Flora v. Comm'r, 362 U.S.
145 (1960) (holding that the full payment of tax is required before a federal court will have
jurisdiction over the refund suit); Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85,89 (1875) ("[P]ayment
of the tax claimed ...[is] a condition precedent to a resort to the courts by the party against
whom the tax is assessed.").
23. See ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE 173-77, 235-38 (1921).
24. Revenue Act of 1924, tit. 9, § 900,43 Stat. 253,336-38. This description is somewhat
simplified. The Board of Tax Appeals was widely viewed as an administrative office and not a
"true" court. But it did provide independent third-party review in an adversarial forum. It served
the same function as a court and eventually Congress changed the form to match the function it
was already performing.
25. The deficiency procedure is codified at I.R.C. §§ 6211-6216 (2000), and "deficiency"
is defined in § 6211. Note that this exception is also available only for income, estate, and gift
taxes. Note too that the concept of deficiency has nothing to do with payment. A taxpayer who
reports the proper tax, but does not pay it, has an underpayment, not a deficiency.
26. Treas. Reg. 301.6211-1(a) (amended 1995); Taylor v. Comm'r, 36 B.T.A. 427, 429
(1937) (stating that the IRS has to use deficiency procedures when determining the tax of a nonfiler).
27. Scar v. Comm'r, 814 F.2d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987) (Hall, J., dissenting).
28. Professor Leandra Lederman has reviewed these three functions. See Leandra
Lederman, "Civil"izing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to Statutory
Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 183, 203 (1996).
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Once a taxpayer receives the Notice of Deficiency, I.R.C. § 6213 allows the
taxpayer (generally) ninety days to seek review of the liability determination from a
neutral third-party tribunal. Only after the ninety days (or the conclusion of the Tax
Court case if the taxpayer timely petitions for review) may the IRS assess. Once the
assessment is made, however, the opportunity for pre-payment judicial review of the
liability determination is lost because, with some exceptions not relevant here, the
Anti-Injunction Act and the pay-first rule apply. Thus it is no surprise that about ninety
percent of the taxpayers who receive a Notice of Deficiency and who seek judicial
review of the IRS liability determination choose 29the Tax Court prepayment option and
do not simply pay the tax and file a refund suit.

It is important to emphasize that the deficiency procedure does not extend to
situations where taxpayers merely underpay their self reported liabilities and then later
want to contest the very liability they reported. 30 Most of the federal income tax
liabilities of individuals that the IRS seeks to collect arise from an underpayment of
self-reported liabilities and not from the refusal to pay an asserted deficiency. 3' This
has important implications for collection policies.
In sum, the assessment marks the point after which (a) the IRS can use its
administrative collection powers and (b) taxpayers cannot obtain judicial review of the
liability determination until the assessment is fully paid. The next Part more fully
explains the administrative collection process.

29. The most recent attempt to count tax cases comparatively was for fiscal year 1987. See
William F. Nelson & James J. Keightly, Managing the Tax Court Inventory, 7 VA. TAX REV.
451, 453 (1988). There is little reason to think the relative percentages have changed.
30. This situation could arise, for example, when taxpayers seek to amend their returns and
the IRS rejects the proposed amended returns. See e.g., Koch v. Alexander, 561 F.2d 1115 (4th
Cir. 1977) (taxpayer reported zero liability on amended return when original return showed
$20,000); Goldstone v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 113 (1975) (IRS has no duty to accept amended
returns once a valid original return is filed). Nor does the deficiency procedure apply to
employment taxes, which account for over one-third of gross tax collections. Those taxes,
imposed by I.R.C. § 3111 (2000) on employers for the privilege of employing workers, are not
included in the definition of "deficiency" in § 6211. Employment taxes have increased in
importance since 1960, rising to just over eleven percent of all taxes collected in fiscal year
1960 to almost thirty-three percent in fiscal year 2006. 2006 DATA BOOK, supra note 9, at 1415 tbl.6.
31. There is no easily accessible public data on this point. I know it from my own studies
while working in the Office of Chief Counsel. However, one can fairly infer it from the various
other available data. See 2006 DATA BOOK, supranote 9, at 23 tbl.9 (showing that less than one
percent of all returns were audited in fiscal year 2006); id. at 41 tbl. 16 (showing that just
seventeen percent of reported liabilities on delinquent returns are paid with the return). In

addition, taxpayers who self reported their liabilities made up nearly fifty percent of the
administrative CDP hearing requests in fiscal year 2004. U.S. GOv'TACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-07-112, TAX ADMnISTRATION: LrrrLE EVIDENCE OF PROCEDURAL ERRORS INCOLLECnON
DUE PROCESS APPEAL CASES, BUT OPPORTUNITIES ExiST TO IMPROVE THE PROGRAM 28 (2006),
availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07l12.pdf [hereinafter GAO 2006 CDP STUDY].
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B. Tax Collection

Collecting tax is a process, not an event. The goal is to resolve unpaid liabilities,
either by collecting the full amount from those taxpayers who can pay (but do not want
to), or by agreeing to a collection alternative for those taxpayers who cannot
immediately pay in full.
At any point in the collection process, taxpayers can seek an alternative to
immediate full payment. The main alternatives are (1) installment agreements, where a
taxpayer fully pays the liability (and interest) over time; 32 (2) offers-in-compromise
(OICs), where the IRS forgives an agreed-upon percentage of the liability and the
taxpayer pays the compromised amount either at once or in installments; 33 and (3)
designation as "currently not collectible"(CNC). 34 This last alternative puts a hold on
most collection activity but leaves the assessment on the books.3 5 If later information
(such as a tax return showing increase in income) shows that the taxpayer has assets to
pay the liability, collection resumes. 36 If a taxpayer has no assets and no prospects, the
IRS writes off the account.
1. Tools of the Collection Trade
Understanding the collection process is easier once one understands the tools of the
trade, or at least two of them. The IRS has three great collection tools: the offset
power, 37the tax lien, and the levy. Since offset power does not trigger CDP, I will just
note it.

32. See I.R.C. § 6159 (2000).
33. See I.R.C. § 7122 (2000).
34. The statutory authority for CNC status derives from the abatement authority, see I.R.C.
§ 6404(c) (2000), which gives the IRS the discretion to abate account balances where "the
administration and collection costs involved would not warrant collection of the amount due."
Id. This language was added in 1954 to "codify the practice of a number ofyears adopted under
the general administrative authority of the Department." H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 412 (1954);
see also S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 581 (1954) (same language).
35. It stops liens and levies but does not keep the IRS from offsetting a future year's
overpayment against the prior year's underpayment. Under the former practice, collection
employees who did not believe a liability could be economically collected filled out a Form 53

to request an abatement of the assessment and to record the basis for their belief so they would
not be held personally responsible for the failure to collect that assessed tax. See Treas. Reg.
Art. 1303 (1926); Carlin v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 451, 454 (Ct. Cl. 1951); Kroyer v.

United States, 55 F.2d 495,496 (Ct. Cl. 1932); Sugar Run Coal Mining v. United States, 21 F.
Supp. 10, 11 (E.D. Pa. 1937). From the Form 53 procedure, the IRS has developed a collection
policy. See I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 5.16.1.1, availableat http://www.irs.gov/inn/
[hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL]. The IRS now accomplishes the same result by
inputting a computer Transaction Code 530, which simply puts a hold on the account. Id.
36. There are also other collection alternatives, such as bankruptcy, or discharging property
from the tax lien, see I.R.S. Chief Couns. Notice CC-2003-016 (May 29, 2003), available at
http://www.unclefed.com/ForTaxProfs/irs-ccdm/2003/cc-2003-016.pdf(reviewing options for

collection), but the three listed above are far and away the most common.
37. The authority to offset comes both from statutory and common law. See I.R.C. § 6402
(2000); United States v. Munsey Trust, 332 U.S. 234, 239 (1947). The offset tool is another
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The tax lien arises automatically under I.R.C. § 6321 once the IRS properly
assesses a liability, sends the taxpayer notice and demand for payment, and the
taxpayer fails to pay.38 Once it arises, it attaches-like virtual "Pay Me" sticky notes
dropping from the sky-on all property the taxpayer has or later acquires. 39 If there are
other liens on the property, the liens get paid off in order of their perfection-a "first in
time, first in right" rule-and for this purpose the tax lien is deemed to be perfected as
of the date the liability it relates to was assessed. 40
When it first arises, the tax lien is "secret" in that there is no public record of its
existence. In order to protect certain creditors, Congress long ago decided that,
although the tax lien may exist and be perfected on all property of the taxpayer as of
the assessment date, it cannot take priority against four types of competing creditorsknown as the "four horsemen"-until such time as the IRS makes it visible by properly
filing a Notice of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL).4 1Once revealed by the NFTL, the tax lien
is good against almost all comers (the few exceptions are listed in § 6323(b)) for the
jurisdiction in which it is filed. 42 For example, if a taxpayer takes out a home equity
loan and the bank properly files its security interest before the IRS files the NFTL, the
bank's lien takes priority over the tax lien.
The tax lien is often misunderstood. What confuses many folks is the relation
between the tax lien and the NFTL. There is only one tax lien, although there may be
multiple NFTLs, depending on how much property the taxpayer has and in what
locations. Even those involved in tax administration get confused. For example, a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report recently asserted that the "IRS
exercises this power when it files a federal tax lien against the property of a
example ofan aggregate collection decision. Taxpayers in financial straits may ask to bypass the
offset, but they must convince an individual employee to allow the refund to issue. See I.R.S.
Field Serv. Advice Mem. 200213012 (Mar. 29, 2002) (describing this system and its
limitations).

38. I.R.C. § 6321 (2000). This section does not specify a time after which a taxpayer has
failed to pay the tax for purposes of triggering the tax lien. However, another section gives the
taxpayer ten days to pay before "it shall be lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax... by

levy ..."I.R.C. § 6331 (2000). The penalty imposed for a failure to pay is triggered only after
twenty-one days from the notice and demand (ten days when the tax liability demanded equals
or exceeds $100,000). I.R.C. § 6651(a)(3) (2000). As a practical matter, since the tax lien is
retroactive to the date of assessment and since it takes much longer than twenty-one days before
the IRS reacts to an unpaid account, the exact time period is of little consequence.
39. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265,268-69 (1945) (holding that a federal
income tax lien attaches to later-acquired property).
40. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 87-88 (1953). "Perfected" means
that the lien identifies the lienor, the amount claimed, and the property subject to the lien. Id.at
84. The IRS wins a tie. See United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447, 453-55 (1993) (holding
that a federal tax lien gets priority over simultaneously attaching, competing liens).
41. The four horsemen are purchasers for value, mechanics lienors, holders of security
interests, and judgment lien creditors. See I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000). This rule protects, for
example, someone who would otherwise have paid full price for property encumbered by the tax
lien. See e.g.,
Middlesex Sav. Bank v. Johnson, 777 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Mass. 1991) (applying
the statutory lien rules to variety of competing creditors).
42. I.R.C. § 6323(b). The NFTL makes the lien visible against all personalty once the IRS
files it in the state of the taxpayer's principal residence or place of business. I.R.C. §
6323(f)(1)(A)(ii). But to make it visible for realty, the NFTL must be filed in the state or county
(depending on local laws) where the realty is located. § 6323(f)(1)(A)(i).
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taxpayer. 'A 3 That is wrong. The IRS does not "file a tax lien," and the NFTL cannot
attach to anything because the NFTL is not the lien. The NFTL just makes the lien
visible and, hence, good against the four horsemen. In short, the NFTL brings the tax
lien to light, not to life.
The third tool, levy, is also often misunderstood. Section 6331 defines this tool as
44
"the power of distraint and seizure by any means" to collect an unpaid tax liability.
This is what the term "levy" means: the power to take any property of the taxpayer to
satisfy a properly assessed and unpaid tax liability. 45 Section 6331 (d) requires the IRS
to give the taxpayer a general notice of its intent to use this tool at least thirty days
before making the first levy. 46 Historically, the purpose of that notice was to give the
taxpayer an opportunity to approach the IRS and resolve the account before the IRS
seized property. At no time did the notice tell the taxpayer exactly what property the
IRS planned to seize; it was just a shot across the bow, issued long before the IRS even
knew whether the taxpayer had any assets worth seizing.
A levy is often confused with a lien, but they are separate tools. First, the IRS must
act to attach a levy to specific property, whereas the lien attaches by operation of law.
Second, levies mostly operate only on existing property, whereas the tax lien attaches
to all future acquired property as well as existing property.47 Most importantly,

43. U.S.

GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,

GAO-05-26R,

OPPORTUNITIES To IMPROVE

1
(2005),
available
at
IRS
LIEN
RELEASES
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0526r.pdf. Even the Treasury's Acting Deputy Inspector
General for Audit made the same error. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN.,
REFERENCE No. 2004-30-086, FIscAL YEAR 2004 STATUTORY REVIEw OF COMPLIANCE WITH LIEN
at
(2004),
available
DUE
PROCESS
PROCEDURES
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2004reports/200430086fr.pdf ("[T]he IRS has the
authority to attach a claim to the taxpayer's assets, called an NFTL, for the amount of the unpaid
tax liability.").
44. I.R.C. § 6331(b) (2000).
45. For reasons unknown to me, the IRS gives the term "levy" a different meaning in its
internal guidance. The IRS distinguishes between a "levy" and a "seizure," whereas the Code
makes no such distinction. In Service jargon, a "seizure" is what is done to something that can
be sold, usually tangible realty or personalty, while a "levy" is done to something that cannot be
sold, generally intangible property such as payments due the taxpayer from a third party, or
money. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 35, at chs. 5.10,5.11 ("Seizure
TIMELINESS

OF

and Sale" & "Notice of Levy"). That distinction is not evident from the statute or from its
history, which the IRS admits. Id. at § 5.11.1.1.2 ("There is no legal distinction between levy
and seizure."). Note that the GAO interprets the distinction between "levy" and "seizure"
differently. It believes that the Service "differentiates between the levy of assets in the
possession of the taxpayer (referred to as 'seizure') and the levy of assets, such as bank accounts
and wages, which are in the possession of third parties, such as banks or employers (referred to

as a 'levy')." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-674, TAx ADMINISTRATION: IMPACT OF
COMPLIANCE AND COLLECTION PROGRAM DECLINES ON TAXPAYERS 6 n.5 (2002), availableat
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02604.pdf. The GAO gives no citation or reason for why it
believes that to be the Service's distinction and I do not think the GAO is correct, but the main
point is that the Code contains no distinction; the power to "levy" is the power to "seize."
46. I.R.C. § 6331(d)(2).
47. The only levy that operates continuously is a wage levy. See I.R.C. § 633 1(e). As to the
ability of the lien to attach to future acquired interests, see United States v. McDermott, 507
U.S. 447, 453 (1993).
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Congress has exempted certain types of property from levy, whereas the tax lien
attaches to all property. For example, while § 6334(a)(3) prevents the IRS from seizing
and selling the first $3,125 worth of books or tools, those items still have the virtual
"Pay Me" sticky note of the tax lien attached to them.
The two tools also operate independently. For example, the Service can levy
property owned by the taxpayer, even if the tax lien no longer attaches to that property
(such as when the IRS mistakenly releases the lien).49 Similarly, the lien alone supports
a levy, even if the property being seized is no longer owned by the taxpayer (such as
when the taxpayer deeds property to a family member or when a bank sets off a
checking account against a mortgage loan)f 0
2. The Bulk Processing Nature of Modem Tax Collection
The IRS employs its collection tools in a three-stage collection process to collect or
resolve some 5.5 million unpaid accounts each year.5' The three stages are: (1) the
Notice stage, (2) the Automated Collection System (ACS) stage, and (3) the Collection
Field Function (CFf) stage. To the extent that a delinquent account is not resolved at
one stage, it moves to the next. The first two stages are highly automated, relying
heavily on aggregate collection decisions applied to the vast majority of accounts. Not
until the CFf stage does any IRS employee go mano a mano with a delinquent
taxpayer. That is the only stage where a specific account is assigned to an individual
IRS employee (a Revenue Officer), who has significant latitude and discretion on how
to collect the amount owed. The third stage occurs some two or three years after the
assessment, and the delay in trying a "personal touch" has long been criticized as poor
collection practice. But it is a reasonable choice when the task is trying to collect
millions of unpaid accounts with only a few thousand employees. Computers come
cheap. Humans are costly. I shall describe each stage in turn, emphasizing both the
idea of bulk processing and the idea that the "collection tools" described above are
used as much to bring taxpayers into discussions as to collect dollars.

48. I.R.C. § 6334(a)(3) (2000); see Popky v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 2d 594,604 (E.D.
Pa. 2004) (holding that a tax lien remained attached to assets exempt from levy, so the
government could claim priority to sell proceeds once the assets were sold).
49. The Service is authorized to levy either"all property and rights to property (except such
property as is exempt under § 6334) belonging to such person or on which there is a lien
provided in this chapter .. ").I.R.C. § 6331 (a) (emphasis added).
50. See United States v. Bank of Celina, 721 F.2d 163, 168 (6th Cir. 1983).
51. 2006 DATA BOOK, supra note 9, at 41 tbl. 16.
52. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, I.R.S., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 232-42
(2004), available at http://ftp.irs.gov/irs-utl/ntafy2004annualreport.pdf [hereinafter 2004
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-94-2, TAX
ADMINISTRATION:

IRS

CAN

Do

MORE TO COLLECT TAXEs LABELED "CuRRENTLY NOT

COLLECrMLE" (1993) (critiquing the lack of a

"personal touch" collection practice).
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i. The Notice Stage
The Notice stage is worked out of centralized campuses (formerly known as
"Service Centers") and brings in over two-thirds of total dollars collected. 3 What
happens here is that computers automatically send out a series ofNotices and Demands
for Payment to taxpayers at their last known addresses.5 4 The automation cannot be
overemphasized. No human hand writes a line. No human tongue licks an envelope.
No human eye reviews an account beforehand. Most importantly, no human brain
makes any individualized decision about what notice to send.
The Notice stage is an excellent example of the distinction between aggregate and
individualized decision making. For example, § 6321 requires only one Notice and
Demand for payment before the tax lien arises, and § 6331(d) requires only a second
Notice (of Intent to Levy) before the Service may seize assets. Nonetheless, the IRS
has made the aggregate decision that for this class of taxpayers (those who have not
fully paid their assessed tax), additional demands for payment beyond those two
minima will often resolve the account. The computer sends non-business taxpayers
four notices and business taxpayers three notices, spaced five weeks apart. No
individual campus employee decides this for each account; it is an institutional
decision made for the bulk processing of accounts receivable.
On reflection, one might think the decision to send all notices to all taxpayers
makes little sense for some subgroups, and makes no sense at all for many individuals.
For example, taxpayers whose assessment is based on their return "as filed" know full
well that an unpaid tax liability exists. Heck, they reported it. Similarly, individual
taxpayers who lose their pre-assessment litigation in Tax Court have ample notice of
where the assessed amount of tax liability comes from. So while the first notice
perhaps serves the purpose of letting the taxpayer know that the IRS is now ready and
willing to receive the payment, it is difficult to think of any purpose served by
additional notices not required by statute (and it is difficult to think why the statute
should require multiple notices in such situations). But it does not matter; to make
individualized decisions about which taxpayers should get what notices would involve
the time and attention of human beings, which is very expensive. The cost of
identifying and exempting those subgroups and individual taxpayers from the Notice

53. Of the $40.8 billion collected in fiscal year 2006, $28.7 billion came from the Notice
stage. 2006 DATA BOOK, supra note 9, at 41 tbl.16.

54. While the Service has at times attempted to reach out with telephone calls rather than
rely on written notices, resource constraints have pretty much squelched this approach. See
TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE No. 2006-30-055, TRENDS IN
AcTIvrrIEs THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2005 23 (2006), available at
[hereinafter 2005
http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2006reports/200630055fr.pdf
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR

COMPLIANCE

TRENDS REPORT].

Recent attempts to farm out collections to private collection firms are one

response to this trend. See House Members' Letter to Everson Calls for Halt to IRS
PrivatizationPlans,TAX NOTES TODAY, July 21, 2006, availableat2006 TNT 140-30 (LExis)
(reprinting a July 19 letter to IRS Commissioner Mark Everson from a bipartisan group of
House members calling on the IRS to halt its plans to privatize debt collection); see also NAT'L
TAXPAYER ADvOCATE, I.R.S., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 34-62 (2007), availableat

http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article/0,,id=165806,00.html
ADvOCATE REPORT]

[hereinafter

2006

TAXPAYER

(describing the history and performance of privatized debt collection).
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process most likely outweighs the gains to the Treasury given the huge numbers of
taxpayers involved.
Another example is the decision on where to mail the notices. The Code generally
requires notices be sent to the taxpayer's "last known address."55 The operational
decision of what that means is an aggregate decision, reflected in Treasury Regulation
301.6212-2, which is written so that human intervention is not required to verify an
address for each of the 5.5 million or so accounts processed each year.56 Instead, the
address contained in the IRS's main data system is deemed the last known address,
even if a third party informs an IRS employee somewhere that the taxpayer has moved.
The only allowed third-party information is from the U.S. Post Office National Change
of Address database which IRS computers access once a week. 5 7 Even there, the
regulation provides that once a taxpayer sends in the Post Office form, the "last known
address" is still the address that is in the IRS database until such time as the
information transfer takes place between the agencies.
Make no mistake, the campuses are full of IRS employees. In fact, the goal of the
Notice process is to get the taxpayer to call into the campus and speak with a Customer
Service Representative (CSR) to resolve the account by paying it in full or by entering
into one of the main collection alternatives (installment agreements, OICs, or Currently
Not Collectible). 8 But just because an employee is involved does not mean that the
taxpayer receives individual attention. IRS employees "in" or "at" the campuses rely
heavily on the aggregate decisions reflected in the rules and instructions given to them
in that capacious compendium, the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM). The IRM
instructs employees how to process almost any situation they encounter and provides
rules for interacting with taxpayers and interfacing with the computers. IRS employees
on the campuses are much more bound by rules than are the IRS employees in the
field. As is typical in bureaucracies, discretion widens as an employee moves up the
hierarchy.
ii. The ACS Stage
If the taxpayer does not respond, or cannot resolve the account at the Notice stage,
the account moves to the Automated Collection System (ACS) stage.59 As its name

55. See Rev. Proc. 2001-18, 2001-8 I.R.B. 708 (listing the fifteen sections of the Internal
Revenue Code that require notices sent to the "last known address").
56. I use the term "accounts" or "accounts receivable." The IRS's technical term for this
concept is "tax module." Generally, a "tax module" is one type of tax liability for one tax
period. See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAx ADMIN., REFERENCE No. 2003-30-186,
SOME AUTOMATED COLLECTION SYSTEM BusiNEsS RESULTS HAVE RECENTLY IMPROVED, BUT

EMPHASIS
ON
NONFILERS
Is
NEEDED
22
(2003),
http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2003reports/200330186fr.pdf.
57. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6212-2(b) (2001).
MORE

available

at

58. The Service Center Collection Branch is where such employees work. They handle
contacts generated by both the Notice process and the ACS.
59. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 35, § 5.19.5.2 ("With some exceptions,
balance-due accounts and return delinquency investigations are issued to ACS at the conclusion
of normal service center notice routines. The exceptions... are listed in Exhibit 5.19.5-9.").
The decision to skip ACS and go directly to CFf is still an aggregate decision; although carried
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implies, ACS is also automated; it too operates from campuses. This is the stage where
the IRS first sends out levies and files NFTLs. 60 Again, I emphasize that this work is
done mainly by computer systems with little human intervention. Computers decide
which accounts get priority in processing. 6' Computers interact with other computers to
identify types and locations of taxpayer assets (such as employer name, bank accounts,
etc.), and computer algorithms determine the most likely levy sources.62 The CDP
Notices required by § 6320 and § 6330 (informing taxpayers of their rights to a
Collection Due Process hearing, which I explain below) are automatically issued by
computer on form letter LT 11, with no human intervention.63 It is the computer system
that prevents most levies until the statutory thirty days pass from the date of the CDP
Notice (with an extra fifteen days built in to allow time for taxpayer CDP requests to
be entered into the system). 64 For some levies, an IRS employee in the Collection
Branch reviews the information on a computer screen and decides how many levies to
send, but even then the employee exercises little discretion on what to do and engages
in little individualized decision making. 65 The decisions have been made beforehand,
in the aggregate. Levies exempt from CDP, such as those to states (to grab state tax
out by humans, it does not result from an individualized determination but instead from rules
about how to treat classes of accounts. See id. at §§ 5.1.1.13, 5.19.5.3.1.
60. NFTL, once again, stands for "Notice of Federal Tax Lien" (emphasis added). It is not
the lien. Somewhat confusingly, the IRS uses a "Notice of Levy" to perform the levy on
intangible items such as bank accounts. That document is the levy. See supratext accompanying
notes 41-43; see also TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAx ADMIN., REFERENCE No. 2004-30094, ADDITIONAL EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE TAXPAYER RIGHTS ARE PROTECTED WHEN
at
available
2-5
(2004),
ISSUED
LEVIES
ARE
MANUAL
http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2004reports/200430094fr.pdf (explaining the difference
between automated and manual levies).
61. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE No. 2004-30-165, THE
NEW RISK-BASED COLLECTION INITIATIVE HAS THE POTENTIAL TO INCREASE REVENUE AND

IMPROVE FUTURE COLLECTION DESIGN ENHANCEMENTS, 1-2 (2004), available at
http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2004reports/200430165fr.pdf (describing a computer
system that "use[s] predictive models to characterize accounts according to the probability of
productive or unproductive closure, for routing to the most effective treatment area").
62. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 35, § 5.19.4.3.5 ("Levy Sources and ACS
Display").

63. See id. at § 5.19.4.3.1 ("Pre-Levy Requirements").
64. Some levies are not subject to the CDP restrictions, notably those seeking to seize state
income tax refunds. Such exempt levies sail right through the system with no check. See
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 35, § 5.19.4.3.3 ("Levy Routing and Duties"). In 2004,
the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) found the computerized
systematic levy process was better than humans at complying with the thirty day CDP wait
period. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 61, at 2-5. By 2006,
TIGTA found both error-free. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCENo.
2006-30-101, FISCAL YEAR 2006 STATUTORY REVIEw OF COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL GUIDELINES
at
available
(2006),
3-4
LEVIES
WHEN
ISSUING
http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2006reports/200630 101 fr.pdf.

65. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 35, § 5.19.1 (explaining
employee procedures for levies). Along these lines, note that the ACS process does not generate
paper files. All data are kept in electronic format which is then picked up by the Integrated

Collection System if the account is transferred to the field. Id. (giving instructions for the virtual
"Desktop Integration" system).
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refunds), are completely automatic, running on weekly or monthly database matches
between the IRS and the state or federal levy source.66
The point of the ACS levies is not so much to collect dollars as to get taxpayers to
call into the campus and resolve the account.67 Oftentimes, taxpayers who do not
respond to notices may well respond if a levy hits, say, their paycheck or goes to a
third party they would prefer not know about their tax troubles. Although § 7602
authorizes the IRS to gather information by using summonses, the process would be far
more efficient by whacking the taxpayer over the head hard enough to prompt contact
in order to resolve the account.
The raw numbers give one a feel for the bulk nature of the ACS collection process.
In fiscal year 1997, the last full year before Congress enacted the CDP requirements,
ACS sent out over 2.9 million levies, which brought in $2.296 billion.68 By fiscal year
2000, due in large part to the impact of the CDP requirements, ACS sent out only
144,000 levies, but still collected almost $1.159 billion. 69 That is, ACS collected over
fifty percent of the dollars using only five percent of the levies. By fiscal year 2005,
ACS levies almost returned to their former levels of 2.535 million, bringing in $1.9
billion.70
These numbers also suggest something else. Most levies shooting out of ACS are
blanks. They don't hit anything. That does not mean, however, that they are useless.
What they do accomplish is to help taxpayers realize the need to address the tax
delinquency in a way that a simple letter cannot.
iii. The Field Stage
Accounts not resolved through the Notice or ACS processes are assigned by
computer to Revenue Officers (RO) in the field (the CFf), using the Integrated
Collection System (ICS), another computer system. Again, since each RO can only
handle so many accounts, accounts are assigned priority using a pre-determined
algorithm, once again representing an aggregate decision. Therefore, only some get
assigned while the others wait their turn in what is called "the queue." Some wait so

66. See I.R.C. § 6330(f) (2000); see also INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 35, §
5.19.9 ("Automated Levy Programs").
67. There is a robust debate within the IRS on whether this use of ACS is the best
collection policy. The National Taxpayer Advocate has tirelessly advocated for more use of
active IRS employee outreach at the ACS stage rather than passive dependence on taxpayers
calling in to resolve their accounts. See, e.g., 2006 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note
54, at 62-82. The merits of that debate are beyond the scope of this Article, and the IRS
management has indicated that it has no intent to modify ACS operations. Id. at 75-77. In fact,
the IRS is creating even more bulk processing algorithms to "use internal and external data on
taxpayer characteristics to better match taxpayers to the treatment stream that will most likely
result in meaningful contact and timely resolution of the case." Id. at 76. Accordingly, this
Article focuses on how ACS is used now and in the foreseeable future and not on how it might
be used in a more perfect world.
68. 2005 TRENDs REPORT, supra note 54, at 25, 29.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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long that they get timed out and written Off.7 1 Here, although ROs use the ICS to
generate levies and NFTLs, they also generate them manually as they engage in the
more traditional methods of searching for delinquent taxpayers and their assets through
old-fashioned legwork. And it is only here, in the field, the final collection stage, that
an IRS employee works each case individually in the stereotypical way most people
think of when they think of tax collection: a face-to-face encounter with a Revenue
Officer.
3. Of Can't-Pays and Won't-Pays
The conceptual context of collection is classification. Taxpayers must be sorted into
the correct "box" for appropriate treatment: "can't-pays" or "wont-pays."
Operationally, classification decisions are made any time a taxpayer seeks one of the
collection alternatives. That can happen at any stage-either in response to a notice, a
levy, or a RO banging on the door. The IRS decision about the collection alternative is
what classifies the taxpayer as a won't-pay or can't-pay. Thus, the operational rules for
deciding who is entitled to an installment payment, who is entitled to compromise their
liability, or who should be designated as "currently not collectible" are all rules about
who will be determined to be a can't-pay at a particular point in time. For example,
when a taxpayer seeks an Offer In Compromise (OIC), the taxpayer has to submit over
fifty pages of forms in the OIC Form 656 application package.72 The forms ask for
detailed personal financial information, and the IRS employee processing the forms
uses the information to verify the taxpayer's claimed lack of assets through third
parties.73
Not all classification decisions are individualized. Some are aggregate decisions.
For example, to evaluate an OIC, an IRS employee must determine the taxpayer's
ability to pay, which requires a decision about what living expenses to allow as
necessary.74 The IRS has developed national and local tables of allowable expenses,
and while the regulations provide that a taxpayer's allowable living expenses should be
an individualized determination, the IRM directs employees to use the tables in some
cases as a cap, and in other cases as a presumption.75 Congress also makes aggregate

71. See id. at 26 (showing that 788,083 delinquent accounts were removed from the queue
inventory in fiscal year 2005).
72. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE,

GAO-06-525, IRS OFFERS INCOMPROMISE:

PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN MIXED; BETTER MANAGEMENT INFORMATION AND SIMPLIFICATION

COULD

IMPROVE

THE

PROGRAM

8

(2006),

available

at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06525.pdf [hereinafter GAO OIC STUDY].

73. See generally id. at 8-11 (describing the OIC process).
74. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 35, § 5.8.8.
75. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 35, § 5.19.1.6 ("Analyze
Taxpayer's Ability to Pay"). The National Taxpayer Advocate discusses this point in detail in
her 2005 Annual Report. See 1 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, I.R.S., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS

271-81

(2005),

http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article/0,,id=152735,00.html

available

[hereinafter

2005

at

TAXPAYER

ADVOCATE REPORT]. As an empirical matter, how often (if at all) IRS employees deviate from

the national and local tables is not clear--the National Taxpayer Advocate says they rarely do,
and the IRS response disagrees. See id. at 281-86. What is clear, however, is that the tax
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decisions. Section 6159(c) requires the IRS to accept installment agreements from all
taxpayers whose liability is less than $10,000.76
Procedurally, all taxpayers start out in the won't-pay box. This is because the IRS
does not know why a taxpayer has not paid the tax. The taxpayer knows. And the
aggregate decision is to keep taxpayers in the won't-pay box until an individualized
decision is made otherwise. That is why I emphasize that the collection process is not
just about collecting money, but is also in large part about collecting information
necessary to make the classification. Taxpayers remain under the legal obligation to
pay the assessed amount unless and until they convince an IRS employee at some stage
that they truly cannot pay, within the policy's guidance as to what that means. Until
they do, the IRS pursues their assets. The won't pay presumption is proper not just
because citizens have the legal duty to report their financial transactions to the
government and to pay the appropriate tax, but also because it places the information
77
burden on the party who has best access to the relevant information.
Proper classification is a dynamic process. Taxpayers may make multiple attempts
to seek classification as a can't-pay. For example, in fiscal year 2005, almost forty
percent of taxpayer OIC submissions were repeat attempts. 78 Taxpayers who are
judged won't-pays at one stage might later be judged can't-pays as their facts and
circumstances change or as they are reviewed by different decision makers or
subjected to different rules. I cannot overstate the dynamic nature of the classification
decision. Taxpayers have multiple opportunities to present information to various
components of the IRS. Since each collection stage involves different IRS employees,
this means that even with the same information, different decision makers may come to
different conclusions about a taxpayer. For example, while one component of the IRS
might reject a taxpayer's OIC because the review process leads to a prediction that the
taxpayer can pay more than is offered, that prediction may prove to be false and
nothing further is ever collected from the taxpayer. 79 Similarly, as time goes on, a
taxpayer's circumstance changes, which can change his or her classification in either
direction. For example, in a recent study, the GAO noted that between 1998 and 2003,
about fifteen percent of taxpayer accounts where an OIC was rejected was later
practitioner community widely believes that the aggregate decision that the tables represent is
rarely modified on an individual basis. Id.
76. The IRS has operationalized this requirement. See INTERNALREVENUEMANuAL.supra
note 35, § 5.14.5.3. As is usual, practical bulk processing reasons have led the IRS to go beyond
the statutory requirements in that it will accept an installment agreement even if the taxpayer can
fully pay the tax immediately. Id. This saves the IRS employees from having to make an
additional determination of the taxpayer's ability to pay immediately.
77. The National Taxpayer Advocate, for one, suggests that a better tax collection policy
would put all taxpayers in the can't-pay box as a start, for the common sense reason that most
taxpayers, in fact, want to pay their taxes and only a small minority seeks to avoid its civic
responsibilities. See 2006 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 54, at 74-75. The

operational difficulty with this approach, however, is the information asymmetry between the
individual taxpayer and the IRS. See generally Camp, supra note 2, at 5-17.
78. See GAO OIC STUDY, supra note 72, at 13 fig.2.
79. See 2004 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 311. The IRS collected

nothing from thirty-seven percent of those OICs that were rejected as too low an offer or for
lack of information to make a reasonable collection potential classification. Id. The National
Taxpayer Advocate did not break out what part of the thirty-seven percent was due to what
cause.
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deemed Currently Not Collectible.80 And the Currently Not Collectible decision itself
is often made for taxpayers who have little current liquidity but large equities in their
primary residences and future income from retirement accounts. 81
One can conceptualize all collection activity as classification. A look at the overall
statistics on IRS inventory management illustrates the point. The Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) Trends in ComplianceActivities report for
fiscal year 2005 (issued March 2006) says that over 5.373 million8 2 delinquent
collection accounts were closed at some stage during the collection process. Of that
number, 1.424 million were closed by full payment, with 186,000 during the Notice
stage, 848,000 during the ACS stage, and 391,000 during the CFf stage.8 3 By
definition, these accounts represent the won't-pays because they eventually proved to
have the resources to fully pay the amount owed. Another 788,000 were simply written
off the books while waiting in the queue to be worked in the field, generally because of
the account's small amount, the taxpayer's increasing age, and lack of taxpayer
information on the account. 84 That leaves 3.161 million accounts closed by one of the
collection alternatives. 85 Those are taxpayers who, for whatever reason, were adjudged
by the agency, at some point in time, to be can't-pays. Unfortunately, neither the GAO
nor TIGTA have produced any statistics showing how many accounts shake out as
can't-pays during each of the stages, but it is certain that there is some distribution
among the three stages just as there is a distribution of liabilities fully paid.86
Proper classification is difficult, even with enough information. A moment's
reflection will suffice to realize that the definitions of won't-pay and can't-pay are
highly operational and contingent on tax administration policy. While simple at the
extremes, classification is difficult in the majority of cases. At one extreme are those in
tax protestor communities, whether religious or political. They have the money but
refuse to acknowledge the government's right to it, for reasons either godly or godawful. At the other extreme are the true turnips who have nothing now and never will.
In between are the vast majority of taxpayers who do not have quite enough assets
right now to fully pay alltheir tax and nontax obligations. Their cry of can't-pay pain
merely means they prefer to pay competing creditors or that competing creditors
presented a more compelling reason to get paid first. Think Tony Soprano.
Determining whether that preference qualifies for can't-pay treatment is central to the

80. See GAO OIC STUDY, supra note 72, at 25 tbl.7.
81. See IrERNAL REvEN E MANAL, supra note 35, § 5.16.1.6 ("Mandatory Follow-Up").
82. The sum of the three values within the Trends in Compliance Activities bar chart is
5.373 million.
83. 2005 TRENDS REPORT, supra note 54, at 28 tbl. 15.
84. Id. at 26 tbl. 11.
85. The subtraction of the won't-pays' 1.424 million accounts paid in full and the 788,000
accounts written off the books from 5.373 million is 3.161 million.
86. It is also unfortunate that the statistics tend to be reported as "accounts" rather than
"taxpayers." A taxpayer may owe multiple tax liabilities (either different kinds of taxes for the
same tax period, most usually employment and income, or the same kind of tax for multiple tax
periods). So reporting by "accounts" obscures just how many taxpayers we are talking about.
This is one of the flaws of CDP review discussed below.
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task of knowing whether to accept or reject the installment agreement or the OIC or to
shunt the taxpayer into the Currently Not Collectible bin.
Proper classification thus depends in large part on policy. Which competing
creditors should the government yield to: landlords, ex-spouses, or private lenders?
How many assets should a taxpayer be allowed to keep to meet competing obligations?
When is a taxpayer's situation so precarious that his or her tax obligations should be
modified or forgiven? These are all matters of policy. Some policies are set by
Congress. For example, § 6334 lists assets exempt from levy-such as that $3,125
worth of books and tools mentioned earlier-and can be viewed as reflecting a
congressional decision to allow taxpayers to prefer certain competing obligations over
their tax obligations. Section 6334 also exempts a minimum portion87of wage income,
as well as such income necessary to make child support payments.
The Treasury and the IRS make most policy calls on who goes into the can't-pay
box. In fact, Congress will sometimes explicitly decline to make a policy call in a
statute in order to give the agency operational flexibility. For example, in the massive
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 ("RRA 98"),
Congress wanted the IRS to expand the definition of can't-pays used to determine who
should get their tax liabilities compromised. 88 But, it did not express the idea in the
resultant statute.89 Instead, Congress "expressed a mood."90 The Conference
Committee report instructs the IRS to create a new category of persons eligible to
compromise their liabilities: those whose classification as can't-pay (through the act of
compromising the liability) would "promote effective tax administration" because of
"factors such as equity, hardship, and public policy." 91 In other words, rather than draw
a bright line, Congress decided to "draw the right line" between
can't-pays and won't92
pays. It left the policy decision to the IRS and Treasury.
The IRS has every incentive to make the right decision. Chronic misclassification
has the potential to undermine voluntary tax compliance, the foundation of our system.
On the one hand, if the definition of can't-pay is too narrow, then the IRS pursues
taxpayers who truly cannot pay. Not only does that waste resources but it also makes

87. See I.R.C. § 6334 (2000).
88. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, § 3462, 112 Stat. 685, 764-66 (1998).
89. See I.R.C. § 7122 (2000).
90. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
91. H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 289 (1998). The idea ended up in the Conference Report, and
not in the statute, thanks in part to the negotiating skills of the lead Treasury Department
representative, Chris Rizek. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss how this introduction
of equity norms into tax administration is at odds with the traditional "turn-square-comers"
approach of administrative law in general and tax administration in particular. Suffice to say that
a similar shift occurs in many other "equitable" provisions such as those covering Taxpayer
Assistance Orders and Spousal Relief. Some of the provisions work well, others do not. But all
of them undercut the traditional idea of a "true" tax liability in favor of a more flexible approach
where-like much else in current postmodern life where the contingency of truth is, ironically,
itself an accepted truth-tax liabilities are treated more as simply another item up for
negotiation and less as a civic responsibility. One might want to debate the wisdom of that
move; no one in Congress ever did.
92. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1 (b)(3) (2002). But see GAO OIC STUDY, supranote 72, at
35-38 (critiquing implementation of the "effective tax administration" concept).
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the IRS look hard and mean, thereby undermining confidence in government and
leaving the citizenry-and ultimately democracy-vulnerable to charlatans and
demagogues. On the other hand, if the definition is too broad, the IRS looks like a
chump, and those who have paid their taxes wonder why the hammer never falls on
similarly situated taxpayers who shirked their responsibility. Error in either direction
weakens voluntary compliance, which depends in no small measure on perception.93
By definition, misclassification results in mistreatment. To treat people "right," one
must first make a judgment about what kind of people they are. The allegations in the
sensationalist congressional hearings into IRS "abuse" in 1997 and 1998 were all about
mistreatment and, hence, about misclassification. 94 The IRS was allegedly treating
taxpayers wrongly because it was either trying to collect taxes not really owed or else it
was brutishly depriving taxpayers of the very assets they needed to survive. In other
words, it was treating can't-pays as won't-pays.

II. THE PROMISE OF CDP
"I think we are all concerned about stories that we hear every day from our
constituents about how they are being abused.... I havefollowed enough cases in my
State through the whole process to reach the conclusion that... there are people who
use the power to intimidate that obviously working for the IRS gives the ability to
do. ,95

Recall the power of an assessment. Until 1998, once the IRS assessed a tax, the
Anti-Injunction Act made it well nigh impossible for taxpayers to complain in court
about any decisions-liability or collection-until after the liability had been fully
paid. 96 The existence of an assessment allowed the IRS to call the collection tune, and
full payment was the price to stop the music and obtain judicial review.
In 1997 and 1998, Senators William Roth and Charles Grassley orchestrated a
series of hearings to highlight what they perceived as problems in tax collections.9 7 The
hearings were full of collection horror stories. Witness after witness complained that
IRS employees were taking unwarranted enforcement actions for illegitimate reasons.
The focus of the hearings was in large part on how, due to perverse incentives,
individual IRS employees took overly aggressive and inappropriate enforcement
action. The perception of the lawmakers was that the IRS had too many bad apples and

93. See generally Leandra Lederman, The InterplayBetween Norms andEnforcement in
Tax Compliance, 64 OHio ST. L.J. 1453 (2003).

94. For an extensive description, see Camp, supra note 2, at 78-91.
95. Practices and Procedures of the InternalRevenue Service: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 16 (1997) (opening statement of Sen. Phil Gramm).
96. Courts were very reluctant to find exceptions outside those listed inthe statute itself.
See Enochs v. Williams Packing &Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1962).
97. The three most important sets of hearings were: (1) IRS Oversight:HearingBefore the
S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Hearing on IRS Oversight]; (2) IRS
Restructuring: Hearing on H.R. 2676 Before S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. (1998)
[hereinafter Hearing on IRS Restructuring];and (3) Practicesand Proceduresof the Internal
Revenue Service: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Finance,105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter
Hearing on Practicesand Procedures].
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needed oversight. The opening statements of the various committee
members
98
demonstrated this understandable focus on people abusing others.
99
The hearings did an excellent job of creating distrust towards the tax bureaucracy.
The clamor for adversarial process was loud: "See, the problem that you have is that
you have got an internal conflict of interest within the IRS. They are their own judge
and jury over people's lives. Let us remove that. This will cure the 'Ivory Soap's'
worth of taxpayer abuse."' t Senator Gramm summed up the prevailing view among
the lawmakers: "[T]his agency has too much unchecked power. An agency in a free
society should never have the ability to investigate, evaluate, and basically prosecute,
all wrapped up into one... With the Internal Revenue
Service, you have no external
01
checks, and I think, basically, that is the problem."'
In response to the dust and noise, Congress created CDP, an adversarial process, to
be Senator Gramm's "external check" and enacted it as part 1of the Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 ("RRA 98"). 02
A. As Proposed.-The Senate Version
The promise of CDP was to correct IRS misclassifications ultimately through the
adversarial process in court. 0 3 The proposal, made by the Senate Finance Committee
and adopted by the full Senate (there was no comparable version in the House bill),
was a very strong move towards judicial review. The Senate proposal would have
required the IRS to give taxpayers thirty days notice before each levy or NFTL. During
that time, taxpayers could ask the IRS for an administrative hearing, and if they did not
like the result, they could ask forjudicial review of eachparticularcollection decision.
Further, the Senate proposal would have allowed taxpayers not only to challenge the
proposed collection decision at the hearing but also to raise any issue, including a
challenge to the liability determination reflected by the assessment. Taxpayers would
then have thirty days to appeal to a court from an adverse decision. Meanwhile, the

98. See Hearing on IRS Oversight, supra note 97, at 6 (statement of Sen. Charles E.
Grassley).
This week we will hear testimony about horrors caused by IRS agents .... This
does not mean that all IRS employees are bad .... At this moment, these hearings
are about these people and the horrendous acts that have taken place. But in the
bigger picture they are proof that more oversight and more diligent oversight is
vital.
Id.
99. For a fuller analysis, see Camp, supranote 2, at 80-87. For the purposes of this paper, I
highlight only how both the proposed CDP statutes and the enacted CDP statutes rest on an
assumption of individualized abuse.
100. Hearing on Practices and Procedures,supra note 97, at 58 (testimony of attorney
Robert Schriebman, Adjunct Professor of Tax Practice & Procedure, University of Southern
California Graduate School of Accounting).
101. Hearingon IRS Oversight,supra note 97, at 210-11 (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm).
102. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, §§ 4001-02, 112 Stat. 685, 783-84 (1998).
103. For the following description about the Senate proposal, see S. REP. No. 105-174, at
67-68 (1998); see also Montgomery v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 1, 13-17 (2004) (Laro, J. & Gale, J.,
concurring). See generally Camp, supra note 2, at 119-28.
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IRS would be barred from taking the proposed action. While the IRS could propose
another levy or another NFTL, the taxpayer would then be entitled to a separate
"kitchen sink" hearing to raise any issue whether related to liability or collection, and
then take a separate court appeal. While there were issue preclusion rules, there were
no claim preclusion rules. If the taxpayer could think up new arguments (or just string
them out), then the taxpayer could present them at the next court review.
The Senate proposal was a logical response to the "problem" of individual IRS
employees being out of control or being given perverse incentives, like quotas, to do
their work. By providing for judicial review of each levy or NFTL action, the
assumption here was that the IRS made individualized decisions about all liens and
levies. The Senate taxwriters operated from a vision of tax administration as
individualized decision making.
The Senate proposal was also a logical response to the "problem" of collecting tax
liabilities not truly owed by taxpayers. By allowing court review of the liability
decision represented by the assessment, the proposal would have eviscerated the
historic pay-first rule and the Anti-Injunction Act and reduced the legal effect of the
assessment to almost a nullity. The taxwriters did not appear to understand how the
deficiency procedures interacted with the Anti-Injunction Act or how most accounts
receivable were based on self-reported liabilities.
Even taken on its own terms, the Senate proposal had some problems. Pre-notice for
each NFTL would allow taxpayers to extract equity from their real estate by obtaining
a secured loan (recall that the bank would become one of the "four horsemen"
protected from the tax lien'4). Pre-notice of each levy would allow taxpayers to switch
banks and re-title assets. The thirty-day period to contest a proposed NFTL or levy
would essentially become a thirty-day period to hide, move, or encumber assets.
Further, court review for each levy would result in huge delays as taxpayers took
advantage of multiple bites at the judicial review apple. Although these concerns
carried no weight in the Senate, the Treasury did have more success with the
Conference Committee, which revised the Senate's proposal into the legislation
eventually enacted.10 5
B. As Enacted: Conference Committee Modifications
The Conference Committee weakened the Senate's strong move to judicial review
in two ways. First, rather than allowing taxpayers to contest each and every collection
action and the merits of liabilities in all situations, the Conference Committee revised
the language to allow for only two CDP hearings: one after the first NFTL and one
before the first levy. 1°6 This meant that the IRS would not have to defend each
proposed levy as a separate individualized decision. Moreover, it would not have to
identify any particular asset it proposed to levy. While that solved the Service's
problem of taxpayers moving assets, it created a significant problem for taxpayers:
how to argue against an abstract decision to levy. Instead of protesting a particularized

104. See supra text accompanying note 41.
105. For a public example of the administration's lobbying, see CBO Revenue Estimates of
IRS BillReform, TAX NoTEs TODAY, May 6, 1998, availableat 98 TNT 87-17 (LExis). That was
just the tip of the lobbying iceberg.
106. H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 263-67. (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
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decision to levy a particular asset-a car, for example-a taxpayer was now forced to
protest the aggregate decision to levy any item of property.
Second, the Conference Committee limited taxpayers' ability to contest liability
decisions. 01 7 Taxpayers could now only protest the liability if they did not actually
receive a notice of deficiency or if they "did not otherwise have an opportunity to
dispute the liability."' 08 The Conference Committee Report explained the statutory
language: "[T]he validity of the tax liability can be challenged only ifthe taxpayer did
not actually receive the statutory notice of deficiency or has not otherwise had an
opportunity to dispute the liability."' 9 The "not otherwise have an opportunity"
language was intended to prevent taxpayers under audit from ducking their chance for
Tax Court pre-payment review by agreeing to the examination report prior to the
issuance of a Notice of Deficiency, consenting to immediate assessment on a Form
870, and then later claiming they had0no entitlement to Tax Court review because there
had been no Notice of Deficiency."I
C. As Implemented: How CDP Works
CDP applies to levy actions and to NFTLs. The CDP provisions regarding levies
are in § 6330. The CDP provisions for NFTLs are in § 6320, but because that statute
basically piggybacks on § 6330, the following discussion cites generally only to §
6330."' CDP has four main components: (1) notice; (2) administrative hearing; (3)
judicial review; and (4) post-determination review. I will discuss each in turn, showing
how the IRS has adapted the CDP requirements to its bulk processing collection
environment.
1. CDP Notice
The IRS must give taxpayers up to two notices of their right to a CDP hearing for
each separate tax liability sought to be collected. Section 6330(a)(1) requires a CDP
notice before the first time the IRS attempts to exercise its levy powers. Section
6320(a)(2) requires notice within five days after the IRS files any NFTL and requires a
CDP notice after thefirst NFTL. Both statutes give taxpayers thirty days from the date
the notice is sent, not received, to request an administrative hearing (the CDP
hearing). 12 While the statutes allow the CDP notice to be delivered to the taxpayer in
person or left at the taxpayer's house, the most important mode of service is "by

107. See id.
108. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B) (2000).
109. H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 265 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).
110. See generally Pomerantz v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 628, 629 (2005) (Involving a
taxpayer that "did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability" when properly
sent a Notice of Deficiency but the taxpayer's attorney chose to waive taxpayer's rights to
contest the deficiency in Tax Court by signing a Form 4549). For one startling example of the
taxwriter's misunderstanding of the deficiency process, see Camp, supra note 2, at 114-17.
111. For the corresponding regulations, see Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6320-1, 301.6330-1 (both as
amended in 2006).
112. See §§ 6320(a)(3)(B), 6330(a)(3)(B) (2000).
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certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to [the taxpayer's] last known
address."' 13

As implemented, the IRS sends approximately eighty-four percent of all CDP
notices automatically out of ACS." 4 The computers automatically spit out form letter
LT 11 with no human intervention." 5 The unfortunate requirement that the notices be
sent "return receipt requested" invariably fools a certain percentage of taxpayers into
thinking that they must sign for the notice to make it valid.1 6 They deliberately avoid
receipt and gleefully think they have beaten the system. Sadly, the information that
tells them they have not comes in the very package they refused. Even taxpayers who
take delivery can never, by definition, get thirty days from the sent date to respond.
The statute requires a substantial amount of information to be included with the
CDP notice, including what tax liability is being collected, how much is owed on it,
what the proposed action is, a "brief statement" explaining the entire law of seizures
and sales (including redemption rights), how the taxpayer can appeal, and what
collection alternatives the taxpayer can propose." 7 As implemented, the IRS not only
sends the one-page notice (usually in the form of ACS pattern letter LT 11) and the
two-page Form 12153 (Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing), but it also
includes two IRS Publications, the twelve-page Pub. 594 (Understanding the
118
Collection Process) and the four-page Pub. 1660 (Collection Appeal Rights).
CDP notices at once, so as to
Whenever possible, the IRS sends out both required
9
consolidate the potential two hearings into one."

113. § 6330(a)(2)(C).
114. For fiscal year 2004, the only year for which statistics are available, ninety-four percent
of levy CDP notices and eighty-four percent of all CDP notices issued from ACS. See 2005
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 459.
115. See INTERNAL REVENuE MANUAL, supra note 35, § 5.18.4.3.4 ("Pre-Levy
Requirements"). Until January 19, 1999, these notices were sent during the Notice stage, but
they are now sent during the ACS stage. This theoretically allows IRS employees to call
taxpayers first, although resource constraints since 1998 have prevented such proactive
measures in practice. See 2004 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 232-43
(critiquing the failure of telephone outreach).
116. The phenomenon was documented in an internal IRS study of Notices of Deficiency,
which are sent certified or registered and without a return receipt. No other statute requires
return receipts on such high volume notices. The National Taxpayer Advocate has
recommended dropping this requirement. 2005 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 75, at
462. It was quite a trick for the IRS to build machines that could attach the little green Post
Office return receipt cards without using human labor.
117. See § 6330(a)(3)(C).
118. See § 6320(b)(4); Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(d) (as amended in 2006). Though the
statutes do not directly discuss the implementation process, these forms are used commonly in
practice.
119. See § 6320(b)(4); Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2006) (questions two
and three and the corresponding answers).

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 84:57

2. CDP Hearings and Equivalent Hearings
"CDP hearings" are for taxpayers who make timely, written requests in response to
the CDP notices. 120 They get the administrative hearing provided for by statute.' 2' The
hearing must be conducted by an "impartial officer" from the IRS Office of Appeals,
an independent function operating within the IRS bureaucracy.' 22 At the hearing, §
6330(c) directs the hearing officer-called the Settlement Officer ("SO"), usually an
experienced former collection field employee-to do three tasks: (1) verify the legality
of the liability and proposed action; (2) consider any appropriate taxpayer argument;
and (3) "balance the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate
concern of123the person that any collection action be no more intrusive than
necessary."'

To accomplish these tasks, CDP requests are assigned to a SO who then sends the
taxpayer a letter inviting direct contact and asking for the information the SO needs to
perform the three tasks.124 The SO then issues a decision document called the Notice of
Determination (note the parallel nomenclature to "Notice of Deficiency"), which is the
taxpayer's "ticket" to judicial review.
"Equivalent Hearings" are for taxpayers who fail to make timely, written requests
for a CDP hearing. The IRS bound itself in its regulations to give taxpayers the same
process as given in CDP hearings and requires SOs to perform the same three tasks:
verify the liability, consider issues raised by the taxpayer, and perform the same

120. Although the statute does not require the request be in writing, the IRS put that in the
regulation. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(a) (as amended in 2006).
121. However, § 6330(g) does allow the IRS to disregard "any portion of a request for a
hearing" that meets the definition of "specified frivolous submission" per § 6702(b)(2)(A).
I.R.C. §§ 6330(g), 6702(b)(2)(A) (2000). Congress added this provision in an attempt to cut
down on the volume of won't-pays who were attempting to use CDP proceedings to delay
collection. See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 6702, 120 Stat.
2922, 2960-62. The provision requires the IRS to publish a list of positions it deems frivolous.
The IRS published the first list in Notice 2007-30. See I.R.S. Notice 2007-30,2007-1 C.B. 883.
Thus, this provision came into force after the period examined within this Article.
122. See I.R.C. § 6330(b) (2000) (requiring that "[t]he hearing under this subsection shall be
conducted by an officer or employee who has had no prior involvement with respect to the
unpaid tax .... ). Although the statute is silent on the Office of Appeals and its role within the
IRS, this statute refers to the Office of Appeals indirectly because the statute is for the appealing
party, which works directly with the Office of Appeals. See INTERAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra
note 35, § 1.17.
123. Section 6330(c) requires the appeals employee to "obtain verification ... that the
requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met" and allows the
taxpayer to raise "any relevant issue," either about the proposed collection action (levy or
NFTL), or about the underlying tax liability. But a taxpayer may only challenge the underlying
liability the taxpayer shows that he or she "did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for
such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability."
124. Cf Carlton M. Smith, Does the Failureto Appoint CollectionDue Process Hearing
Officers Violate the Constitution'sAppointments Clause? 8 (Cardozo Legal Studies, Research

Paper No. 245, 2008) (describing system used to issue notices of determination).
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balancing analysis. 25 The critical difference is that the taxpayer is not entitled to
judicial review of Equivalent Hearings. This difference is reflected in the decision
document's title. A CDP hearing results in a Notice of Determination, which is another
"ticket to the Tax Court" like a Notice of Deficiency. But an equivalent hearing results
in a document titled "Decision Letter." It is a ticket to nowhere.
In implementing the statute, the IRS has transformed the meaning of "hearing" into
something completely different from what was contemplated by Congress. Congress
assumed that the "hearing" would be a discrete event.12 6 But the IRS has stretched that
concept to a degree that obliterates the adversarial concept of a "hearing" as a single
point in time where all the parties come together to hash out all the issues at once. In its
place, the IRS has created an inquisitorial hearing process. This transformation can be
seen in multiple ways.
First, CDP hearings need not be conducted in person and need not be a single event,
but may instead be a series of telephonic or written correspondence taking place over
time. 27 Even if a taxpayer requests an in-person hearing, the Appeals Officer can8
refuse the request if, in his or her judgment, there is nothing to have a hearing about.12
There is no requirement that the SO tell the taxpayer what the hearing will consist

125. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(i)(2), Q & A 12(2006) ("[The Office of] Appeals will
consider the same issues that it would have considered at a CDP hearing on the same matter.").
See generally I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-016 (May 23, 2003), available at
http://www.unclefed.com/ForTaxProfs/irs-ccdm/2003/cc-2003-016.pdf(addressing Collection
Due Process cases). The regulation follows up on the strong hint made by Congress in the
Conference Report. See H.R. REP.No. 105-599, at 266 (1998) ("The Secretary must provide an
equivalent hearing to the pre-levy hearing if later requested by the taxpayer.").
126. This is seen in language of the Conference Report, which refers to the "date of the
hearing," "the scheduled hearing," and "at the time of the pre-levy hearing." H.R. REP. No. 105599, at 266.
127. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6630-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2006); Loofbourrow v. Comm'r,
208 F. Supp. 2d 698, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (stating that a series of letters between taxpayer and
the Office of Appeals constituted a sufficient "hearing").
128. The policy is spelled out in a 2003 I.R.S. memorandum. See I.R.S. Chief Counsel
Notice CC-2003-031 (Sept. 11,2003), availableat http://www.unclefed.com/ForTaxProfs/irsccdm/2003/cc-2003-031 .pdf. The policy is used with non-cooperative taxpayers who tend to be
tax protestors. See id. This practice has been approved by the Tax Court. See Katz v. Comm'r,
115 T.C. 329 (2000). Many federal district courts have also approved the practice. Cf Frese v.
United States, No. 05-1741, 2006 WL 231895, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2006) (holding that
Appeals Officer's refusal to hold a face-to-face hearing until taxpayer submitted a later year's
tax return and providing specific information relating to his financial status was not abuse of
discretion). But see Cavanaugh v. United States, No. 03-250, 2004 WL 880442, at *6 (D.N.J.
Mar. 23, 2004) (holding that a SO's decision to deny a request for a face-to-face hearing and
instead proceed by telephone was an abuse of discretion).
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129

It is no wonder that hearings can sometimes be so informal that a taxpayer may
0
not understand that one took place until receiving the Notice of Determination.13
Second, when a taxpayer requests a CDP hearing, the InternalRevenue Manual
(IRM) instructs the IRS collection employee responsible for the case to continue
working on it for forty-five days after the CDP request or, with management approval,
up to ninety days. 131 The collection employee is instructed to offer the taxpayer "Fast
Track Mediation," an internal program designed to give taxpayers
the ability to resolve
32
their accounts by negotiating through a third-party mediator.'
Third, there is no adversarial party. Once the collection employee transmits the file
to the SO, further contact is restricted to requests by the Office of Appeals for further
information. 133 The collection employee does not participate in the "hearing" but is
restricted to writing a "dissent" if the SO accepts a collection alternative. The "dissent"
becomes part of the package that is elevated within the IRS's review chain. 34 Thus, the
Appeals SO now works the case, involving other functions as needed. For example, if
the taxpayer makes an Offer In Compromise and submits a processable Offer, the IRM
provides that:
of

Appeals will generally work the offer investigation internally using electronic
research sources and taxpayer documentation, particularly when the offer is not
complex or does not require any field verification. If complex financial analysis
issues surface, either regarding particular asset(s) or the offer as a whole, Appeals
may send an Appeals Referral Investigation (ARI) to Collection
35 for assistance.
Appeals will retain jurisdiction of the offer in these instances.1
The final way in which the IRS has transformed the CDP process into another
collection stage is by presuming that the "hearing" begins with the issuance of the
initial contact letter by the Appeals SO and ends with the issuance of the Notice of
136
Determination (for CDP hearings) or the Decision Letter (for Equivalent Hearings).
Likewise, the Office of Chief Counsel has instructed its attorneys that the
"administrative record" includes everything in the SO's file, both written and
37
electronic.'

129. AllGlass Sys., Inc. v. Comm'r, 330 F. Supp. 2d 540, 545 (E.D. Pa. 2004) ("[T]here is
no requirement that a CDP hearing be specifically designated as such by the conducting officer
so long as the taxpayers and IRS officers, interse, do in fact address the issues on the merits
during the communications."); see Frese,2006 WL 231895, at *7-8 (collecting cases).
130. See Stewart v. Comm'r, No. 03-271, 2004 WL 838045, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 1,
2004) (holding that the taxpayers had received a CDP hearing even though the SO stated that
the meeting "was an informal meeting and was not the due process hearing").
131. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 35, §5.1.9.3.5.
132. See id. § 5.1.9.3.8 ("CDP and Equivalent Hearing Fast Track Mediation (FTM)").
133. Id. § 5.1.9.5 ("Communications with Appeals").
134. See id. § 5.1.9.5.1 ("Disagreement with Appeals Decisions").
135. Id. § 5.1.9.3.9.1.
136. See id. § 34.5.4.
137. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. CC-2006-019, at 66 (Aug. 18, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-ccdm/cc-2006-019.pdf (listing all material that should be transmitted
to the court for review but emphasizing that "[iun CDP cases, the administrative record consists
of all materials relied upon by an appeals or settlement officer in making a determination
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The upshot of all this is that the IRS has made the CDP "hearing" essentially a
fourth stage of collection, complementing the Notice stage, ACS, and CFf. The CDP
"hearing" is far from adversarial. Taxpayers may not call witnesses,1 38may not demand
documents from the Service, 39 and have no right to examine documents or materials
that the SO uses to perform the verification task.140While taxpayers can raise issues
and submit written materials, their ability to do so is no different than in any other
stage of the collection process. The administrative CDP hearing is instead inquisitorial,
with the SO firmly in control of the issues and information processing. CDP is simply
another opportunity for the taxpayer to be classified as a "can't-pay."
Thus, it is no surprise that in almost forty percent of the CDP cases examined in this
study, the same pattern emerges: the taxpayer requests a CDP hearing, the SO requests
information, the taxpayer fails to provide the information, and the SO issues a Notice
of Determination allowing collection to proceed.141 Although not usually reflected in
the court decisions, the SO often asks for the exact same materials that the IRS
142
collection employee would need to ask for, and in fact may have already asked for.
As with every stage of collection, the SO presumes the taxpayer is a "won't-pay" and
invites the taxpayer to submit information showing that he or she should be considered
a "can't-pay." If the SO determines that the taxpayer is a won't-pay, the SO issues a

regarding the collection" and that, generally, "the administrative record consists of the
information an agency reviews when making its determination").
138. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d) (as amended in 2006).
139. Bamill v. Comm'r, No. 6994-OiL, 2002 WL 977364, at *3(T.C. May 13, 2002).
140. See Nestor v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 162 (2002) (holding that a SO was not required to give
taxpayer copies of the documents used to verify the Service's compliance with applicable
administrative requirement); see also Roberts v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 365 (2002) aft'd, 329 F.3d
1224 (11 th Cir. 2003).
141. While I could cite hundreds of cases, here are just a few: Kindred v. Comm'r, 454 F.3d
688 (7th Cir. 2006) (taxpayers failed to provide requested financial information); Olsen v.
United States, 414 F.3d 144 (1st Cir. 2005) (taxpayers also failed to provide requested financial
information); Pennington v. United States, No. H-04-3118,2006 WL 1896996, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
Jul. 10, 2006) (taxpayer failed to submit adequate documentation in support of his offer to
compromise until after filing district court action; although district court asked IRS to review
petitioners claims, the court upheld the SO's decision to reject petitions offer and impose a
levy); Cohen Ent. v. United States, No. 05-1587, 2006 WL 1207956, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 4,
2006) (taxpayer failed to provide requested documents); Frese v. United States, No. 05-1741,
2006 WL 231895, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2006) (taxpayers failed to respond to SO request to
"describe the legitimate issues he wished to discuss"); Gardner v. United States, No. 04-2686,
2005 WL 1155728, at *1-2 (D.N.J. April 5, 2005) (SO asked taxpayer to submit a corrected
return, and present specific and non-frivolous arguments; taxpayer's failure to provide either
warranted dismissal); AllGlass Sys., Inc. v. Comm'r, 330 F. Supp. 2d 540 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (SO
asked taxpayer to file current returns and current financial information in order to consider
collection alternatives; taxpayer failed to respond); Lister v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 774
(2003) (taxpayer failed to file requested returns or provide current financial information).
142. See, e.g., I.R.S., Telephone Conference Satisfied Collection Due Process Hearing
Rights, TAx NOTES TODAY, Mar. 6, 2000, availableat 2000 TNT 44-81 (LEXis) (SO requested
the exact same documents as field collection employee had requested in order to process a
taxpayer's request for collection alternative). For example, if the taxpayer wants to make an
Offer In Compromise, the taxpayer has to provide the same information using the same form
(Form 656) regardless of whether the taxpayer submits the form to a RO or a SO.
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Notice of Determination, throwing the taxpayer back into the regular collection process
stream.
This description of the "hearing" process is not a criticism of CDP. Far from it. The
Office of Appeals has long been respected as an effective internal check on IRS
operations. When the GAO studied the effect of the Office of Appeals on CDP
hearings, it found that between sixteen and twenty-seven percent oftaxpayers received
a different (better) outcome after they appealed the NFTL or levy proposal. 43 Almost a
third of these different outcomes were because the Office of Appeals was more
successful in eliciting information from taxpayers than other functions.144 One common
fear was that CDP would transform the Office of Appeals into a "mini-me" Tax Court
under the pressure of creating a "record" for review. 145 That has not happened. As
implemented, the CDP "hearing" has become essentially a separate, fourth, stage of
collection, albeit one that gets court review.
In fact, as implemented, the internal review procedure is strikingly similar to
another long-standing internal review program called the Collection Appeals Program
(CAP). 146 First implemented in 1996, CAP allows taxpayers to protest any levy, any
NFTL, or any termination or rejection of an installment agreement (a main collection
alternative), either before or after the action is taken, although taxpayers will generally
not know when an NFTL is about to be filed. CAP hearings are like CDP and
Equivalent Hearings in that the Appeals Officer "review[s] the case for appropriateness
based on law, regulations, policy and procedures, . . . considering all the facts and
circumstances," and then issues a "closing letter" explaining the rationale for the
decision. 147 Importantly, the IRM instructs Appeals Officers that "[j]udgment is likely
to be an issue on these types of cases although they can also involve legal or
procedural issues. Appeals may reverse the Collection function's action, if evaluation
of the taxpayer's
history and current facts and circumstances reveal a more appropriate
148
solution."'

143. GAO 2006 CDP STUDY, supra note 31, at 3-4. The GAO's report found that sixteen
percent oftaxpayers negotiated collection alternatives with the Office of Appeals that they had
not been able to negotiate before and eleven percent "fully paid their liabilities or no longer had
balances due to IRS." Id. This finding means that Appeals sometimes reduces the amount owed,
by abating penalties or interest, for instance. The GAO report did not specify how many of the
eleven percent received reduced liabilities. Id. My personal experience suggests it was probably
most of them.
144. Id.
at 19-20 (finding that "when Appeals differed from Collection on the merits of the
taxpayer's argument" in thirty-one percent of the cases it did so because the taxpayer gave it
more information). The National Taxpayer Advocate has also noted the ability of the Office of
Appeals to elicit more information from taxpayers. 2004 TAXPAYER ADvOCATE REPORT, supra
note 52, at 460.
145. See Leslie M. Book, CDP and Collections: Perceptions and Misperceptions, TAX
NoTEs TODAY, Apr. 26, 2005, at 487, availableat 2005 TNT 79-42 (LExis); Camp, supra note
2, at 127 ("[T]ilting Appeals towards becoming a "mini-me" Tax Court is unwise."); Pete
Lowry, Thoughts on the Practicalitiesof the CDPProcess,TAX NOTES TODAY, May 9,2005, at
783 (2005), availableat 2005 TNT 89-42 (LExis).
146. The CAP process is set out at INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 35, § 8.24.1
("Special Collections Appeals Programs Overview").
147. Id.
at § 8.24.1.2.7.8.
148. Id.
at § 8.24.1.2.7.10
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There are two main differences between CAP appeals and CDP appeals. First,
taxpayers who go to CAP are generally at a later stage in the collection stream (most
often in the CFf stage) where there is usually something much more individualized to
complain about than an abstract threat to levy. Accordingly, taxpayers involved in
CAP proceedings have a much better sense of what information they need to present to
contest the levy or NFTL, allowing the Office of Appeals to obtain and review the
relevant information much more quickly. That is what, in part, accounts for the second
difference: CAP appeals generally are resolved in five business days whereas CDP
appeals average 236 days.' 49 In the absence of any empirical data comparing CDP
hearing outcomes with CAP hearing outcomes, one cannot conclude what, if any, value
the longer CDP processing time adds to the classification task or whether it is
commensurate with the increased potential for gamesmanship. I will return to this point
when I discuss the costs of CDP.
3. Judicial Review
A taxpayer unhappy with a Notice of Determination must file a petition in Tax
Court within thirty days of the Notice's issue date. 50 The Tax Court uses one of two
standards of review, depending on the issue appealed. First, for all challenges to the
collection decision, the Tax Court reviews the administrative record to see whether the
collection decision was an abuse of discretion.' 5' This is true for both challenges to the

149. 2005 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 455 (based on internal
information obtained from the Office of Appeals). My database shows that those CDP hearings

from which taxpayers appeal to courts take, on average, 339 days. I discuss the longer
processing time below.
150. See I.R.C. § 6330(d) (2000). Congress amended § 6330(d) in August 2006. Pension
Protection Act of 2006, ch. 8, 120 Stat. 1019 (2006). Before Congress acted, § 6330(d)
provided that appeals went to whatever court had jurisdiction over the underlying tax liability.
I.R.C. § 6330(d) (2000). Thus, if the tax being collected was the type of tax over which the Tax
Court would otherwise have jurisdiction (such as income, estate, or gift taxes), the taxpayer filed
there. If the Tax Court would not otherwise have jurisdiction over the tax (such as employment
tax liabilities and certain penalties), then the taxpayer had to file in federal district court.
Taxpayers who filed in the wrong court had thirty days from the dismissal of the case to file in
the correct court. See Render v. IRS, 309 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (rejecting the
IRS's argument that the court was without jurisdiction to hear taxpayer's appeal because
taxpayer had not waited for a Tax Court order dismissing the case before she refiled). As is
typical with such taxpayer "victories," Ms. Render later lost on the "merits." Render v. IRS, 389
F. Supp. 2d 808 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
151. Goza v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 176, 179 (2000) (relying on Conference Report language).
For a time, a divided Tax Court allowed taxpayers to supplement the administrative record by
introducing new evidence not submitted to the Appeals SO. It was reversed by the Eighth
Circuit, which limited the abuse of discretion review to whatever record is produced. Robinette
v. Comm'r, 439 F.3d 455, 462 (8th Cir. 2006), rev'g 123 T.C. 85 (2004); see also Olsen v.
United States, 414 F.3d 144, 150 (1st Cir. 2005); Living Care Alternatives, Inc. v. United
States, 411 F.3d 621, 631 (6th Cir. 2004).
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52
adequacy of CDP procedures as well as the merits of the collection decision.1
Second, for properly raised challenges to the liability
decision, the Court will usually
153
conduct a traditional adversarial trial de novo.

4. Continuing Jurisdiction
Section 6330(d)(2)(B) provides that the Office of Appeals retains jurisdiction over
future collection decisions regarding the same unpaid liability that was protested in the
CDP hearing. Ifthe taxpayer "has exhausted all administrative remedies" and shows "a
change in circumstances with respect to such person," then the taxpayer can ask the
Office of Appeals to review the ongoing collection. 5 4 There is not, however, any
recourse to further judicial review.
Retained jurisdiction is a different concept from remand. The Tax Court and those
district courts that have considered the matter have concluded that they have the ability
to remand cases back to the Office of Appeals for further processing, while retaining
the ability to review the subsequent decision. 155 Also, the IRS has, at times, moved to
remand 6to give the taxpayer additional process before submitting the decision to the
5
court. 1

III. THE FAILuRE OF CDP
"Judicialreview of collection due process hearings presents a realproblem for
reviewing courts. A57

Tax collection requires distinguishing between taxpayers who can immediately pay
the full amount due (but do not want to), and taxpayers who cannot so pay. The
process is investigatory--or inquisitive-in nature and sorting "won't-pays" from
"can't-pays" involves correctly applying the sorting policies created by Congress and
the IRS. The premise underlying CDP was that IRS employees could not be trusted to
correctly classify taxpayers as can't-pays or won't-pays. CDP promised to correct

152. See Cavanaugh v. United States, No. 03-250, 2004 WL 880442, at *6 (D.N.J. 2004)
(holding that the SO's denial of a request for a face-to-face hearing and choice to proceed by
telephone was an abuse of discretion); Sego v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 604, 612 (2000).
153. Sego, 114 T.C. at 610. If the taxpayer properly challenges his or her liability because he
or she did not receive a Notice of Deficiency or otherwise did not have a prior opportunity to
contest the assessed liability, the review is always de novo. Likewise, ifthe taxpayer challenges
the liability decision by invoking the spousal relief rules in § 6015 (b) or (c) the review is de
novo. I.R.C. § 6015 (2000). However, if the taxpayer seeks spousal relief under § 6015(f), the
Court reviews the closed record for abuse of discretion. I.R.C. § 6015(f); see also Butler v.
Comm'r, 114 T.C. 276, 283 (2000).
154. I.R.C. § 6330(d)(2)(B) (2000).
155. See, e.g., MRCA Info. Servs. v. Conm'r, 145 F. Supp. 2d 194,201 (D. Conn. 2000);
Lunsford v. Comm'r, 117 T.C. 183, 189 (2003).
156. See, e.g., Ahee v. United States, No. CV-S-01-0211,2002 WL 1023165, at *1(D. Nev.
Dec. 27,2001); Rennie v. IRS, No. F-01-5712, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18954, at *1 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 26, 2001).
157. Living Care Alternatives of Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 635 (6th Cir.
2005).
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misclassification by mandating both internal review (by the Office of Appeals) and
external review (by courts) to ensure the IRS got it right.
In this Part, I first present my thesis of why the CDP judicial review process cannot,
in theory, add value to IRS collection decisions, and how the process harms taxpayers
and hinders proper oversight of IRS collection activity. I then present the results of my
empirical study of 976 decisions issued by the courts in the seven calendar years of
2000 through 2006 and discuss how they support or call into question my thesis.
A. The Theory of CDPFailure
Those who created CDP operated under a false understanding of the tax collection
process. As a result, they tried to create an adversarial process check on perceived
abuses. But a system that processes over 5.5 million collection accounts each year
simply does not have the resources to support such an adversarial process check, either
for internal or external review. As a result, the structure of tax collection tends to push,
push, push at any attempted adversarial reform to bring it in line with the inquisitorial
model. This is true for both internal review reforms and external review reforms.
As to the internal review, I have demonstrated above how the IRS has co-opted the
required administrative "hearing" to make it part of the inquisitorial administrative
process; taxpayers are still presumed to be won't-pays and must articulate-within the
applicable internal operating rules-why they should be treated otherwise. As
implemented, the internal review process is no different from any other part of the
collection process, except that taxpayers may get access to a more experienced IRS
employee who has more discretion to resolve the issues.
The external review story is similar, albeit more complex. At bottom, it is simply
not possible for CDP judicial review to either catch or correct the IRS's abuse of
taxpayers. Three intractable problems with interposing adversarial review on an
inquisitorial process turn the great opportunity for a taxpayer's "day in court" into an
empty promise. First, courts have no choice but to adopt a "record review" rule. This
rule, however, prevents taxpayers from getting relevant information before the court,
including, most importantly, information about changed circumstances, and so does
little to solve either individualized or systemic abuse. Second, court review of thefirst
collection decision comes too early in the collection process to add any value to the
classification decision. At that stage, courts cannot add value to either the quantity or
quality of the information necessary to determine whether a taxpayer is a can't-pay or a
won't-pay. Finally, the inquisitorial collection process does not produce a "final
agency action" within the standard administrative law meaning of that term until the
final dollar is collected from the taxpayer. All decisions up to that point are interstitial;
court review is simply looking at a freeze-frame of the video. Accordingly, judicial
review is not proper until the tax is fully collected, at which time the Tax Code already
provides a well understood structure for judicial review of tax liability, through the
refund procedure, and of collection decisions, through the § 7433 action for damages. I
will address each of these three problems in turn.
1. Record Review Rule Denies Relevant Information
A court reviewing the IRS decision to levy or to file an NFTL has a choice: it can
base its decision on the information available to the Service at the time the reviewed
decision was made, or it can allow new information with which it can judge the merits
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of the decision. The former choice is called "record review" and is how courts
typically review the actions of other agencies. 5 '
Record review is "adversary process lite." Full-fledged adversary process-the
proverbial "day in court"-promises the litigant the ability to frame the issues for
decision, present supporting evidence, and test the veracity of an opponent's evidence
through critical questioning and cross-examination. 159 But "record review" denies
litigants the ability to present the reviewing court with evidence that was not provided
to the agency whose decision is under review.' 60 Instead, the court will only review
"the record," which means whatever evidence and issues the litigant put before the
agency and the agency put into its administrative files. The rationale for record review
is closely tied to the rationale for the exhaustion doctrine: it preserves the agency's role
as primary decision maker. To allow litigants the freedom to introduce new evidence to
the court would allow them to circumvent the agency and, in effect, substitute the court
for the agency as the tribunal
to hear and determine a matter that Congress had
161
delegated to the agency.
Until 2006, the Tax Court rejected a record review rule for CDP cases. In Robinette
v. Commissioner, a fractured Tax Court decided it would allow the taxpayer to
introduce evidence that was not part of the administrative record. The seven-member
plurality opinion boldly declared that "we are not limited by the Administrative
62
Procedure Act (APA) and our review is not limited to the administrative record.'
The concurring opinions, however, sought to limit that statement, emphasizing that the
Tax Court was not required to receive all new evidence and that taxpayers could not,
with impunity, "refuse[] to comply with an Appeals officer's reasonable request for
relevant evidence at the hearing."' 163 Instead, the concurrences, joined by ten judges,
limited the holding to times where the taxpayer "attempted to introduce relevant
evidence at the Appeals Office hearing, but the Appeals officer refused to consider that
evidence and failed to include it in the administrative record."' 1 4
The Tax Court's holding illustrates one of the problems with integrating broad
precepts of administrative law principles into tax administration. More than almost any

158. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729,744 (1985) ("The [Administrative
Procedures Act] specifically contemplates judicial review on the basis of the agency record
compiled inthe course of informal agency action in which a hearing has not occurred.").
159. See Marvin E. Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1031, 1036-41 (1975); Friendly, supra note 1, at 1291-92; Amalia D. Kessler, Our
InquisitorialTradition:Equity Procedure,Due Process, andthe Searchfor an Alternative to
the Adversarial,90 CORNELL L. REv. 1181, 1188-89 (2005).
160. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) ("[TIhe focal point for judicial review
should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in
the reviewing court."); United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963) ("[I]n
cases where Congress has simply provided for review, without setting forth the standards to be
used or the procedures to be followed, this Court has held that consideration is to be confined to
the administrative record and that no de novo proceeding may be held.") (italics in original);
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 443 (1930); 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,

cases).
See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50 (1938).
Robinette v. Comm'r, 123 T.C. 85, 95 (2004), rev'd, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 114 (Wells, J., concurring).
Id. at 116 (Thornton, J., concurring).

ADMInlSTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 11.6 (4th ed. 2002) (collecting

161.
162.
163.
164.
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other agency process, the CDP "hearing" process-particularly as transformed by the
IRS as I describe above-looks far more like a part of the inquisitorial collection
process than an adversarial hearing. The Tax Court's concern was that, whatever the
merits of such a proceeding, the hearing did not give taxpayers an adequate
opportunity to create a record for review. That intuition was best captured by Judge
Wells in his concurrence: "If the Tax Court had no authority to develop a factual
record in the instant case, there would not have
been a sufficient record to determine
165
whether [the SO] had abused his discretion."'
The Tax Court's concern in Robinette was neither foolish nor myopic. Judge Wells'
statement reflects the Tax Court's understanding of its historic role in reviewing tax
liability decisions for abuse of discretion. When taxpayers seek pre-assessment review
in Tax Court of an IRS proposed liability, the Tax Court has-since its inceptionalmost always used a de novo standard of review, giving the taxpayer the standard
adversarial process rights to introduce evidence, cross-examine, etc.166 Sometimes,
however, the Court reviews an IRS liability decision for abuse of discretion. For
example, if the IRS determines that a taxpayer's method of accounting for his or her
tax does not "clearly reflect income" as required by § 446(b), the Tax Court reviews
that determination under an abuse of discretion standard.' 67 Even here, however, the
taxpayer can introduce new evidence to explain why the IRS abused its discretion. The
Tax Court's focus is on getting to the right substantive result, and it has long been
comfortable hearing new evidence at trial that the IRS may not have considered. 168
The Tax Court was not the only trial court concerned about the status of the
"record" in CDP cases, although its remedy of allowing a taxpayer to introduce
evidence before the court was unique. In Mesa Oil, Inc. v. UnitedStates, the district
court adopted a more traditional approach by placing the burden on the IRS to produce
a record comprehensive enough for a reviewing court to make sense of. 1 6 9 At issue in
Mesa Oil was the adequacy of the SO's balancing determination. Recall that the SO is
required to (1) verify the liability, (2) consider taxpayer arguments, and (3) balance the
need for the NFTL or levy with the impact on the taxpayer. The district court in Mesa
Oil was unhappy that the Notice of Determination simply recited the statutory

165. Id. at 114 (Wells, J., concurring).
166. See Barry v. Comm'r, 1 B.T.A. 156, 157 (1924) ("The record of the case made in the

Internal Revenue Bureau is not before the Board except in so far as it may be properly placed in
evidence by the taxpayer or by the Commissioner. The Board must decide each case upon the
record made at the hearing before it, and, in order that it may properly do so, the taxpayer must
be permitted to fully present any questions relating to his tax liability which may be necessary to
a correct determination of the deficiency. To say that the taxpayer who brings his case before the

Board is limited to questions presented before the Commissioner, and that the Board in its
determination of the case is restricted to a decision of issues raised in the Internal Revenue
Bureau would be to deny the taxpayer a full and complete hearing and an open and neutral
consideration of his case.").

167. For an interesting discussion of the various times that the Tax Court engages in an
abuse of discretion review of liability determinations, see Charles A. Boreck, Social Science
Explanationsfor DisparateOutcomes in Tax CourtAbuse of DiscretionCases: A Tax Justice
Perspective, 33 CAP. U. L. REv. 623 (2005).
168. See Ewing v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 32, 41 (2005) (Thornton, J.,
concurring) (listing
examples), rev'd on other grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006).

169. No. Civ. A 00-B-851, 2000 WL 1745280 (D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2000).
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balancing test and gave no analysis for why the balancing test favored the IRS. The
court believed that the record had to disclose the rationality of the decision or else
court review would be a joke:
[Tlhere must be enough information contained in the documentation created by
the IRS for a court to draw conclusions about statutory compliance and whether
the [SO] abused his or her discretion. Here, the scant letters and Notice of
Determination make those tasks difficult if not impossible. The government's own
arguments illustrate this problem. It asserts, for example, that Mesa points to no
evidence or argument offered at the due process hearing which was ignored by the
[SO]. Yet the lack of a record makes it impossible to tell what was discussed at the
hearing, and what factors were considered by the [SO] in making her
Determination. Thus, the lack of a record erodes Mesa's statutory right to judicial

review. 170
While a few district courts followed Mesa Oil, the circuit courts have emphatically
rejected both it and the Tax Court's approach. These courts have adopted-for
understandable reasons-a very strong record review rule that significantly undermines
the promise of CDP. Thus, the Eighth Circuit directly overruled the Tax Court's
Robinette decision, holding that the reviewing court must confine itselfto the record as
presented by the agency.171 However, the circuit panel also created a kind of "heads I
win, tails you lose" rule in favor of allowing the IRS-but not the taxpayer-to
supplement the record:
Of course, where a record created in informal proceedings does not adequately
disclose the basis for the agency's decision, then it may be appropriate for the
reviewing court to receive evidence concerning what happened during the agency
proceedings. The evidentiary proceeding in those circumstances, however, is not a
de novo trial, but rather is limited to the receipt of testimony or evidence
explaining the reasoning behind the agency's decision.
The other circuits that have adopted the record rule have been even more emphatic in
rejecting Mesa Oil's modest record review, with its accompanying remand remedy for
perfecting incomplete records. In Living Care Alternatives of Utica, Inc. v. United
States, the taxpayer argued that the record was inadequate to support the IRS's
decision.173 There, the record consisted only of the parties' pleadings and the Notice of
Determination itself The Sixth Circuit held that the record was enough. The court
concluded that in light of the historic pay-first rule and the informality of CDP

170. Id. at *7; accordMuhammad v. United States, No. C/A 0:02-2677-17BD, 2003 WL
21152978, at *4 (D.S.C. Jul. 15, 2003) (quoting Southmark Prime Plus, L.P. v. Falzone, 776 F.
Supp. 888, 893 (D. Del. 1991) (remanding to the IRS because the record did not contain enough
information for the court "to find that the Appeals Officer did not commit an abuse of discretion
in rendering her decision, or that 'no relief could be granted to the Plaintiff under any set of
facts that could be proved."'). Note the placement of the default rule-the Appeals Officer
abused his discretion unless the record shows sufficient justification.
171. Robinette v. Comm'r, 439 F.3d 455,459 (8th Cir. 2006).
172. Id.
at 461 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
173. 411 F.3d 621, 629 (6th Cir. 2005).
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hearings, "Congress must have been contemplating a more deferential review of these
tax appeals than of more formal agency decisions. 174 For courts to demand more than
the "scant" record presented would mean that "the judiciary will inevitably become
involved on a daily basis with tax enforcement
details that judges are neither qualified,
175
nor have the time, to administer."'
The strong record review rule presents real problems for taxpayers because they are
simply stuck with the record. For example, in AllGlass Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner,
the corporate taxpayers were on the hook for employment taxes and were represented
by counsel. 176 They timely requested a CDP hearing and proposed an Offer In
Compromise (OIC) as a collection alternative. The SO asked for a personal financial
statement from the taxpayers' principal owner. The owner's attorney did not meet the
fifteen day deadline set by the SO who issued a Notice of Determination six weeks
later that upheld the collection action against the companies. When the taxpayers tried
to submit the requested information to the court in an effort to have the matter
remanded, the court refused to even look at it, explaining:
As a consequence of taxpayers' failure to provide the requested information, [the
SO] was faced with incomplete offers-in-compromise and therefore was unable to
consider the offers as an alternative to the levy. Because of the deleterious effect it
would have on the IRS's efforts to enforce the Revenue laws of the United States,
taxpayers are not free to disregard administrative deadlines and, without cause,
proceed at their own pace. Given these facts, the Court concludes that [the SO]
sufficiently considered taxpayers'
alternative collection offers, with the
177
information availableto her.
AllGlass illustrates both the pressures that lead courts to adopt a strong record review
rule and the difficulties such a rule presents for taxpayers. Worse, the IRS Office of
Chief Counsel has instructed its attorneys to put forward only those documents "that
support the motion for summary judgment" and no more. 178 Thus unwary taxpayers
may not realize-either during the hearing or after-the responsibility imposed on
them in an adversarial system to ensure the completeness of the record created and sent
forward for judicial review.

174. Id. at 625.
175. Id. at 631; see also Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144, 150-51 (lst Cir. 2005)
(adopting a strong record review standard).
176. See AllGlass Sys., Inc. v. Comm'r, 330 F. Supp. 2d 540, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
177. Id. at 547 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
178. I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2006-019, 60-61 (Aug. 18, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-ccdm/cc-2006-019.pdf. I do not suggest the IRS is trying to hide the
record from court review. It is just that, as I show above, the "hearing" basically encompasses
the entirety of the taxpayer account history. That is a lot of information to wade through. From
the IRS's point of view, it makes sense to minimize the court's burden by simply providing the
smallest amount of information necessary to support its decision. That the decision to minimize
the record is administratively sound does not make it any less harmful to taxpayers. It is the
taxpayer's responsibility to put into the record for review any other materials. As I argue below,
that is well nigh impossible for most of the taxpayers to understand, much less accomplish.
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Despite the horrid effects of record review, CDP advocates claim that even this
cursory court review adds theoretical value to the process in two ways. First, the mere
possibility of review keeps the IRS employees honest. 179 Second, record review allows
courts to police the Service's overall collection process by shifting the court's focus
from the correctness of the individual classification decision to the correctness of the
administrative process resulting in that decision.180 I shall address each in turn.
The "keeps them honest" claim is difficult to sustain when one realizes how rare
and unusual it is, from an IRS employee's perspective, to have a court review a
collection decision. For example, of the 15,822,443 collection decisions made by the
8
IRS between 2000 and 2006, fewer than 3,000 were likely to be reviewed by a court.1 '
Moreover, court review of any particularcollection decision, when it happens, occurs
only years after the decision, and there are several layers of management and the
Office of Appeals review between the IRS employee who made the decision and the
courts. So insulated-by both time and layers of bureaucracy-it would be very
surprising to find any trickle-down effect of potential court review.
More fundamentally, the first claim misanalyzes the problem. The problem
(misclassification) is not that nasty IRS employees work out their anger on hapless
taxpayers. 82 It is not personal. The misclassification problem arises from systemic
decisions and bulk processing that roll over those who lack the resources to respond. It
is the system that must be kept honest, not individual IRS employees.
The second claim at least focuses on the correct problem, but the remedy is wrong.
Court review is neither necessary nor sufficient to police IRS collection policies. CDP
proponents might cite to Crawfordv. UnitedStates183 as a case that demonstrates how
court review adds value to the IRS's systemic decisions. In that case, the district court
held that the IRS abused its discretion in refusing to consider Mrs. Crawford's
proposed collection alternative.'" She wanted the IRS to forbear collecting from her
and instead go after her ex-husband, who was jointly liable for the unpaid tax. Mrs.
Crawford said the state divorce decree had given her ex-husband both the
responsibility and the resources to pay the tax.' 85 The district court remanded the case

179. See Leslie Book, Fix CDP, But Do Not Repeal It, A.B.A. SEC. OF TAX'N
Fall 2004, at 13, 13.
180. Id.at 15 ("It is the review of agency action that provides systemic pressure for the
agency to do the job right in the first place.... The focus of... review should be (and is in
other areas of the law) on what the agency did, rather than on wrestling, on an individualized
basis, with the right answer ....). The National Taxpayer Advocate has also recognized this
second argument for court review and has proposed expanding court review to provide "the
authority to review the entirety of the collection life cycle" so that "where the courts find that
the IRS has abused its discretion, all taxpayers will benefit from the changes in procedures or
additional training that result from such decisions." 2005 TAXPAYER ADvOCATE REPORT, supra
note 75, at 463.
181. See notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
182. This claim again betrays a nineteenth century vision of how the IRS operates. See
Stanwood v. Green, 22 F. Cas. 1077 (S.D. Miss. 1870) (No. 13,300) and United States v.
Fordyce, 25 F. Cas. 1143 (N.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,130) for examples of judicial review to
check the excesses of a particular IRS agent named Stanwood.
183. 422 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Nev. 2006).
184. Id.
at 1214.
185. Id.
at 1210.
NEWSQUARTERLY,
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for "proper consideration" of her proposal, stressing it was doing so only because of
the "limited circumstances" in which the third party was jointly liable." 6
The district court's order issued in March 2006.187 Lo and behold, in December
2006, the IRS published a policy in its IRM regarding requests to collect from third
parties. 188 The policy is both broader and narrower than the court's holding in
Crawford.On the one hand, the policy permits taxpayers to suggest collection from
third parties who are not jointly liable. On the other hand, the policy requires that the
third-party assets either already be liquidated or be in the process of liquidation
and
89
sets a default period of 120 days for the third party to make payment.
The argument that the institutional voice of the judiciary, represented by the
Crawfordopinion, caused a systemic change in collection policy is weak. It was not a
necessary input for change. As I explain in more detail in Part tV,190 the more
important institutional voices for systemic decisions are those of the Taxpayer
Advocate Service, the Treasury Inspector for Tax Administration, and the General
Accountability Office. Nor was the court's opinion sufficient to cause the change. Even
if the court decision was one of the triggers, it only triggered a process, not the
outcome. That process resulted in the following aggregate decision:
The Settlement Officer is only required to consider taxpayer assets, not third-party
assets, when evaluating a collection alternative. However, it maybe appropriate in
certain situations, based on the credible evidence presented, to considerthe extent
third party assets are available to pay the liability, and whether withholding levy
while third-party assets are being liquidated may be a more efficient and less
intrusive manner of collection.19
A second problem with the claim that court review can police systemic decisions is that
the IRS is a bigger institutional player than any one court. The IRS must administer the
tax law across the entire country, and it routinely runs up against "local" federal district
courts with whose rulings it disagrees and refuses to implement. One can see evidence
of this in almost every issue of the InternalRevenue Bulletin, where the IRS publishes
its nonacquiescences to court decisions. Thus, a single district court decision, or even
multiple circuit court decisions,192will not "check" a tax administration position without
the IRS agreeing to the check.

186.
187.

Id.at 1214.
Id. at 1209.

188. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 35, § 8.22.2.4.8 ("Requests to Collect from
Third Parties").
189. Id.

190. See text accompanying notes 293-335.
191. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supranote 35, § 8.22.2.4.8.1 (emphasis in original). Even
if the issue is framed as a question of "law" (as the court framed it in Crawford), it generally
takes more than one trial court opinion to convince the decision makers within the IRS to
change an institutional position. For example, it took the decisions of five different circuit
courts over a three-year period before the IRS abandoned its systemic practice of reviving a tax
liability when, due to a clerical error, it erroneously refunded a payment to the taxpayer. For a
more complete description, see Bryan T. Camp, The Mysteries of ErroneousRefunds, TAx
NOTES,

Jan. 17, 2007, availableat 2007 TNTI 1-55 (LExis).

192. See Camp, supra note 191 for one example where it took adverse decisions from five
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More fundamentally, the second claim looks only to the form of the process rather
than the substance of the classification. Thus, the Crawford court was quick to
emphasize that the IRS Office of Appeals need only consider Mrs. Crawford's
proposal. In Brown v. Commissioner, the Tax Court went even further.' 93 There, the
taxpayer had submitted an OIC, but the OIC was not made part of the record for court
review. 94 So instead of reviewing the substance of the taxpayer's offer to see whether
the IRS properly rejected it, the Tax Court relied on the process used by the IRS in
interacting with the taxpayer, as revealed by the SO's notes and affidavit. Thus, the
court recited all the specific back-and-forths and concluded that the Office of Appeals
"gave petitioner an opportunity to correct and complete financial information, yet
petitioner failed to do so."'195 In essence, the SO swore to the court that the information
he received was incomplete, and rather than independently
reviewing the information
196
itself, the court accepted the word of the SO.
A more illustrative example of how the CDP record review rule elevates form over
substance lies in the Tax Court's evolving approach to reviewing Notices of
Determination, the decision document that the Office of Appeals issues that becomes
the taxpayer's "ticket" to Tax Court review. Early on, the Tax Court allowed a
taxpayer to challenge the validity of a Notice of Determination on the grounds that the
IRS did not give the taxpayer a proper "hearing."' 97 That allowed taxpayers to obtain a
court order stopping the collection action that was the subject of an invalid Notice of
Determination.
The Tax Court soon abandoned a substantive review of the Notice of Determination
in favor of a formal analysis. That is, it decided to presume all Notices of
Determination were valid and not "go behind" them to see whether they were really
so. 98 If the taxpayer proved that the "hearing" was inadequate in some way then the
court could remand the case to the IRS to correct the problem, but the court would not
invalidate the collection decision. 199 The result of this shift in review is that instead of
halting collection, court disagreement delays it.
More importantly, the collection decision being reviewed just has to look good, not
actually be good. If it does not look good enough, then the court's remand tells the
agency to, in effect, "go back and make it look better." This was the essence of Justice
Black's famous dissent in SECv. Chenery Corp.2 A remand simply allows the agency
to dress up its decision to look better to the court. 20 ' The IRS just has to "consider"
Mrs. Crawford's proposal and the court will most likely find no fault if the official

different courts of appeals before the IRS changed its position.
193. No. 16142-03S, 2004 WL 1775680 (Aug. 10, 2004).
194. Id. at *3.
195. Id.
196. See id. at *1-3. Mr. Brown is most likely what I call an inarticulate taxpayer who got
tripped up by procedural rules. See infratext accompanying notes 207-19.
197. See, e.g., Meyer v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 417 (2000).
198. See Lunsford v. Comm'r, 117 T.C. 159 (2001).
199. Id.
200. 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
201. See id. at 99 ("Of course, the Commission can now change the form of its decision to
comply with the Court order."). This is precisely what happened. See SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The Court by this present decision sustains the
identical administrative order which only recently it held invalid.").
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considering it swears in an affidavit that her proposal was rejected after due
consideration. Thus, record review looks to form, not substance.
To sum up this first problem, CDP puts courts in something of a dilemma. On the
one hand, to be effective, court review must take the approach of the Tax Court
plurality in Robinette.20 2 Court review of a closed record does not encourage the
agency to do a betterjob so much as it encourages the agency to create a better looking
record. The National Taxpayer Advocate has argued, on this basis, for expanded court
review: "Who really cares if the taxpayer has had several opportunities to ...[bring
forward the information] and misses them--if the taxpayer is before us now, do we
really want to collect a tax that is not, in fact, due?, 20 3 The decision to limit judicial
with a resounding "yes." But that
review to the record answers that rhetorical question
2 4
answer adds no value to tax administration. 0
On the other hand, to allow taxpayers to introduce new evidence at the judicial
review stage would make courts assume the agency's role and work the cases. Opening
the record would put courts in the position of making the initial judgment as to whether
a taxpayer is a true can't-pay or a clever won't-pay. Not only do courts lack the
expertise of the agency employees to make a fair evaluation of the information, they
also lack the resources to verify the information presented. The quality of information
is a crucial aspect of making the right classification. And it is to that issue that I now
turn.
2. CDP Does Not Improve Information Quality
Judicial review on a closed record might not be so bad if the administrative process
produced a decent record. Proper classification depends upon proper information. As I
have demonstrated above, one can conceptualize the entire collection process as the
IRS's attempt to obtain and verify information from the taxpayer so as to make the
correct classification decision. CDP neither helps the IRS acquire decent information
to resolve unpaid accounts nor helps taxpayers explain their situation to the IRS and,
ultimately, the reviewing court.
CDP first kicks in at the ACS stage because that is when the IRS seeks to file the
firstNFTL or make the first levy. By the ACS stage about two-thirds of taxpayers have
already resolved their accounts either by fully paying or by convincing the IRS that
they are can't-pays, thus entering into one of the collection alternatives. 205 At least
ninety-four percent of first levies and fifty-two percent of first NFTLs are issued
automatically by ACS.2 °6 Unresolved accounts in ACS are, by definition, owed by

202. Robinette v. Comm'r, 123 T.C. 85 (2004), rev'd, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006).
203. 2004 TAXPAYER ADvOCATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 459.
204. Remember, the taxpayer can theoretically bring a refund suit after fully paying the tax
owed. See, e.g., Flora v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 63 (1958); Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 59799 (1931) (finding that administrative collection of taxes comported with Fifth Amendment due
process because taxpayers had a "prompt" postdeprivation action inthe form ofthe refund suit).
205. Over two-thirds of the total amount collected on taxpayer delinquent accounts comes
from the Notice stage and less than one-third comes from liens, levies, and offsets, labeled
"additional actions" in the table. 2006 DATA BOOK, supra note 9, at 41 tbl. 16.
206. The National Taxpayer Advocate reports that, in the 2004 fiscal year, ninety-four
percent of the 1.7 million CDP notices for first levies issued from ACS and fifty-two percent of
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taxpayers who are still classified as won't-pays, either because they have not
responded to prior notices (I will call them nonresponsive taxpayers) or else have
responded inadequately to move themselves into the can't-pay box (I will call them
inarticulate taxpayers).
Conceptually, the ACS levies and NFTLs are effective at bringing in nonresponsive
taxpayers. Putting aside the dedicated won't-pays, nonresponsive taxpayers are,
logically, either low-functioning taxpayers who do not fully appreciate the
consequences of a paper notice, or else taxpayers who are overwhelmed by life's
demands and unable to adequately prioritize and respond to the notices. Levies and
NFTLs help them prioritize and address the issues.
Levies and NFTLs, however, do little to help inarticulate taxpayers. Even when
such taxpayers do respond, their organizational and expressive skills are so poor that
they have a very difficult time explaining their situations.2 7 These are the types of
taxpayers that bulk processing hurts the most. They have the most difficult time
interacting with a bureaucracy and being heard. Their problem is often not so much the
lack of an opportunity to explain their circumstances as it is the lack of their ability to
(1) recognize the opportunity, (2) gather the necessary information, and (3) present the
information necessary for an accurate classification.
CDP does not address the problems of either nonresponsive or inarticulate
taxpayers. It is just another form sent to the taxpayer's last known address. It gives the
taxpayer fewer than thirty days to jump through the proper bureaucratic hoops to
request the CDP hearing. If the taxpayer misses the thirty-day deadline, the taxpayer
gets an "equivalent" hearing, but no opportunity to invoke the adversarial process of
court review.
As to nonresponsive taxpayers, there is no reason to believe those who did not
respond to prior notices (whether out of pique or perplexity) will behave any
differently toward another piece of paper. Unlike a levy, which will actually take
money, freeze a bank account, or reveal their tax problems to a third party, the CDP
notice does not raise the stakes. It is "same ole, same ole." As to inarticulate taxpayers,
who may have indeed responded to prior notices but who have not convinced the IRS
that they are can't-pays, giving them a thirty-day deadline does nothing to help them
organize their thoughts, gather their materials, and present their cases. In sum, the CDP
the 0.5 million CDP notices for NFTLs came out of ACS. See 2005 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE
REPORT, supra note 75, at 459 tbl.2.7.1. Combined, that means that eighty-four percent of all
first levies and first NFTLs stem from the ACS stage.
207. Many sources suggest that many, if not most, of the taxpayers who fail to resolve their
accounts during the Notice stage are of the type I call inarticulate. A 2006 GAO study made
several findings which suggest that inarticulate taxpayers make up the largest group of those
who invoke the CDP process. First, it found that the Office of Appeals was initiating more than
twice as many contacts with the taxpayers as the taxpayers were initiating with the IRS. GAO
2006 CDP STUDY, supra note 31, at 20 tbl.3. This suggests that taxpayers needed considerable
prompting to pursue the hearing. Second, it found that over thirty percent of the cases were
closed because the taxpayer failed to respond to requests for information. Id. at 15 tbl. 1.1. This
suggests that a significant number of taxpayers were unable to gather and present the
information needed to evaluate their claims of can't-pay. Third, although forty percent of
taxpayers wanted to contest the merits of the tax liability decision, less than ten percent ofthose
could even make the proper allegation (that they had not received a statutory Notice of
Deficiency from the IRS) to enable a review of their liability. Id. at 27-28. This suggests that
many taxpayers simply did not understand the scope and limitations of the CDP hearing.
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notice just gives nonresponsive taxpayers another opportunity to waste and inarticulate
taxpayers another opportunity to babble. It is thus not surprising that in the one year
that data is available, 98.8% of taxpayers receiving a CDP notice did not request a
CDP hearing.2 °s
The high nonresponse rate to CDP notices could support either the proposition that
IRS classification decisions are right almost all of the time or the proposition that
taxpayers generally agree with the presumption that they are "won't-pays." That is the
reading suggested by the National Taxpayer Advocate, among others. 209 Putting aside
the inherent incredulity of the proposition that the IRS has an such an incredibly low
error rate, a more nuanced reading of the statistics supports the claim that CDP does
not give those taxpayers who disagree with the collection process either adequate
notice of their peril or help for presenting the information that could correctly classify
them. One sees this in looking at the relative response rate between ACS actions and
field actions. Thus, although ninety-four percent of first levies issue out of ACS, only
0.86% of them trigger a CDP request, whereas over 4.2% of levies made by field
personnel trigger a request for CDP hearing. 210 While both response rates are low, it
makes sense that the field response rate would be higher because it is in the field that
the taxpayer will have encountered an actual, live IRS employee who presents a far
more credible threat than just another bulk notice received in the mail.
The most plausible explanation for these very low response rates is that the
population of taxpayers who receive CDP notices derives no benefit from the notices.
The bare notice of this special hearing opportunity with the benefit of court review is
insufficient to alarm these taxpayers into prioritizing their affairs. In addition, the
thirty-day deadline for a written request does not help those who lack the ability to
interact with the government in the first place. In both situations, CDP adds little value
to the basic task of sorting out the can't-pays from the won't-pays so as to ensure
proper treatment by the government. It does not help taxpayers make their case nor the
IRS understand it.

208. 2005 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 459 tbl.2.7.1 (reporting that of
the 2,276,684 CDP notices issued in fiscal year 2004, only 28,133 resulted in a request for a
CDP hearing). Note that a single taxpayer may be the recipient of more than one CDP notice
because many taxpayers are delinquent for more than one tax period. There is no published data
on how many taxpayers receive CDP notices per year, but TIGTA's 2005 Trends Report does
report that the ratio of uncollected accounts per taxpayer for cases waiting action in the queue is
three to one. See 2005 TRENDS REPORT, supra note 54, at 27 fig. 13. Moreover, the National
Taxpayer Advocate has stated that for fiscal year 2006 "taxpayers with delinquencies whose
accounts were assigned to ACS for collection had an average of 1.9 delinquent tax periods,
[and] taxpayers whose accounts were waiting in the . . . [queue] to be assigned to field
2006 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE
personnel had an average of 3.1 delinquent tax periods ....
REPORT, supra note 54, at 64 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the 2.276 million CDP notices in fiscal
year 2004 probably affected between 750,000 and 900,000 taxpayers. However, since the
28,133 appeals are also counted on a per account basis and not on a per taxpayer basis, the ratio
between CDP notices and appeals remains the same, whether counted as accounts or taxpayers.
209. 2004 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 461 ("[T]he system is operating
exactly as any due process review should. The vast majority of taxpayers work with the IRS or
do not object to collection actions; but for those few taxpayers who do object, CDP is there.").
210. See 2005 TAXPAYERADvOCATEREPRT, supra note 75, at 459 tbl.2.7.1.
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Lister v. Commissioner is a window into the world of inarticulate taxpayers and
shows how court review adds no value to the information necessary to make a proper
classification, even when the taxpayer manages to jump through all the necessary
procedural hoops.21' Ms. Lister failed to file her 1993 and 1994 tax returns.212 Using
third-party information, the IRS made a liability determination and sent her a Notice of
Deficiency for each year. 213 She did not seek the allowed pre-assessment review in Tax
Court. Thus, after the IRS assessed the liability, Ms. Lister lost her ability to contest
the liability decision without fully paying the tax first. Ms. Lister did, however, manage
to respond to the single CDP notice issued for both years. 214 She sent in the Form
12153 with this explanation of why the IRS should not collect the tax: "Claimant never
received cash. Claimant received bills of credit. Claimant provides notable service.
Claimant unable to meet cash demands. Claimant DNA is 75+ years. Claimant did not
215
file 1993 and 1994 1040A. Civil penalties don't apply. See 1040 & Sched. R.",
Although the assigned Appeals SO tried to elicit more comprehensible information,
Ms. Lister's "only contentions before the Appeals Office and before th[e] court...
were that she is disabled and unable to pay any liability and that she is entitled to a
refund .... ,,216 When Ms. Lister appealed the Notice of Determination to the Tax
Court, the IRS asked the court to impose sanctions against her under the authority of §
6673.217 That section allows a court to impose up to $25,000 in sanctions against any
litigant who abuses the court's process by using it primarily to delay resolution of the
case or persists in asserting frivolous arguments.2 18 The court refused to sanction Ms.
Lister, characterizing her as merely clueless, not devious:
We also note that the record fails to establish that all of petitioner's claims were
frivolous or groundless. While petitioner's filings were confused, often
unintelligible, and sometimes reminiscent of protester rhetoric, not all of the
arguments contained in those filings were frivolous or groundless on their face.
Petitioner's principal claim was that she is impoverished. In fact, she may well be.
Unfortunately, petitioner did nothing to prove2 19her financial condition at the
section 6330 hearing before the Appeals Office.
The Ms. Listers of the world are not protected from arbitrary IRS collection decisions
by judicial review. While the IRS decision to classify them as won't-pays may or may
not be correct, judicial review is not the way find out. If the legislators were truly
serious about allowing taxpayers to invoke the adversarial process of court review,
Congress would have adopted the Senate proposal to allow court review ofall lien and
levy decisions, not just thefirst levy or NFTL. I gave the practical reasons against that
idea above. The next part explains how, under conventional notions of administrative

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

85 T.C.M. (CCH) 774 (2003).
Id. at 774.
Id.
Id. at 775.
Id.
Id. at 177.
Id.
See I.R.C. § 6673 (2000).
Lister, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 778 (emphasis omitted).
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law, the interstitial nature of collection decisions makes such decisions inappropriate
subjects for judicial review, no matter when and how they are made.
3. CDP Are Decisions Not Proper Subject for Judicial Review
The dynamic nature of the classification decisions and the high-volume, automated
nature of the collection process are perhaps the most important reasons why adversarial
judicial review adds no value to this branch of tax administration. Taxpayers start out
as presumed won't-pays. To get into the can't-pay box, they must convince the relevant
decision maker that they deserve a collection alternative. Even if they get a collection
alternative, however, it is always conditional on future compliance, usually for five
years. 220 A taxpayer is always subject to reclassification, depending on the changing
facts and circumstances of the taxpayer's life. The CDP provisions make certain lien
and levy decisions subject to court review. But these decisions-whether they are the
first or last in the series of decisions that make up the collection process-are not the
proper subject for judicial review for three fundamental reasons: (1) they represent
aggregate, not individual, decisions about taxpayers; (2) they are, at bottom, decisions
about taxpayers but are reviewed as though they are decisions about taxpayer
accounts; and (3) they are interstitial.
First, the decision reviewed by CDP is almost always an aggregate one. As I
showed above, those who inserted CDP into the Tax Code assumed that the veryfirst
collection actions resulted from IRS employees deciding to levy specific property, such
as a car. They thought that IRS employees misanalyzed information about a particular
taxpayer or ignored a taxpayer's protests. So they fashioned a traditional remedy for
situations in which one person abuses another-a court action allowing taxpayers "one
proposed levy action or
opportunity to have an independent third party look at thefirst
21
,2
thefirst actual Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing ....
The taxwriters fundamentally misunderstood how the IRS operates and, indeed,
must operate, given that it processes over 5.5 million unpaid accounts each year. As I
have shown, the initial decision to levy or file an NFTL is not an individualized
classification decision; it is an aggregate decision. In fact, the ACS CDP notice
represents the confluence of two great aggregate decisions: that all taxpayers are
won't-pays until shown otherwise, and that the levies and NFTLs are needed to collect
both dollars and information from the taxpayers who were either nonresponsive or
inarticulate during the Notice stage. Thus, for all taxpayers whose accounts are
processed beyond the Notice stage, this confluence of two aggregate decisions,
decisions which have nothing to do with them individually, is their one and only
opportunity to complain to a court that the IRS has misclassified them. It is at this point
that CDP bares its paper teeth.

220. Both the Installment Agreement and OIC forms contain clauses in which the taxpayer
agrees to timely file and pay all taxes for the term of the agreements (or five years for OICs). See
I.R.S., FORM 9465: INSTALLMENT AGREEMENT REQUEST (2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f9465.pdf; I.R.S., FoRM 656: OFFER

IN

COMPROMISE (2007),

availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f656.pdf. The IRS monitors compliance closely and
treats defaults as presumptive evidence that the taxpayer was really just a crafty won't-pay. See,
e.g., Robinette v. Comm'r, 123 T.C. 85, 95 (2004), rev'd, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006).
221. 2004 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 459 (emphasis added).

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 84:57

The CDP remedy is simply not designed to review bulk processing decisions. The
adversarial format ofjudicial review is designed to review individualized decisions to
ensure that "a relatively small number ofpersons.., who were exceptionally affected,
in each case upon individual grounds" have the opportunity to contest that decision as
applied to them.222 In administrative law terms, ACS decisions to fire out a levy or an
NFTL are the product of rules, not orders. The situation at the ACS stage is governed
by Bi-Metallic, not Londoner. Until the taxpayer presents enough information for the
IRS to make an individual classification decision, the taxpayer's complaint is, by
definition, a systemic complaint- a rant against the system. There is no consideration
of whether the levy is appropriate for any particular asset of the taxpayer, such as a car.
It's all just abstraction. It is not that the IRS is "right" to issue a levy during the ACS
stage; it is simply that there are no good reasons to not do so based on the information
available at the time.
Second, the decision reviewed by CDP is about collecting a liability. Court review
is framed as whether or not the IRS abused its discretion in deciding to collect this
liability.223 That is the wrong decision to be reviewing. As I have demonstrated,
although the collection tools are used to collect dollars, they are also used to collect
information from which the IRS can classify a taxpayeras a won't-pay or a can't-pay.
So by reviewing the collection decision about a specific account and not the
classification decision about a specific taxpayer, the court is reviewing the wrong
decision. For example, if a taxpayer owes two years worth of taxes, then a court ruling
that the IRS may not collect for one of those years, perhaps because the IRS has
misclassified the taxpayer who is really a224
can't-pay, will in no way prevent the IRS
from proceeding to collect the other year.
Third, CDP requires courts to review only thefirst levy or NFTL. But those first
decisions are not, by any means, the last. This dynamic nature of the collection process
is the most intractable problem. Court review looks at only one frame in the video.
Even if CDP were "reformed" to review the actual classification decisions when they
occurred and on a per taxpayer basis, 225
it would still run smack into this insurmountable
obstacle to effective judicial review.

222. The quote is Justice Holmes's famous tag line in Bi-MetallicInv. Co. v. Colo. Bd.of
Equalization,239 U.S. 441,446 (1915), and is commonly thought of as the great demarcation
between what constitutes adjudicative action and what constitutes legislative action. Holmes
was distinguishing what process was due to persons affected by legislative decisions (rules)
from the process due to persons affected by adjudications. The latter was the subject of
Londonerv.City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). Interestingly, both Londonerand
Bi-Metallic were tax cases.
223. One can look at almost any CDP case for examples of how the courts frame the
question. See, e.g., Sampson v. Comm'r, No. 4170-05S, 2006 WL 1228593, at *1 (T.C. May 8,
2006) (stating that the issue is "whether [the IRS] abused [its] discretion in rejecting an offer-incompromise... that petitioner submitted for the taxable year 2002").
224. See, e.g., Rivera v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 832 (2003); see also infra text
accompanying notes 267-71.
225. For example, Congress could provide narrowly tailored causes of action for each time
the IRS rejects a collection alternative. This would at least put an individualized decision in
front of a court: was the IRS correct in rejecting the taxpayer's Offer In Compromise or
proposed Installment Agreement? Congress has done something similar for taxpayers who seek
to undo the joint liability of a prior return. Section 6015(e) allows for judicial review of IRS
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Generally, courts review only final agency decisions. For example, section 704 of
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provides that courts should review only
"final" agency actions. 226 Doctrinally, the issue is moot for CDP because the statutory
scheme allows review of the first NFTL or levy decision. So, mine is not a doctrinal
argument. Congress has spoken. But the reason that courts wait for agency actions to
be final supports my claim that CDP court review is the wrong process at the wrong
time.
To be a final agency action subject to judicial review, the action must be "the
consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process ... .,, 227 That is, the test is
applied from the agency's point of view. Simply because a decision imposes legal
disabilities or liabilities does not alone make the decision final.228 The reason courts
give for this requirement is that it allows the agency sufficient room to carry out its
mission without excessive judicial entanglement. 229 Even an interstitial decision which
imposes significant costs on the plaintiff is not thereby made final. For example, in
Nor-Am AgriculturalProducts,Inc. v. Hardin,the Seventh Circuit declined to review
an emergency order issued by the Department of Agriculture that suspended a
company's registration of a pesticide, thus preventing the company from using or
selling the product. 230 The company asked the federal courts to find that the agency had
abused its discretion under the relevant statute, and both the district court and a panel
of the Seventh Circuit did so. The Seventh Circuit heard the case en banc, however,
and decided that the emergency order was neither a "final" order within the meaning of
the organic statute nor a final agency action subject to judicial review within the
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. 231 It explained that the purpose of
limiting judicial review to final orders was "to avoid delay and interference with
agency proceedings by confining review to orders effectively terminating
administrative adjudication." 232 The emergency order was not final because the agency
had procedures in place to continue the process. While from the plaintiff's point of
view the decision was final because it would force the plaintiff out of business, the
court applied the test for finality from the agency's view of finality, not the plaintiff's.
The aggregate collection decisions made during the ACS process are not final in the
administrative law sense of final agency action. They are continually subject to
modification. Levied property may be returned and NFTLs withdrawn. Rejections of
collection alternatives are not final agency actions because taxpayers can come back at
anytime with more or different information. The default presumption of won't-pay is
refusals to relieve spouses of joint liability. See I.R.C. § 6015(e) (2000). While that is not a
collection decision, it is still an example of a targeted cause of action. But as I explain in the
text, it would still not make sense because collection is such a moving target.
226. See I.R.C § 7421 (2000).
227. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (emphasis added); see also Appalachian
Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
228. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-78 (articulating a two-part test for determining the finality
of agency actions in which "affecting legal relations" is the second part).
229. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, &PAULR. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROCESS § 5.7.1 (4th ed. 2004) ("The requirement of final agency action as a prerequisite to

judicial review is designed to avoid premature judicial involvement in the agency decision
making process.").
230. 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970).

231. Id.at 1155.
232. Id. at 1157.

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 84:57

subject to revision until the account is fully paid. And at that point, the taxpayer has the
refund remedy.
The interstitial nature of the reviewed decision is highlighted by comparing it with
the § 7433 damage action.2333Ifan IRS employee willfully or negligently disregards any
statute or regulation regarding collection of tax, § 7433 allows a taxpayer to recover
the greater of a statutory minimum or actual economic damages. 234 In § 7433 cases, a
court reviews a discrete set of past actions taken by a specific IRS employee and
judges whether those actions violated a law.235 The events being reviewed are over.
What is done is done. In contrast, the actions subject to CDP review are not over; what
is being reviewed is an intermediate point in the collection process which may or may
not change in the future. Yogi Berra said it best: "It ain't over 'til it's over."236 And in
collection, it ain't over until it's paid.
4. Costs of CDP
CDP's failure to live up to its promise is not benign. I count at least three costs to
both the public at large and to taxpayers who are fooled into thinking that they will get
their proverbial day in court. First, there is a resource cost, both within the IRS and the
courts. Accepting the need for effective review of collection decisions, the CDP
framework is suboptimal. Second, CDP has done doctrinal damage that has
undermined the foundational role of the assessment in tax administration. Third, as it
has developed, CDP threatens the symbolic legitimacy of both courts and the tax
collection system. I shall discuss each in turn.
i. Resource Costs
The CDP drain on resources comes from two sources. First, many taxpayers who
are correctly classified as won't-pays soak up agency and court resources that could be
used to help other taxpayers or to resolve other pending litigation. While various
studies have consistently reported that taxpayers who raise only frivolous, time-wasting
arguments make up about five percent of administrative CDP cases, 23 7 my study shows
that they make up over thirty-seven percent of the 976 cases that resulted in court
decisions between 2000 and the end of 2006.238 In both examples, this minority of
taxpayers hogs a hugely disproportionate share of resources as agency or court

233. I.R.C. § 7433 (2000); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7433-1 (as amended in 2003).
234. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7433-1.
235. See generally Steve R. Johnson Code Sec. 7433: Damages Against the IRS for
Wrongful Collection Actions, J. TAx. PRAC. & PROc., Dec. 2006-Jan. 2007, at 23.
236. YOGI BERRA wrrH TOM HORTON, YOGI: IT AIN'T OVER... 5 (1989).
237. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-53-03, REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, at 15

(2003), availableat http://www.house.gov/jct/x-53-03.pdf; GAO 2006 CDP STUDY, supranote
31, at 17. The IRS has surmised that five percent of taxpayers hogged agency resources because
"[a]ppeals personnel must often read lengthy frivolous submissions in search of any substantive
issue that might be contained within the case file." Similarly, courts have to deal with even more
of the same. Id.
238. See infra app. tbl.l.
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personnel slog through "lengthy frivolous submissions in search of any substantive
issue that might be contained within the case file., 239 For example, in Satterlee v.
United States, the court noted that the taxpayer's initial petition was "ninety eight
pages long and difficult to comprehend at best., 240 The court diligently scoured the
complaint for some substance and spent eight pages addressing it. 241 Although in the
great scheme of things this is not a large cost, it is a cost nonetheless.
The second cost is more direct and more substantial: delayed collection. In theory,
delay costs both taxpayers and the government for the same reason: the time value of
money. For every day that taxpayers delay collection, they owe additional interest and
possible penalties on their taxes. For example, in Harris v. Commissioner, the
petitioners properly filed and reported their tax liabilities in each of the years from
1995 to 1999, but had not fully paid those years. 242 Their unpaid taxes totaled $6,421.
However, by the time their OIC was denied on November 30, 2003, their liability for
interest on their unpaid taxes totaled $7,122,243 making their total liability more than
double the amount of unpaid tax. The National Taxpayer Advocate has rightly noted
that the accumulation of interest and penalties on those taxpayer accounts not resolved
during the Notice stage will often equal or exceed the original delinquencies. 2" While
for tax protestors this accumulation of interest and penalties may be just the cost of
their hobby, for the vast majority of taxpayers, the promise of CDP leads them further
and further into debt.
The government also loses by delay. The accumulation of theoretical interest and
penalties is useless if they are never collected. As the National Taxpayer Advocate
notes, "delayed meaningful contacts on delinquent collection cases actually contribute
to wasted resources by focusing them on inventories that are inflated by multiple
delinquent tax periods .... ,245 Just like in comedy, timing is everything in debt
collection practice. It is the early creditor who usually worms the most money from the
debtor. The IRS statistics in the following table tell the story; after three years,
collections on each unpaid dollar reaches zero.246
Table 1. IRS Collection on an Unpaid Dollar Reaching Zero After Three Years

Current
$1.00

Month
$0.97

3 Months

6 Months

12 Months

$0.72

$0.53

$0.28

4 Months
$0.13

36 MonthsI
$0.00

ii. Doctrinal Damage
Court review of CDP threatens the sound development of the tax law in two ways.
First, it seriously undermines the legal effect of the assessment. Recall that the tax

239. GAO 2006 CDP STuDY, supra note 31, at 17.
240. 432 F. Supp. 2d 941, 944 (W.D. Mo. 2006).
241. See id.at 941-48.

242. Harris v. Comm'r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 217 (2006).
243. Id.
244. See 2006 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra,note 54, at 65-66.
245. Id. at 69.
246. The table is created using data from 2004 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supranote 52,

at 233 tbl.1.15.1 (footnotes omitted).
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assessment represents the culmination of an administrative process to determine a
taxpayer's liability. When the IRS disagrees with the taxpayer's self reported liability,
it issues a Notice of Deficiency, and the taxpayer may obtain pre-assessment judicial
review by going to the Tax Court. But once the assessment is made, the strong pay-first
rule takes over and a taxpayer who wishes to contest the assessed liability must first
fully pay the liability before seeking a refund. Traditionally, therefore, taxpayers who
self report their liability and whose returns are accepted by the IRS have no rights to
argue for a change in an adversary forum without first fully paying the assessed
liability. In short, the assessment performs the function of a judgment.
CDP undermines this role of the assessment by permitting all taxpayers who have
not received a Notice of Deficiency to contest their liability through CDP, including
taxpayers who self reported the liability and accordingly never received a Notice of
Deficiency. This is the Tax Court's plain language interpretation of § 6330 in one of
the more notable taxpayer "victories" out of the 976 judicial decisions found.247 Under
this reading, CDP threatens the historic pay-first rule and provides taxpayers a way to
end run the Anti-Injunction Act.248 Even the National Taxpayer Advocate recognizes
this problem and has asked Congress to limit post-assessment court review of liability
to a review of whether the IRS properly considered a taxpayer's request for an audit
reconsideration. 249
The second source of doctrinal damage is the adversary process of court review,
which increases the risk that bad collection policy will become bad law. For example,
recall that the IRS refused to consider Mrs. Crawford's proposal that it first collect
from her husband because even though they both owed the tax, she was the one who
was supposed to pay.250 Whether or not the IRS should consider such a request is a
matter of collection policy beyond the scope of this Article. Doing so might or might
not make sense. But because the issue came up in an adversarial context where the
government attorney (an attorney from the Department of Justice and not even from the
IRS) was called upon to zealously advocate for his client, the government took the
position that the statutory definition of "collection alternatives" must, as a matter of
law, be read to exclude proposals such as Mrs. Crawford's."' What should be a policy
call becomes, in the courts, a statutory call.

247. See Montgomery v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 1 (2004).
248. See I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2000).
249. See 2004 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 461-63 ("Providing a second
opportunity to go to court to a taxpayer who, for whatever reason, has already had one
opportunity to challenge the underlying tax liability in Tax Court and missed it, diminishes the
meaning of the Notice of Deficiency and pre-assessment review."); see also Danshera Cords,
CollectionDue Process: The Scope andNature of JudicialReview, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1021,
1044-45 (2005).
250. See supratext accompanying notes 183-96.
251. See Crawford v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Nev. 2006). For an excellent,
thoughtful essay on the proper ethical role of government counsel, see Michael Hatfield, Fear,
Legal Indeterminacy,and the American Lawyering Culture, 10 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 511

(2007). It is, of course, possible that the government position was not simply a litigation
position and that the Office of Appeals had sought guidance from the Office of Chief Counsel,
which had concluded that the statute barred consideration of third-party payments in evaluating
collection options. But that would be very strange, especially considering the CDP regulations
were deliberately crafted to emphasize the broad range of alternatives that the Office of Appeals
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Another example of this effect of adversarial court review is Parker v.
Commissioner, which, like Crawford, is another taxpayer "victory" and one which
252
CDP advocates believe shows how judicial review checks IRS systemic abuses.
While I count Parker as a taxpayer victory, the court's review did not uncover a
systemic problem, much less fix it. Worse, the case shows how a bad collection policy
might get set in law. I read Parkeras a cautionary tale.
In Parker,the taxpayer sent in the proper form to request a hearing. 2 3 The IRM
instructs SOs to generally schedule hearings within thirty days and to give taxpayers
fourteen days to respond to information requests. 254 Treasury Regulation § 301.6320-1
provides that if the taxpayer requests a face-to-face hearing, the taxpayer must be given
the hearing "at the Appeals Office closest to [the] taxpayer's residence." 255 In Parker,
the SO violated both directives, giving the taxpayer less than eight days to arrange to
drive 180 miles to a hearing, even though there was an Appeals Office where the
taxpayer lived.256 The taxpayer did not make the hearing, but managed to fax a
document to the SO on the scheduled day of the hearing. The document explained that
he could not make the meeting, had not had time to prepare, and wanted a face-to-face
hearing in his city of residence. The taxpayer and the SO then talked on the phone. The
SO heard enough, and, ignoring the taxpayer's request for a face-to-face
hearing,
257
issued the Notice of Determination approving collection action.
In court, the IRS attorney raised a ludicrous ex post argument that the taxpayer had
waived a face-to-face hearing because he had not explicitly asked for one on his initial
request for a CDP hearing. The court properly rejected that argument and remanded
the case to the Office of Appeals to give the taxpayer a face-to-face hearing.258 There
was not, however, any systemic error. The aggregate collection decisions reflected in
the regulations and IRM instructions were fine; as a result of the case, the IRS did not
have to change one word in its regulations or the IRM. The problem was not that there
was a bad operating procedure so much as it was that the IRS attorney-under the
pressure of an adversary system-put out a silly ex post argument that taxpayers waive
their right to a face-to-face hearing if they do not explicitly request one on the initial
form. The adversary system often produces ex post defenses that, if successful, then
become entrenched rules of law. Far from adding value, this case shows again the
potential downside of the adversarial process. A different court, with less
understanding of tax procedure, might well have bought the argument and thus
entrenched an operating rule that nowhere appears in the regulations or IRM. Parker
represents the potential cost of CDP to the system.

could consider. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3) (as amended in 2006).
252. See Parker v. Comm'r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 327 (2004). In her 2005 Annual Report, the
National Taxpayer Advocate cites Parker as a case showing how "U]udicial review is an
essential component of CDP rights because in some instances the IRS collection system
demonstrates .. .[t]he desire to obtain efficiencies of scale at the expense of providing
taxpayers with a reasonable CDP hearing .... 2005 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supranote
75, at 457-58 & 458 n.70.
253. See Parker,88 T.C.M. (CCH) at 327.
254. See INTERNAL REvENUE MANuAL, supra note 35, at § 8.22.2.2.
255. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(d)(2), Q & A D7 (as amended in 2006).
256. Parker, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) at 327.
257. See id.
258. See id.
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iii. Symbolic Dilution
Our society and culture, and particularly our legal system, have long elevated and
celebrated the idea and ideal of the individual.259 Scholars recognize that adversarial
process furthers that ideal in two important ways. First, it allows justice to be
administered on a retail, not wholesale, level, and in a manner that respects the
individual's autonomy. 260 Second, it serves as a symbol of the proper administration of
justice.26' I have demonstrated above how CDP court review fails the first purpose: it
does not help secure the information necessary for the proper classification of
taxpayers, and it rarely reviews a truly individualized agency decision about a
particular taxpayer.
CDP proponents claim that Collection Due Process adds value, if for no other
reason than because it provides taxpayers with a symbol that the system cares about
them. 262 The very use of the term "Collection Due Process" and the rhetoric used by
the taxwriters in 1998 plays up the symbolic function: taxpayers get their day in court.
But a symbol which is a cynical, empty, and false promise becomes pernicious and
destructive. 263 CDP perverts courts as symbols ofjustice and transforms them instead
into symbols of taxpayer manipulation and government oppression.
On the taxpayer side, there is one population of taxpayers who delight in CDP:
those who use the process to delay payment or to promote their syphilitic politics. They
might be can't-pays or they might be won't-pays, but they refuse to give up the
information from which a decision can be made.
On the government side, the most egregiously cynical aspect of CDP is that it
reviews only liens and levies, leaving improperly classified can't-pays vulnerable to
the Service's third great collection tool: setoffs. Setoffs do not trigger CDP "rights."
Setoffs happen automatically whenever the IRS computers sniff out a past-due tax

259. See generally KERMrrL. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW INAMERICAN HISTORY (1989)
(emphasizing the growth of law as growth of individual rights against the state); PERRY MILLER,
THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIL WAR BOOKS ONE

THROUGH THREE (1965) (introducing and defending the "head/heart" dichotomy).

260. See Camp, supranote 2, at 17-20 (discussing the differences between the inquisitorial
and adversarial systems).
261. See generally Jon C. Dubin, TorquemadaMeets Kaflca: The Misapplicationof the Issue
Exhaustion Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1289
(1997); Mark Fenster, The Birth of a "Logical System ": Thurman Arnold and the Making of
Modern Administrative Law, 84 OR. L. REv. 69 (2005); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side
of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy,
Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication ofSocial Security Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
772 (1974).
262. See, e.g., Danshera Cords, How Much Process Is Due? I.R. C.Sections 6320 and 6330
Collection Due Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REv. 51, 102 (2004) ("Without a consistent process

that comports with our notions of 'due process,' public confidence in the fairness, equality, and
effectiveness of the tax collection system may be reduced. This risk may pose a significant threat
to our system of tax collection. Taxpayers are far less likely to comply with the tax law if they

believe that the tax law is unfair or that they are not afforded the same rights as others.").
263. Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers ofSymbolic Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of
the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REv. 413, 415 (1999) (describing recent tax law

provisions as a "pernicious exercise in symbolic legislation").
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liability or other approved debt against which the refund may be applied.2 4 Yet it is
the setoff of Earned Income Tax Credits (EITCs) that can cause many low income
taxpayers the most problems. 265 If ever there was a case to be made for pre-deprivation
"hearings" of the adversarial type, it is for EITC taxpayers. Many have the "brutal
need" for the credit, which is the replacement-in the form ofa refundable tax creditfor the same type ofwelfare payments that the Supreme Court decided were important
enough to require a pre-deprivation hearing. 266 To the extent one believes in CDP's
effectiveness, omitting these collection actions from review is outrageous; it diminishes
even the symbolic value of CDP as a protector of innocent taxpayers unjustly treated
by the IRS.
But wait, it gets worse. Recall that a court reviews only collection decisions about
tax periodsand not decisions about taxpayers. But those collection decisions are really
a judgment about whether a taxpayer is a can't-pay or a won't-pay. Accordingly, if a
taxpayer is faced with collection on multiple tax liabilities but can only get to court on
one of them, a decision by the court that the IRS abused its discretion to collect that
liability from that taxpayer is good for nothing. The IRS can still collect on the other
tax period. Even if the taxpayer gets both tax periods before the court, the court may
well issue a "split decision" finding for the taxpayer on one year and for the IRS on
another year.
The case of Rivera v. Commissionerillustrates the cost.2 67 It was a "split decision"
because the court disallowed collection on some ofthe taxpayer's accounts but allowed
collection to proceed on others. 268 Victory it may have been, but mostly it was a waste
of everyone's time for the following reasons.
John Rivera did not file tax returns for many years. The IRS investigated and
assessed tax liabilities against him for the years 1977-92, 1994, and 1997 for a total of
$175,000, with approximately $106,000 stemming from the 1977-1983 period and the
remaining $69,000 from the other years. Rivera had a face-to-face CDP hearing during
which the SO suggested several collection alternatives to him, but Rivera never sent in
the forms or information necessary to process any collection alternative. Eventually, a
year after he requested his CDP hearing, the SO issued a Notice of Determination and

264. As the IRS explains on its Web site, "you may not get all of your refund if you owe
certain past-due amounts, such as federal tax, state tax, a student loan, or child support. The IRS
will automatically apply the refund to the [amounts] owed." I.R.S., Refund Inquiries,
http://www.irs.gov/faqs/faq/0,,id=199566,00.html.
265. See, e.g., Bartman v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1213 (2004), aff'd in part,vacated in
part, 446 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2006) (describing how one taxpayer's EITC of $3000 was setoff
when the newly divorced and unemployed taxpayer had less than $5000 gross income). Since
the IRS collected by setoff, the taxpayer had no recourse to CDP. Id. Not only does the IRS
automatically setoff refunds against past tax liabilities reflected in the IRS records, but in
another bulk processing decision, it also will automatically hold refunds if its records show that
the taxpayer did not file a return in any one of the five prior years. INTERNAL REvENuE MANUAL,
supra note 35, § 25.12.1.1. The taxpayer must then contact the IRS and show a legitimate
reason for the non-filing in order to get the refund.
266. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Whether EITCs are "property" to the
extent of triggering a constitutional due process analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. I
happen to think that a good case can be made that they are.
267. 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 832 (2003).
268. See id. at 835.
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Rivera went to have his day in court. 269 The main decision by the court was that the
IRS had improperly assessed Rivera for the years 1977-1983. As a result, the court
barred the IRS from collecting any of those liabilities and remanded the case for
further proceedings with respect to those years. 27° The court spent six pages reviewing
the liability decision but then took only one sentence to decide that the IRS did not
abuse its discretion in collecting the other assessed liabilities.27'
What did Rivera "win"? First, he won delay. Rivera successfully delayed collection
of all liabilities for some 1,200 days, from February 1, 2000, the date of the CDP
notice, until May 14, 2003, ninety days after the Tax Court decision. If nothing else,
CDP taxpayers always "win" delay as shown by Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix.
Rivera also won the reduction of his liabilities from $175,000 to $69,000 (until such
time as the IRS properly reassessed the liabilities disallowed). Whether or not that is a
"victory" depends on whether or not Rivera had the money to pay the $175,000. If
Rivera was truly a won't-pay, then delaying collection of $106,000 is certainly a
"victory" for him. However, that kind of taxpayer manipulation is hardly a "victory"
for good tax administration. Quite the opposite, such a "victory" is an abomination. A
flush Rivera should be made to pay the assessments and then litigate in a refund suit.
Make Rivera fulfill his duty to report his financial transactions by bearing the burden
to show that he overpaid his taxes in a refund suit. Make Rivera, and not law-abiding
taxpayers, suffer the consequence of his poor record-keeping and non-compliance with
his legal obligation to file returns and pay taxes.
But what if Rivera was truly just an inarticulate can't-pay?272 Where's the victory
now? Now the IRS goes after him for $69,000 instead of $175,000. Big deal. Recall
that CDP does not review the IRS classification of Rivera-as-taxpayer, it just reviews
the decisions about a particular liability. To the IRS, he is still a won't-pay. The system
rolls on and inarticulate taxpayers are crushed. So the IRS still levies his wages, it still
seizes his car or other personalty, it still files a Notice of Federal Tax Lien, which
damages his credit and impedes his ability to transfer assets. In short, it still intrudes on
his life in a most unpleasant way. CDP has done nothing to help Rivera if he was
improperly classified.
Assuming Rivera was really an inarticulate can't-pay, CDP is worse than useless.
Mr. Rivera spent time, energy, emotion, and faith thinking he could "have his day in
court." He got it, but it did not help him whatsoever. Rivera thus illustrates the cost of
CDP to taxpayers. On the one hand, taxpayers properly classified as won't-pays ought
not to have CDP because it simply delays the proper collection of tax at the expense of
compliant taxpayers. On the other hand, improperly classified taxpayers need much,

269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See id.
Since Rivera had not filed returns for those years, there was no limitation period
for the IRS to assess. See generally I.R.C. § 6501(c) (2000).
272. The record suggests that Rivera may have been an inarticulate taxpayer who needed a
voice. See Rivera, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 832 (suggesting that the face-to-face conference seemed
to define some issues, but that Rivera did not follow up). After he filed his petition to the Tax
Court, the IRS sent him copies of Form 4340 for all the tax periods at issue asking Rivera to
admit to the truth of them. Id. at 833. Rivera failed to respond. Id. These failures to respond and
Rivera's failure to get counsel suggest that Rivera may not have had the resources to articulate
his position.
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much more than what CDP gives them in order to truly have a meaningful opportunity
to be heard. Part IV sketches some ideas toward the latter.
B. The Study and Its Results
The numbers support my theoretical critiques. To study the efficacy of judicial
review, I gathered into a database all court decisions issued during the study period
that reviewed a taxpayer appeal from a CDP hearing. 273 The review period ran from the
first court decision issued in January 2000 through the end of December 2006.274
During this review period, 976 court orders addressed appeals by taxpayers from the
administrative CDP process. A summary of my basic data appears in Table I of the
Appendix. My study addressed four areas: (1) how often do taxpayers prevail in court
and to what effect; (2) what effect, if any, does representation by counsel have on
outcomes; (3) how many taxpayers abuse the court process by raising frivolous
275
arguments; and (4) how much time does court review add to the collection process. I
present my findings in that order.
1. Courts Overturn Only One-in-a-Million Collection Decisions
To study how taxpayers fare in court, I coded cases where a taxpayer appealed from
a Notice of Determination and where the court did not completely affirm the IRS
decision as a taxpayer "win." Using those criteria, I counted sixty-three taxpayer wins
among the 976 cases reviewed. 276 I then divided the wins into three types: (1) those
where the court rejected the merits of the IRS decision at issue; (2) those where the
court found error in the procedure that produced the IRS decision at issue and
remanded the case to the IRS to do over; and (3) those where the court's decision was
interstitial-where the taxpayer had survived an IRS motion to dismiss or motion for
277
summary judgment, and where I could find no further recorded activity in the case.

273. My assistants searched three electronic databases to find evidence of opinions: LEXIS,
Westlaw, and Tax Analysts. In addition, if upon reading a case my assistants found evidence of
another court decision that had not been picked up by any of those services (such as a reported
appellate decision referencing a trial court decision), they tracked it down on PACER. Once
again, I must thank my assistant Lee Franks for his prodigious assistance in this matter. He was
truly the Oscar Peterson of Excel and performed the heavy lifting for data input and quality
control. He also rendered many of the charts and graphs and, most importantly, gave thought
and care to his work. I would also like to thank my prior research assistants Ariya McGrew,
Peter Hall, and John Valdez for all their help in setting up the database and doing the initial data
entry. Naturally, I remain responsible for any errors.
274. The first case was Diefenbaugh v. Weiss, No. 3:99 MC 7029, 2000 WL 202705 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 6, 2000), aff'd,No. 00-3344, 2000 WL 1679510 (6th Cir. Nov. 3, 2000).
275. I initially gathered data to compare outcomes as between district courts, which handled
approximately forty percent of all CDP appeals, and the Tax Court, which handled the
remaining sixty percent. Note that neither the Court of Federal Claims, nor any bankruptcy
court, issued any decision reviewing a CDP hearing during the review period. However, since
all CDP appeals must now be taken to the Tax Court, I have not analyzed this data in this
Article.
276. See infra app. tbl.2 for a listing of these cases.
277. I did not count cases as "win" cases where a subsequent decision showed that the
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The sixty-three wins broke into twenty-seven "merit" decisions, twenty-six
"procedural" decisions, and ten "interstitial" decisions. Finally, I looked at whether the
IRS decision at issue was one about the taxpayer's liability or about collection
alternatives. Of the sixty-three wins, twenty-six concerned IRS liability decisions and
thirty-seven involved IRS collection decisions.
Pegging the number of wins at sixty-three of 976 (or 6.5%) both understates and
overstates the benefit to taxpayers of CDP court review. The number understates the
benefits because the 976 reported outcomes probably cover less than half of the court
cases filed. In its 2006 study of CDP administrative hearings, the General
Accountability Office estimated that approximately two percent of administrative
decisions were appealed in fiscal year 2004.278 Given that the IRS Office of Appeals
has closed approximately 149,311 administrative hearings since 1999, it is reasonable
to expect some 3,000 cases to have been appealed to courts for review.279 While the

taxpayer had lost on remand. See Newstat v. Comm'r, No. 16989-02L, 2004 WL 2075172 (T.C.
Sept. 16, 2004) (upholding an IRS collection decision for one year, but remanding the case a
second year for a new CDP hearing). The remand in Newstat produced the same collection
decision and the court upheld it. Newstat v. Comm'r, No. 16989-02L, 2005 WL 3068347 (T.C.
Nov. 10, 2005); see also Ahee v. United States, No. CV-S-01-0211-KJD LRL, 2002 WL
10223165 (D. Nev. Dec. 27, 2001) (where the government moved for the remand to give a
taxpayer a face-to-face hearing). The same court later upheld the resulting decision to collect.
Ahee v. United States, No. CV-S-01-021 I-KJD LRL, 2002 WL 31061637 (D. Nev. July 22,
2002). Nor did I count as a "win" cases like Burt, Inc. v. IRS, No. 2:05-CV-301, 2006 WL
2797744 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2006) (where the taxpayer survived an IRS Motion for Summary
Affirmance). The same court later awarded the IRS a Motion for Summary Judgment. Burt, Inc.
v. IRS, No. 2:05-CV-301, 2007 WL 952009 (N.D. Ind.Mar. 27, 2007). In addition, I did not
count cases like Dora v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 356 (2002) (where the taxpayer survived a Motion
to Dismiss when the court decided it had jurisdiction to review the IRS decision to collect by
jeopardy levy). Petitioner ultimately lost the case on the merits. Dorn v. Comm'r, No. 6240OOL, 2003 WL 21500028 (T.C. July 1, 2003). To the same effect, compare Parker v. Comm'r,
117 T.C. 63 (2001) (establishing that the tax court had jurisdiction to review), with Parker v.
Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) (2005) (upholding the IRS collection decision). Finally, I did not
include as a "win" one case that was later reversed on appeal. Robinette v. Comm'r, 123 T.C. 85
(2004), rev'd, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006). In sum, unless I could find an adverse final
outcome, I counted all remands and interstitial victories as taxpayer "wins."
278. GAO 2006 CDP STUDY, supranote 31, at 4. The GAO studied 208 of the 32,241 CDP

administrative hearings closed by the IRS Office of Appeals in fiscal year 2004. Id.
at 2.
279. This number was a bit tricky to find. First, I looked at the GAO 2006 CDP STUDY,
supra note 31, at 12 fig.2, which reports that the Office of Appeals closed 126,200 hearings
between fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2005. The 2005 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra
note 75, at 459 tbl.2.7. 1, reports that the 2,276,684 CDP Notices issued in fiscal year 2004
generated 28,113 requests for CDP hearings. The report does not say, however, how many CDP
requests were made during any other time period. Id.The 2006 GAO study reports the number
of CDP administrative case closures per year through fiscal year 2005, but does not report the
number of requests. GAO 2006 CDP STUDY, supranote 31, at 12 fig.2. Given that a CDP case
takes an average of 300 days to process in the Office of Appeals, the GAO figure of 27,900 case
closures in fiscal year 2005, id., correlates nicely with the Taxpayer Advocate's report of28,133
CDP requests in fiscal year 2004. 2005 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 75, at
tbl.2.7. 1. Accordingly, I used the number of case closures reported by the GAO for fiscal year
2000 through fiscal year 2005, and then took an average to project a value for fiscal year 2006.
Since the number of administrative CDP cases has been fairly steady since fiscal year 2002, it
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lack of a reported outcome in sixty percent of the cases might be mostly due to
taxpayers not pursuing the matter, it is also quite possible that some taxpayers derive
additional benefit because filing suit brings into the picture a new set of decision
makers: IRS and DOJ attorneys. To that extent, CDP acts to provide taxpayers another
chance to negotiate, to provide more information, or to present the same information to
new eyes.
However, to the extent that the promise of CDP was to provide an external check on
abusive collection decisions by agency personnel, the ratio of sixty-three wins per 976
decided cases woefully overstates the benefit of CDP court review. The numerator
should be far smaller and the denominator should be far, far larger.
The numerator of sixty-three overstates the effectiveness of CDP court review in
two important ways. First, thirteen of those decisions are "split decisions" like the
Rivera case discussed above. 28 0 I would submit that "split decisions" are of little help
to taxpayers because the IRS gets the green light to continue the very types of
collection actions complained of. Second, another seven are cases where CDP provides
a duplicative avenue to court review. That is, these seven taxpayers would have been
able to obtain equivalent court review even without CDP, so CDP added no value to
them.28 1 That brings the numerator down to forty-three cases, including those where the
taxpayer simply "won" a remand or just survived an interstitial motion. If one
eliminates those, then the numerator comes down to sixteen cases where one can
conclusively say that a court found that the IRS had made an incorrect liability or
collection decision.
The denominator is also wrong. The promise of CDP was to provide court review of
IRS collection decisions. The proper denominator should therefore be the universe of
IRS collection decisions. Between fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2006, the IRS took

seems reasonable to assume similar numbers over the course of the calendar year compared to
the fiscal year. Accordingly, I apply the two percent estimate to the number of hearings closed.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 267-72.
281. These cases include two where the taxpayer was also in bankruptcy and sought a ruling
that the IRS was thereby prohibited from proceeding with any CDP hearing during the
bankruptcy. This issue could just as well be raised before the bankruptcy court, as the taxpayer
did in In re Parker, 279 B.R. 596 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2002). Two other cases involved the
taxpayer's claim of entitlement to innocent spouse relief under §6015, which the taxpayer could
have just as well raised through the court review provisions in § 6015(e). For a discussion of the
interplay between the CDP provisions in §§ 6320 and 6330 and the Innocent Spouse provisions
in § 6015, see Bryan T. Camp, The EqualProtectionProblemin Innocent Spouse Procedures,
TAX NoTEs TODAY, July 18, 2006, availableat 2006 TNT 137-C (LExis). Finally, three cases

involved taxpayers seeking court review of the liability for the Trust Fund Recovery Penalty
(TFRP) imposed by § 6672. This is a penalty imposed on a responsible person for failure to
properly pay withholding taxes of his or her employees. While there is no pure prepayment
court review, taxpayers have to only pay one employee's withholding for one quarter to get into
court. See, e.g., Fidelity Bank v. United States, 616 F.2d 1181, 1182 n.1 (10th Cir. 1980)
(taxpayer paid $381 to gain review of assessed penalty of over $36,000). Once a taxpayer pays
the withholding, the IRS will cease collection of the entire liability pending the outcome of
judicial review. See I.R.C. § 6672(c) (2000); INTERNAL REvENuE MANUAL, supra note 35, §
5.7.7.6.2. Accordingly, the CDP provisions are simply a duplicate method for taxpayers who
want to contest their TFRP liability. Notice, however, that I did not count as duplicative those
cases where a taxpayer sought relief from a collection decision regarding the TFRP, only those
where a taxpayer contested a liability decision.
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15,822,443 discrete collection actions. 282 During that same period the Office of
Appeals considered and closed an estimated 149,311 requests for an administrative
CDP hearing. 283 Of those, probably 3,000 or so resulted in petitions filed in district
court or tax court. 284 The table below sets out the potential figures.
Table 2. Potential Numerators and Denominators
Potential
Numerators

All Wins

Wins less Splits
and Duplicates

Wins less Splits,
Duplicates, and
Procedural
Victories

63

Potential
Denominators

All Recorded
Court Decisions
1

976

43

Probable Court
Petitions
3,000

16

Administrative
Hearings Held
149,311

Collection
Decisions
15,822,443

Thus, if one asks "how often does the taxpayer win decided cases?" the proper ratio
would be sixty-three wins out of 976 decisions, or 6.5% of the time. However, if one
asks "how often will a collection decision be overturned by a court?" the proper ratio is
sixteen to 15,822,443, or 0.0001%. In other words, courts do not disturb 99.999% of
collection decisions made. That equals a ratio of one decision overturned to 988,903
collection decisions made. It is not a stretch to call that ratio one in a million. I submit
that the latter question is the correct one because the promise of CDP was to provide
judicial oversight of the claimed IRS abuse of taxpayers.
Note that I do not claim that the IRS commits error in only one in a million cases. In
fact, I have little doubt that the IRS erroneously classifies can't-pays far, far more often
than that. The point is that the adversarial process of court review is inherently
ineffective to police the bulk processing of collection accounts and these numbers
strongly support allowing those judicial resources to be used elsewhere.
2. Represented Taxpayers Are Three Times as Likely to Prevail
The second finding of my study also supports the argument that CDP adds little
value to taxpayers. Taxpayers represented themselves in 741 of the 976 cases
reviewed, a ratio of seventy-six percent. Yet only 4.5% of pro se taxpayers were able
to convince a court that the IRS committed error, while 12.7% of represented taxpayers

282. This figure is the sum total of cases reported by the IRS in 2003 and 2006 for the years
TREASURY, 2003 DATA BOOK 27 tbl.16, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03databk.pdf; 2006 DATA BooKsupra note 9, at4l tbl.16. Each
table breaks the collection decisions into NFTLs filed, levies issued, and seizures made.
Furthermore, each table provides data for the three years prior to the year being reported. Recall
that most of these collection actions were not individualized decisions. For example, ninety-four
percent of all levies were the product of aggregate decisions made at the ACS stage. See supra
text accompanying notes 205-07.
283. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
284. The GAO estimated that approximately two percent of the taxpayers who requested an
administrative hearing during fiscal year 2004 later sought court review. GAO 2006 CDP
2000-2006. I.R.S., DEP'T OF THE

STUDy, supra note 31, at 4.
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gained some sort of relief or survived a dispositive motion, as the following table
illustrates.
Table 3. Taxpayer Legal Representation and Outcomes in CDP Cases
Representation

Number of Cases

Percent of All Cases

Number of Wins

Win Percent

Pro se

741

75.9

33

4.5

With
Representation

235

24.1

30

12.7

Total

976

100

63

6.5

This finding is ambiguous. On the one hand, it supports a hypothesis that, in an
adversary process, professional representation helps the taxpayer find "voice."
Professionals are far less likely to goof up technical rules ofpleading, such as failing to
raise all arguments in the administrative hearing. 285 The case of Brown v.
Commissioner illustrates this point.286 There, the taxpayer failed to raise in his pleading
"a spousal defense or make a valid challenge to the appropriateness of respondent's
intended collection actions. These issues are now deemed conceded. 287 Mr. Brown
got tripped up by Tax Court Rule 33 l(b)(4), which provides that a taxpayer's petition
must raise all issues and "[a]ny issue not raised in the assignments of error shall be
deemed to be conceded. Each assignment of error shall be separately lettered." Even if
Mr. Brown had raised these issues during the administrative process, and even if Mr.
Brown had carefully ensured that the proper record got before the Tax Court, Mr.
Brown also needed to be sure to mention these issues in his pleading. This first
hypothesis assumes that all claims have roughly equal merit, but that only those who
can afford representation can get their message across. The others have no choice but
to go it alone because they cannot afford to hire a professional voice.
On the other hand, the finding might support an argument that legal professionals
perform a screening function. Taxpayers whose cases have merit are more likely to
find someone to represent them, and taxpayers who seek to raise only frivolous claims
are less likely to find representation. I cannot rule out this hypothesis entirely,
especially when one considers the high percentage of frivolous claims made on appeal
to courts. However, in its study of administrative CDP hearings, the GAO noted that
'
"most individuals were lower-income taxpayers with varied liability amounts."288
Specifically, it found that fifty-four percent of CDP requests came from taxpayers

285. One of the main technical pleading rules provides that a taxpayer may not seek court
review of an issue that the taxpayer did not mention during the administrative hearing. Treas.
Reg. § 301.6330-1(f)(2) (2006); see also Bourbeau v. Comm'r, No. 6896-02L, 2003 WL
1918920 (T.C. Apr. 22, 2003). While normally it is pro se taxpayers who commit this error,
counsel can do so as well. See Bruce v. Comm'r, No. 24303-05L, 2007 WL 1793448 (T.C. June
21, 2007) (refusing to consider a taxpayer's request for penalty abatement because, while the
taxpayer appeared to raise an issue of liability in his request for CDP hearing, "petitioner's
representative stated at the hearing that no such challenge to the amount of assessment existed.
Accordingly, in this proceeding we do not consider petitioner's underlying tax liability.").
286. No. 16142-03S, 2004 WL 1775680 (T.C. Aug. 10, 2004).
287. Id. at *3.
288. GAO 2006 CDP STUDY, supra note 31, at 25.
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whose adjusted gross income was less than $50,000.289 1 submit that this finding makes
the first hypothesis more plausible than the second.
3. Frivolous Cases Account for One-Third of All Cases
Many CDP commentators and participants were concerned that CDP would serve to
fuel the fires of taxpayers who sought to raise only ideological arguments. In its early
years, CDP was indeed a "boon to tax protestors and a pain to everyone else." 290 My
data show that political tax protestors were the main users of CDP in 2002 and 2003.
In 2002, 100 of the 204 court decisions (forty-nine percent) labeled the taxpayer
arguments as "frivolous" or "tax protestor" arguments. In 2003, it was 100 out of 190
cases (fifty-two percent) that did so. But the data, as detailed in the graph below, shows
a decreasing percentage of cases attributable to this group in later years.29' The decline
directly correlates with the rise in court-imposed monetary sanctions. The strong
correlation between imposition of sanctions and decrease in protestor cases detailed in
my graph suggests that imposition of court sanctions is effective, at least as to a
relatively small and well-connected community like political tax protestors.
Figure 1. CDP Cases and Sanctions
03PChses Brought by Tax Phtestms and Those Resuidng in
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4. Collection "Delay" Process
My last finding is that CDP might as well be called "Collection Delay Process."
Court review adds substantially to the delayed collection of accounts that should be
collected, and the delay occasioned by court review is only getting worse over time.
Recall that when a taxpayer timely requests a CDP Hearing, the taxpayer stops the
IRS from using two of its three great administrative collection tools: the NFTL and the
levy. To determine the delays attributable to each stage in CDP, I took from the
decisions the following three dates: (1) the date on which the IRS issued the CDP
notice ("Notice" date); (2) the date on which the IRS Office of Appeals issued its

289. Id.
290. Camp, supra note 2, at 122.

291. See infra app. tbl.1 for the data used in making this graph.
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Notice of Determination that formed the basis for the court appeal ("Determination"
date); and (3) the date of a trial court's final order disposing of the case before it
("Disposition" date). Not all cases yielded all three data points, even after searching
PACER. The following table shows the results and the number of cases on which the
results are based.
Table 4. Mean Processing Time in Days
Year
(Total cases decided that year)
Notice to Determination
Determination to Disposition
Notice to Disposition

2000
(30)
201
(10)
324
(15)
511
(17)

2001
2002
(46)
(204)
314
315
(23)
(122)
436
407
(30) 1 (155)
703
762
(29)

2003
(190)
332
(133)
486
(153)
840
(146)

(135)

2004
(171)
402
(125)
558
(145)
956
(130)

2005
(179)
357
(149)
566
(149)
936
(137)

2006
(156)
372
(97)
627
(122)
1,010
((110)

Avg.
Days
328
486
817

My data show that the administrative portion of CDP delays collection by an
average of 328 days, and court review (up to trial court disposition) adds an average of
486 days.292 As the following graphs demonstrate, moreover, not only is the delay
attributable to the courts greater than that attributable to the administrative hearing
process, but it is growing at a more rapid rate.
Figure 2. CDP Processing Times
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292. See infra app. tbl.2. This figure is consistent with figures presented by researchers who
have studied this subject in the past. In a study of fiscal year 2001 CDP cases, the Taxpayer
Advocate found an average CDP appeals processing time of 300 days. NAT'L TAXPAYER
ADvOCATE,

I.R.S., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 47 (2003). In a study of fiscal year 2004

CDP cases, the GAO found an average cycle time of 314 days for cases involving nonresponsive
taxpayers-those who were either completely unresponsive to all contact attempts initiated by
the Office of Appeals, as well as those who ultimately failed to provide the information
requested by the Office of Appeals. GAO 2006 CDP STUDY, supra note 31, at 27.
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This data supports the critique given above in Part II.A.4 that that CDP entails
resource costs to both taxpayers and the government.
IV. THE RULE OF LAW AND INQUISITORIAL DUE PROCESS

"[Ifn America the law is king. For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in
free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other. ,,293
This Part examines the claims by CDP proponents that adversarial judicial review
of IRS collection decisions is necessary to, or at least advances, rule of law principles.
After unpacking the claims, I shall explain how my study refutes them, and then I shall
suggest how an inquisitorial-grounded process of tax collection conforms more to
mainstream notions of rule of law and due process than does an adversarial-grounded
process.
A. Rule of Law Claims
The phrase "rule of law" contains some deep ambiguities. 294 For example, theorists
have historically disagreed over whether the idea necessarily contains moral content, is
morally neutral, or is a useless social construct. 295 However, modem mainstream
theorists appear to agree on at least two core components of the concept.296 First, the

293. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE, reprintedin THOMAS PAINE: COLLECTED WRITINGS 1,
34 (Eric Foner ed., 1996) (1776) (emphasis in original).
294. See generallyBRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY
(2004) (reviewing historical conflicts over meanings associated with rule of law).
295. Compare, e.g., LON M. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964) (arguing that moral
content inheres in the rule of law), and JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW
AND MORALITY (1984) (arguing that rule of law has no necessary connection to systems of
morals), with Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151 (1985)
(arguing that rule of law is an empty phrase, used as a rhetorical device by the powerful to
subjugate the powerless). For an example of the contemporary debate see Hamish Stewart,
Incentives and the Rule of Law: An Intervention in the Kramer/SimmondsDebate, 51 AM. J.
JuRts. 149 (2006) (recounting and participating in an ongoing debate between two particular
theorists). I am somewhat puzzled by this debate, which seems little more than exercises in boxdrawing, at least to my admittedly untrained eye. After all, few would disagree with either of the
following statements: (1) the United States legal system followed the rule of law from 1789
through 1865; and (2) during that time period, the laws that treated certain categories of humans
as property were immoral, even though democratically enacted and impartially enforced. See
generally A.E. Keir Nash, Reason of Slavery: Understandingthe JudicialRole in the Peculiar
Institution, 32 VAND. L. REv. 7 (1979) (demonstrating the impartiality and formalism of slave
law application). To claim that immoral legal systems cannot "qualify" as following the rule of
law, it seems to me that one must reject one of those propositions. If one cannot, then one must
concede that even systems imposing immoral obligations or conferring immoral benefits may do
so per the rule of law. Since that is unsatisfactory, one must then create another analytical box to
decry the immoral legal regime. See RAZ, supra, at 307 ("[c]onformity to the rule of law is a
virtue, but only one of the many virtues a legal system should possess.").
296. I leave out the deconstructionists, like Professor Peller, from any further consideration
since their main purpose is to remind us why all theories are ultimately social constructs. While
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legal rules of the state, properly enacted, must apply with equal force and effect to all
297
members of the state, regardless of their position in the societal power structure.
This is the idea encapsulated by the phrase "no person stands above the law." Second,
the legal system must contain structural mechanisms to prevent the arbitrary
administration of the laws by individuals, whether acting as dictators, kings, or
bureaucrats. 298 This idea is often expressed as an antithesis, contrasting the rule of law
with the rule of mere mortals. Both of these common concepts find concrete expression
in our own legal system through the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, which requires "due process" before the government may deprive a citizen of
life, liberty, or property. 29
CDP proponents say that judicial review of IRS tax collection decisions is necessary
to either preserve or promote these procedural aspects of the rule of law. The rhetoric
of the commentators echoes the rhetoric of the congressional taxwriters discussed
above in Part I. For example, Les Book claims that, prior to CDP, "Congress and the
Supreme Court... exempted the IRS from procedural regularity and external checks
on agency discretion, both of which are associated with rule of law principles." 300 As a
consequence, he says, the IRS had "almost absolute discretion in collecting taxes and
considering the merits of taxpayer requests for collection alternatives." 301 Thus,
Professor Book concludes that both the administrative hearings and their judicial
review "comprise a step in the progression of the rule of law.. ,302 CDP is necessary
for "procedural regularity" and is a necessary "external checks on agency discretion"
to prevent the arbitrary administration of the tax collection laws by IRS employees.3 °3
Similarly, Danshera Cords claims that "judicial review is one of the most important
aspects of CDP. 3 3 She asserts that "[w]here different taxpayers are afforded different
rights based on arbitrary factors, such as the area in which they live or whether they
have been assessed income tax deficiencies or penalties that require consideration by
the district court, the notion of due process is lessened."30 5 While Professor Cords does
not explicitly justify her conception of judicial review as necessary to preserve or

that is all well and good, it does not help figure out which social constructs are preferable or
possible.
297. See FULLER, supra note 295, at 81 (describing the congruence between official action
and declared rule as one of the eight elements of a legal system that conforms to a "rule of
law"); RAz, supra note 295, at 210-13; TAMANAHA, supra note 294, at 114-19 (asserting this
idea to be "a thread that has run for over 2,000 years, often frayed thin, but never completely
severed...").
298. See FULLER, supranote 295, at 81 (locating in courts the task of preventing "the lawless
administration of the law"); RAz, supra note 295, at 216-17 (discussing the importance of an
independent judiciary); TAMANAHA, supranote 294, at 122-26.
299. U.S. Const. amend. V; see Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular
Culture, 98

YALE

L.J. 1579, 1603 (1989) ("Lawyers are taught and trained to regard 'due

process' as the very essence of fairness and the rule of law."). Of course, "due process" is itself
a conceptual box of many colors (and mixed metaphors).
300. Book, supra note 3, at 1161.
301. Id. at 1162.
302. Id.at 1161.
303. Id.
304. Cords,supra note 249, at 1024.

305. Cords, supra note 262, at 107.
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promote rule of law values, her articles on CDP emphasize the necessity ofprocedural
'3°6
regularity and national uniformity and she frequently adverts to "due process.
Finally, Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate, has been a staunch proponent
ofjudicial review of CDP hearings. In each of her Annual Reports to Congress since
2003, she has reported that the CDP regime has been the number one tax issue litigated
in federal court. Ms. Olson considers this a good thing, because "over time, the true
value of CDP judicial review would emerge. 30 7 Her specific claim is that court review
"brings IRS collection practices, and the attendant judicial oversight, within
established administrative law and practice., 308 Similarly to Professor Cords, Ms.
Olson is not explicit on just what "established administrative law" benefits are
conferred on tax administration by judicial review of CDP hearings. She instead jumps
from broad generalizations to specific cases. For example, in her 2006 Annual Report
she claims that
each of the 195 cases decided during the period under review tells an important
story. Because the filing of a lien and levying upon property are some of the most
intrusive actions the IRS can take against a taxpayer, each case provides
information about how taxpayers and the IRS behave and how problems can be
avoided.30 9
Ms. Olson does not explain why judicial review is necessary for tax administrators to
learn either the "important story" or the "information about how taxpayers and the IRS
behave."
Taken together, it is fair to characterize these claims as focusing on the procedural
aspects of rule of law principles. The repeated contention is that without judicial
oversight, the IRS will act contrary to rule of law principles because it will act with
absolute discretion. The IRS will treat similarly situated taxpayers differently based on
"arbitrary factors," such as where they live. The strong claim is that judicial oversight
of tax collection decisions is necessary to conform tax administration to rule of law
principles. The weak claim is that judicial oversight "furthers" rule of law principles.
Both claims are empty.

306. Professor Cords's latest article reiterates both her assertion that judicial review is
necessary and her concern that it can add value only if done properly. See Danshera Cords,
Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection Decisions, 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 429,
477 (2008) (asserting that "[a] consistent approach to judicial review of tax collection decisions
will benefit taxpayers and tax collection administration"). Her approach is to limit court
involvement to a review of the record in existence at the time of the administrative hearing. Id.
Her article, however, neither addresses the problems that I identify above, nor explains why
judicial review is a necessary component of procedural regularity. Professor Cords simply
assumes that judicial review is intrinsically good.
307. 2006 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 54, at 556.
308. Id.at 557.
309. Id.at 561.
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B. Refutation of Claims
My study of CDP's role in the tax collection process refutes the claim that judicial
review of tax collection decisions is either necessary or helpful for tax administration
to be consistent with rule of law principles. This is so for three reasons.
First, my study shows how CDP proponents mistake the problem. A proper rule of
law analysis requires a full appreciation of the bulk processing nature of modem tax
administration. Professor Book notes that the IRS has almost absolute discretion in
making collection decisions but does not acknowledge that the most important
collection decisions are made as to entire populations of taxpayers and not individual
taxpayers. As explained in Part I, the single most important aggregate decision is to
label all delinquent taxpayers as won't-pays. Since taxpayers have the information, it is
reasonable to make them come forward with that information to show the IRS that they
are can't-pays and not won't-pays. When they do, the IRS employee's decision is then
bounded by complex sets of rules and requirements, set out in the relevant parts of the
Internal Revenue Manual. For example, if a taxpayer wants to avoid a levy by
obtaining an Offer In Compromise, the taxpayer must follow rigid processing rules and
strict eligibility rules. 310 Those rules are aggregate decisions and leave little room for
discretion on the part of the IRS employee. While it is correct to say that, as an
institution, the IRS has "absolute discretion," it is incorrect to make that same claim
about individual IRS employees.
The problem is not that either employees or the IRS act lawlessly. Ironically, it is
precisely because tax administration is so rule-bound that hardship occurs. When the
rule of law becomes the law of rules, taxpayers suffer. Take levies for example.
Congress properly enacted § 6331 to empower the IRS to levy on a delinquent
taxpayer's property or rights to property within thirty days of the IRS sending notice
and demand for an unpaid tax. The IRS operationalized the levy power by deciding, in
the aggregate, to give taxpayers not one, not two, not three, but four or even five
notices and demands for payment before sending out levies. No one could reasonably
argue that either the statute or its implementation were inconsistent with the rule of
law. Every delinquent taxpayer is treated the same--everyone is presumed to be a
won't-pay and everyone who does not respond gets hit with a levy, regardless of his or
her geographic location or his or her status in the societal power structure. There has
been no credible evidence presented suggesting that IRS employees abuse individual
taxpayers during the tax collection process.31
The rhetoric that judicial review is needed to promote rule of law values thus
mistakes the problem by confusing arbitrary results with incorrect results. It is
undoubtedly true that some taxpayers are misclassified and, as a consequence, suffer
hardship. But the mere misclassification of a taxpayer is not the same as an abuse of
discretion by an employee of the IRS. The problem is not that the IRS or individual
employees are abusing discretion in the moral sense of the term "abuse." The problem
is simply the error that inevitably occurs in any administrative system. A taxpayer has
always been able to contact the IRS, both before and after a levy is issued, to ask for

310. See generally IrrERNAL

REvENuE MANuAL,

supra note 35, at ch. 5.8; GAO OIC

STUDY, supra note 72.

311. For an in-depth discussion of the failure of evidence see Camp, supranote 2, at 80-81;
see also Cords, supranote 262, at 52.
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and receive a decision about his or her ability to pay. All that the administrative
hearing provisions of CDP add to the tax collection system is a single additional
opportunity to have a more experienced IRS employee apply those rules to the
information presented by the taxpayer.
The question thus becomes whether judicial review of this single additional tax
classification decision is either necessary or helpful in promoting the rule of law. Once
the question is properly framed, the second reason why judicial review does not further
rule of law values becomes evident: courts are not being asked to create legal rules or
settle disputed points of law-to say what the law is-but are instead asked to identify
and correct erroneous classifications. They are performing neither the function of lawgivers nor of original fact-finders. My study shows how courts become simply another
layer of decision makers who work the case-and do so rather poorly. Because they
are far removed from the field and work with only a skimpy paper record, their
decisions, whether in favor of the taxpayer or not, are inherently more arbitrary than
the decisions being reviewed. In the role of a super caseworker, they lose their ability
to promote the rule of law much as an appellate court does when deciding an appeal on
a "totality of the circumstances" standard. Justice Scalia explains:
To reach such a stage [where the appellate judge decides the case on the totality of
the circumstances] is, in a way, a regrettable concession of defeat-an
acknowledgement that we have passed the point where "law," properly speaking,
has any further application. And to reiterate the unfortunate practical
consequences of reaching such a pass when there still remains a good deal of
judgment to be applied: equality of treatment is difficult to demonstrate and, in a
multi-tiered judicial system, impossible to achieve; predictability is destroyed;
judicial arbitrariness is facilitated; judicial courage is impaired. 2
The third way in which my study refutes any claim that judicial review promotes
rule of law values lies in the small number of taxpayers who even try to obtain court
review. Courts cannot adequately police the exercise of agency discretion if they are
not presented with the opportunity to review the discretion in the first place. In the
CDP context, this means that taxpayers must take the initiative to file a court petition
after the IRS refuses to reclassify them as can't-pays. My study shows not only that the
most miniscule percentage of eligible taxpayers seek judicial review in the first place,
but also explains why that is so: the combination of lack of resources and lack of
ability stymie the very taxpayer who might benefit the most from yet another level of
review. When courts are reversing only about one out of 1,000,000 collection
decisions, it is fair to say that judicial review adds nothing to the rule of law.
C. InquisitorialDue Process
The main concern of CDP proponents is an important one: taxpayers should be
properly classified so that they receive the proper treatment. We all want the IRS to
reach the "right" result for each taxpayer. In the context of tax collection, that means
we want the IRS to administer its collection programs so that taxpayers are properly

312. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cin. L. REv. 1175, 1182
(1989).
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classified. CDP proponents, however, might want more. They might argue thatjudicial
review is "due" taxpayers, not because the rule of law demands it, but because our
conception ofjustice demands it. This last section explores that idea.
As discussed above, the demand for judicial review is not justified by rule of law
principles. Nor, as my study shows, can the demand for judicial review rest on
instrumentalist grounds: courts are simply a very poor structural mechanism to ensure
that the IRS reaches the right result. However, there might be a moral claim based on a
concept ofjustice that always requires adversarial process as part of the process "due"
taxpayers. Such a claim would rest on what Professor Jerry Mashaw calls the "moral
judgment" model of justice. 313 CDP proponents demand an adversarial review
mechanism not simply to correct errors, but also to pass judgment on the process and
the parties. In his study of the Social Security Administration's processing of disability
claims, Jerry Mashaw contrasted314 that model of justice with what he called the
"bureaucratic rationality" model.
These models have different goals and operational structures. Briefly, the
bureaucratic rationality model seeks to distinguish can't-pays from won't-pays as
efficiently as possible (i.e., more outcomes per unit of resources used to generate the
outcomes). The goal is simply to discover whether the taxpayer has sufficient assets to
pay the liability in full. In contrast, the moral judgment model seeks to determine "the
deservingness of some or all of the parties in the context ofcertain events, transactions,
or relationships that give rise to a claim., 31 5 In Professor Mashaw's study, the moral
judgment called for was the deservingness of injured workers to Social Security
Disability payments. In the context of tax collection the judgment called for is the
deservingness of taxpayers to be free from coercive collection or, put another way, the
deservingness of the IRS to collect (if it can) from the taxpayer.
The choice of process reflects the choice of goals. The bureaucratic rationality
model chooses a process that seeks to develop the most relevant information at the
least cost. The scope of what information is relevant is relatively narrow and focuses
on assets. This model relies on the integrity of prior processes that have produced the
tax liability determination. In contrast, the moral judgment model seeks to maximize a
"contextualized exploration of individual deservingness" 316 in which, in the words of§
6330, the taxpayer may raise "any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the
proposed levy.,317 Not surprisingly, this conception ofjustice leads to an emphasis on
adversarial process, as Mashaw demonstrates. 8

313.

JERRY L. MASHAW,

BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING

SociAL DIsAILITY CLAIMS

29-

31(1983).
314. Id. at25-26.
at 30.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A) (2000).
318. MASHAw, supra note 313, at 30. The struggle over administration of Social Security
Disability claims illustrates the resiliency and power of the idea that adversarial process is a
necessary component of the administrative state. Professors Paul Verkuil and Jeffrey Lubbers
have documented twenty-five years worth of failed attempts to remove or reduce the role of
adversary process in making or reviewing Social Security Administration disability
determinations. See Paul Verkuil & Jeffrey Lubbers, Alternative Approachesto JudicialReview
of Social Security DisabilityCases: A Report to the SocialSecurity Advisory Board,44 ADMIN.
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The CDP debate can be seen as a debate about these two concepts ofjustice. I have
previously explored how those who created CDP sought to shift the tax administration
paradigm from an inquisitorial one to an adversarial one. 319 In Mashaw's terms, that is
simply another way of stating that CDP derives from a moral judgment view of tax
administration where certain taxpayers deserve to be relieved of IRS collection action.
Mashaw's study demonstrates how the different models were in tension within the
Social Security Administration and how that agency resolved the tension in favor of
bureaucratic rationality. My study of the IRS response to the CDP provisions shows
much the same result. As demonstrated in Part II, the IRS has gone far in suppressing
the adversarial features implicit in CDP, and in administering CDP through what I call
an inquisitorial paradigm and what Mashaw calls a bureaucratic rationality model.
The central promise of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a "meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner." 320 The Supreme Court long ago decided that the
rule of law embodied in the Due Process Clause does not require the government to
give taxpayers a pre-deprivation hearing regarding tax collection. 321 Only after a
properly assessed tax is collected may the taxpayer invoke judicial process.
This promise of "meaningful" not only has a legal dimension, however, but also a
moral one. It is, in essence, an issue of "voice." Distrust of the bureaucracy-of the
Borg collective-inheres in American culture, which celebrates the autonomy of the
322
individual in so many ways, one of which is the reliance on adversarial process.
Indeed, just as Judge Friendly noted in the quotation that started this Article, the
traditional check on agency discretion has been through the adversarial process
provided by courts or administrative law systems modeled on the adversarial process
paradigm. 323 Because this paradigm depends on the litigants to provide the needed
information, one must be either exceptionally adept at gathering and presenting
evidence, or be able to hire someone to do it on his or her behalf
Ironically, the adversarial check ofjudicial review is simply unavailable to the class
of taxpayers we should worry about the most: the inarticulate can't-pays. 32 4 By
definition, they do not have the ability to gather the information necessary to trigger
the exercise of discretion, much less to trigger a meaningful review. By definition, they
do not have the money to hire someone to do it for them. 325 These are serious barriers
to voice. Nor are taxpayer assistance clinics able to serve anywhere close to a
reasonable number of taxpayers. Not only do they serve only a small fraction of
taxpayers in need but their assistance often comes too late in the process-when the

L. REv. 731 (2003).
319. See Camp, supra note 2.
320. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
321. Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
322. I discuss these ideas further in Camp, supranote 2, at 18-20. See also MASHAW, supra
note 313, at 223 ("Bureaucracy is probably the most important of our negative symbols."
(quoting THuRmAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 209 (1941 ))).
323. See generally Henry J. Friendly, supra note 1(reviewing the historical developments
and understandings of the term "hearing" with respect to administrative agencies).
324. I do not worry about won't-pays: they do not have a claim to voice. And articulate
can't-pays are generally able to interact with the bureaucracy well enough to be heard.
325. See infra app. tbl. I (indicating that seventy-six percent of CDP cases are argued pro se).
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taxpayer's only remaining hope is judicial review-to matter. 326 In short, adversarial
process is not effective for the inarticulate or the poor. We owe them a better system.
The better approach to overseeing the tax collection classification decisions is to
improve the inquisitorial process model used in tax collection. Like other
bureaucracies, the tax bureaucracy is governed by rules. Tax administration in general,
and tax collection in particular, must process taxpayers, returns, and accounts in bulk.
To do that, the IRS uses systems of processes. Those systems are built on rules and,
whether executed by humans or machines, rules are inherently both under- and overinclusive. 327 In the tax collection context, the main rule is that delinquent taxpayers
start out and remain won't-pays until the taxpayer provides the information to the right
bureaucrat at the right time to be reclassified. Thus, the moral question, if you will, is
how best to give taxpayers voice to help IRS employees properly mitigate the overand under-inclusive effect of rules in classifying taxpayers.
There are several ways to improve the system, both to reduce the need for taxpayers
to prove their status as can't-pays and to help taxpayers interact with IRS employees
when they do have to speak up. First, the IRS can use bulk processing to classify some
groups of taxpayers as presumptive can't-pays. The algorithms that drive the queue
already do this on the back end. The IRS could do it on the front end. For example,
taxpayers who received the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in a given year might be
treated as presumptive can't-pays and automatically be placed in the status of
"currently not collectible."
Second, the National Taxpayer Advocate has made the wonderful suggestion that
the IRS kick certain groups of taxpayers into automatic audit reconsideration
processes. 32s Automatic audit reconsideration would occur in cases where there may be
reason to distrust the assessment process (i.e., the liability determination), such as
cases where the IRS has prepared a substitute for return and has had no contact from
the taxpayer regarding the liability proposed on the substitute for return. Improving the
taxpayer's voice in the tax determination process improves the accuracy of the
collection process. In addition, it reduces the number of cases where the IRS is trying
to collect taxes not actually owed.
Third, functions within the IRS that help give taxpayers voice in the system should
be strengthened (i.e., funded), to help taxpayers gather and present the information
necessary for the IRS systems to make the correct collection decision. The Offices of
Appeals and the Taxpayer Advocate do this, the former on the individualized retail
level and the latter on both the individual level and systemic level.329

326. In fiscal year 2008, the IRS funded 154 clinics. Hearingon InternalRevenue Service
FY 2009 Budget Request Before the S. Comm. on FinanceServ. and GeneralGov't Comm. on
Appropriations, 110th Cong. 17 (2008) (written statement of Nina Olson, National Taxpayer
Advocate). About half of the clinics are located in law schools and service far fewer taxpayers
than nonacademic clinics. The Tax Clinic at Texas Tech, for example, assisted approximately
thirty-four taxpayers in calendar year 2007.
327. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953 (1995).
328. 2005 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 75, at 463. The National Taxpayer
Advocate actually suggests this idea be codified. Id. This would be an unhappy result since
statutory provisions prevent an agency from reforming its practices as time and technology bring
about new opportunities to improve administration.
329. For a detailed review of the history and function of these offices, see Camp, supranote
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It is critically important that these two internal components remain internal and
resist assuming an institutionally adversarial posture to the rest of the IRS. That is,
many commentators believe that the concepts of tax "enforcement" and tax "service"
are at opposite ends of the pole. 330 This is a false dichotomy. As Ms. Olsen has
repeatedly stressed, "taxpayer rights and higher rates of tax compliance can coexist and
do not reflect opposing values.",331 Inquisitorial due process is not necessarily about
consolidation or dispersion 332
of authority; it is as much or more about information
management and evaluation.
By virtue of their internal position within the agency, the Taxpayer Advocate
Service and the Office ofAppeals add multiple layers ofvalue-value which cannot be
replicated by any type of outside agency. First, taxpayers tend both to respond better
and feel better about requests for information when the requests come from an Appeals
Officer or from a Taxpayer Advocate, who they perceive are in positions to give
immediate relief or help.333 This improves outcomes not only by improving quality of
information in a way that cannot be matched by either the judiciary or any outside
reviewing entity, but also by increasing taxpayers' respect for the system.
Second, the Office of Appeals and the Taxpayer Advocate are uniquely positioned
as internalcomponents to act as cultural counterweights to the enforcement mentality
that makes it so difficult for collection employees to maintain the necessary perspective
to carry out the IRS mission and not succumb to the false dichotomy between taxpayer
rights and taxpayer compliance. One of the most valuable services these components
provide to other IRS functions is education about better practices, both for gathering
taxpayer information and processing it. In short, they can help field employees become
better listeners.
Third, these offices add symbolic value. Professor Mashaw is the latest in a long list
of scholars who note that bureaucracies have no effective symbolism to allay popular
distrust.334 Both the Office of Appeals and the Taxpayer Advocate Service could
provide such symbolism. The symbolism should not be architectural, such as housing
the two functions in different physical facilities. That would diminish their ability to be
2, at 93-103.
330. See, e.g., Testimony Before the Joint CongressionalReview on the Strategic Plansand
Budget of the IRS, 109th Cong. (2005) (written testimony of Raymond T. Wagner, Jr.,
Chairman, IRS Oversight Board) (discussing "shifts in customer service and enforcement");
Practicesand Proceduresof the InternalRevenue Service: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on

Finance,105th Cong. 23 (1997) (statement of Joseph F. Lane, Chairman, Nat'l Gov't Relations
Comm., The Nat'l Ass'n of Enrolled Agents) (suggesting that we "divide the IRS into two
separate agencies, one for the taxpayer service, and the other for tax law compliance"); Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ASSESSMENT OF FIsCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST 24 (2005),
availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05566.pdf (describing the "swinging pendulum,
where enforcement gains are achieved at the cost of taxpayer service and vice versa"); Alvin
Lurie, Killed with Kindness orHow We Stopped Hatingthe IRS, 100 TAX NOTES 593 (July 28,

2003) (arguing enforcement should be the primary mission of the IRS); William Stevenson,
IRS's PrimaryFocus on Service is the Right Way to Go, 99 TAX NOTES 1850 (June 23, 2003).
331. 2004 TAXPAYER ADvOCATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 227.
332. See Camp, supra note 2, at 5-17.
333. See 2004 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 460 ("Often Appeals
Officers are more helpful and successful in eliciting information from and conversing with the
taxpayer than [field IRS] employees.").
334. See MASHAW, supra note 313, at 222-27.
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internal cultural counterweights. Instead, the symbolism should arise from highly
visible actions. For example, the Taxpayer Advocate has made a clever suggestion:
that Congress give the Taxpayer Advocate Service the ability to provide de minimis
"apology" payments to taxpayers who have been aggrieved by the system.335 Such
payments, especially if prominently promoted in the media, would provide highly
visible public reassurance that someone was watching out for the interests of the
"people" against the "bureaucracy." Such authority should also be vested in the Office
of Appeals.
Strengthening the ability of both the Office of Appeals and the Taxpayer Advocate
to amplify and fine tune taxpayer voices within the collections system will be far more
effective than judicial review at providing taxpayers a process that is meaningful, in all
senses of the word. It would, at the same time, add value to tax administration by
improving the classification decisions. It would answer the clamor for adversarial
process. It would, in short, be a step towards a notion of inquisitorial due process.

335. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADvOCATE, I.R.S., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGREss 478-90
(2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article/0,,id=177301,00.html.
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APPENDIX

To analyze how court review might add value, I ventured to extract the following
variables from the cases: (1) whether the unpaid assessment was from a deficiency or a
self reported liability; (2) whether the taxpayer was represented by counsel or acted pro
se; (3) whether the trial court's disposition was appealed (and the result); (4) which
type of court (Tax Court or District Court) performed the review; (5) whether the
taxpayer raised frivolous, tax protestor-type arguments; (6) whether any court imposed
sanctions on the taxpayer; (7) whether the taxpayer or government prevailed (any case
where the government did not prevail was counted as a taxpayer victory, even if it was
simply the court denying a dispositive motion); (8) whether the taxpayer's complaint
was about the merits of the tax assessment or the collection procedure or both; (9) the
date of the CDP notice; (10) the date of the Notice of Determination or other
administrative disposition; and (11) the date of the trial court disposition and, if
applicable, the appellate court disposition. The following table notes my basic
findings.
Table 1. Basic CDP Statistics
Year
Records
Deficiency
Pro Se
Appealed
Opinion Type
Tax Court
Tax Court Memos
Special Trial Judge
District Court
Bankruptcy Court
Claims Court
Protestor
Lack of Jurisdiction
Sanctions
Taxpayer Victory
Complaint
Procedural
Liability
Both

2000
30
15
20
3

2001
46
9
34
7

2002
204
82
174
26

2003
190
76
150
36

2004
171
52
118
24

2005
179
69
137
18

2006
156
48
108
3

Total
976
351
741
117

10
7
0
12
1
0
3
13
1
3

12
13
1
20
0
0
11
18
2
1

19
80
7
97
1
0
100
92
34
5

16
92
9
73
0
0
100
66
50
4

20
66
28
57
0
0
42
21
16
21

13
77
26
63
0
0
62
29
26
18

14
61
23
57
0
1
47
30
15
11

104
396
94
379
2
1
365
269
144
64

10
16
4

9
34
3

44
130
27

49
106
34

71
38
62

42
50
86

78
31
47

303
405
263
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Table 2 Key
Win Type Column
M = Win on the Merits
P = Win on Procedure
I = Interstitial Win
L = IRS Error in Liability Decision
C = IRS Error in Collection Decision
For example, "PC" means a procedural win in a
collection decision where the IRS was in error.
Notes Column
TP Taxpayer
SJ Summary Judgment
TRFP = Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (§ 6672)
OIC = Offer In Compromise
SOL = Statute of Limitations

Table 2. Taxpayer "Victories" Sorted by Year of Decision, Then by Taxpayer Name
Case Citation

Win
Type

Pro Se

Notes

Butti v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M.
(CCH) 967 (2006).

PC

Yes

Remand to allow TP to contest liability

Calafati v. Comm'r, 127 T.C. 219
(2006).

PC

No

IRS had to give TP face-to-face hearing

Crawford v. United States, 422 F.
Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Nev. 2006).

PC

No

TFRP

Gerhart v. United States, No. 04CV-04942, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
54549 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2006).

IC

Yes

TFRP; TP survived Motion to Dismiss

Harris v. Comm'r, 92 T.C.M.
(CCH) 217 (2006).

MC

Yes

IRS abused discretion by rejecting the OIC

Manko v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 195
(2006).

ML

No

IRS failed to issued necessary deficiency

Moore v. Comm'r, 92 T.C.M.
(CCH) 131 (2006).

PC

No

Remand for new hearing because ofexparte
taint

Oman v. Comm'r, 92 T.C.M.
(CCH) 372 (2006).

MC

Yes

Remand for clarification and further
consideration

Pineda v. Comm'r, No. 3081-05S,
2006 WL 469652 (T.C. Feb. 27,
2006).

PC

Yes

Split; IRS must consider installment agreement
or other collection alternative on remand

Sampson v. Comm'r, No. 417005S, 2006 WL 1228593 (T.C. May
8, 2006).

PC

Yes

Remand to consider using a future income
agreement as part of taxpayer's OIC

Sherer v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M
(CCH) 759 (2006).

PL

Yes

No liability for taxpayer
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Bennett v. Comm'r, No. 629103S, 2005 WL 1405977 (T.C. June
16, 2005).

ML

Yes

Split; TP won partial Innocent Spouse relief

Beverly v. Comm'r, No. 1077403L, 2005 WL 544842 (T.C. Mar.
7, 2005).

MC

Yes

Duplicate Relief: Automatic Stay violation

Bo v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH)
1474 (2005).

ML

Yes

Split; TP won some abatements, not others

Dibble v. United States, No. 1:05CV-201, 2005 WL 3556073 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 29, 2005).

IC

Yes

Split; TP partially survived dismissal

Electro, Inc. v. Comm'r, No. 04S113-KI, 2005 WL 43870 (D. Or.
Jan. 7, 2005).

IC

No

TP survived dismissal

Freije v. Comm'r, 125 T.C. 14
(2005).

MC

Yes

Remand to recalculate liabilities in light of
improper assessments and application of
payments

Garage v. United States, No. Civ.
04-1133 (HAA), 2005 WL
3610064 (D. N.J. Nov. 22, 2005).

PC

No

Remand for face-to-face hearing; same attorney
as Cavanaugh v. United States, No. 03-250,
2004 WL 880442 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2004),
which had the same outcome

Hayes v. Comm'r, No. 7699-02L,
2005 WL 697962 (T.C. Mar. 28,
2005).

ML

Yes

Split; TP won one year, IRS won two years;
similar to Rivera v. Comm'r, No. 2401-01L,
2003 WL 345341 (T.C. Feb. 14, 2003)

Hendricks v. Comm'r, No. 11416,
2005 WL 758043 (T.C. Apr. 5,
2005).

ML

No

Duplicative Relief: Innocent Spouse

Jackson v. Comm'r, No. 525-04S,
2005 WL 342102 (T.C. Feb. 14,
2005).

ML

Yes

Split; TP won abatement of some interest; IRS
could collect other interest, penalties

Johnson v. Comm'r, No. 2059403S, 2005 WL 883701 (T.C. Apr.
18, 2005).

IC

Yes

Homeless TP survived SJ

Lites v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M.
(CCH) 191 (2005).

PC

No

Split; no abatement but remand for Appeals to
consider installment offer

Mesa Oil, Inc. v. United States,
467 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006).

PC

No

Split; TP won new hearing

Julian W. Mandody, 89 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1445 (2005).

IC

Yes

TP survived SJ motion; allowed to introduce
new evidence; pre-Robinette

Norris v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M.
(CCH) 381 (2005).

MC

Yes

IRS must restore Installment Agreement

Richard v. Comm'r, No. 121603S, 2005 WL 2591956 (T.C. Oct.
13, 2005).

ML

No

SOL; assessment late because no fraud
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Smith v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 36
(2005).

MC

No

Duplicative Relief: Automatic Stay Violation

Zapara v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 223
(2005).

ML

Yes

IRS must credit TP for value of seized stock as
of the day the IRS should have sold it but did
not

Borges v. United States, 317 F.
Supp. 2d 1276 (D.N.M. 2004).

PL

No

Duplicative Relief: TFRP

Cavanaugh, No. 03-250, 2004 WL
880442 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2004).

PC

No

Remand for new hearing; same attorney as
Garage v. United States, No. Civ. 04-1133
(HAA), 2005 WL 3610064 (D.N.J. 2005)

Chavez v. United States, No.
Civ.EP-03-CA-303(KC), 2004 WL
1124914 (W.D. Tex. May 18,
2004).

MC

No

TFRP

Chocallo v. Comm'r, No. 1269502L, 2004 WL 1435478 (T.C. June
28, 2004).

PL

Yes

Remand to allow TP to contest liability (TP
succeeded on remand)

Cooper v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1033 (2004).

IC

No

TP survived SJ

Cox v. United States, No. CIV-040085-F, 2004 WL 3080342 (W.D.
Okla. Nov. 12, 2004).

PC

No

TFRP

Creel v. Comm'r, 419 F.3d 1135
(1 th Cir. 2005).

ML

No

IRS could not collect penalties, interest

Haws v. Comm'r, No. 19830-02S,
2004 WL 728916 (T.C. Apr. 6,
2004).

PC

No

Remand to determine whether prior installment
agreement covering tax year to be collected had
been terminated

Fowler v. Comm'r, No. 6650-02L,
2004 WL 1559188 (T.C. July 13,
2004).

MC

Yes

Split; IRS should have accepted OIC, but could
still file NFTLs

Hudson v. IRS, No. 03-CV-172,
2004 WL 1006266 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 25, 2004).

ML

No

Split; TP won abatement of interest on TFRP;
IRS won right to collect reduced TFRP liability

Israel v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M.
(CCH) 23 (2003).

ML

Yes

Split; IRS had not properly assessed one tax
year IRS got green light for two other years

Molina v. Comm'r, No. 4026-03L,
2004 WL 2538097 (T.C. Nov. 10,
2004).

ML

Yes

Reduced liability

Montgomery v. Comm'r, 122 T.C.
1(2004).

PL

No

Remand to allow TP to contest liability

Pollack v. United States, 327 F.
Supp. 2d 907 (W.D. Tenn. 2004).

IC

No

Split; TP survived SJ as to collection decision
but lost SJ as to liability decision
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Ramirez v. Comm'r, No. 1415402S, 2004 WL 766432 (T.C. Apr.
14, 2004).

PC

Yes

Remand: IRS must reconsider OIC

Ratke v. Comm'r, No. 9641-OIL,
2004 WL 585810 (T.C. Mar. 25,
2004).

ML

No

IRS bound by prior settlement agreement as to
liability

Robertson v. Comm'r, No. 522103, 2004 WL 2153937 (T.C. Sept.
27, 2004).

IL

Yes

Split; TP lost SJ on four tax periods but
survived SJ on fifth tax period to allow TP to
contest self reported liability

Law Offices of Neal Sanders v.
Comm'r, No. 02-2060, 2004 WL
838058 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2004).

IL

No

Split; TP count one dismissed, but TP survived
SJ; TFRP

Skrizowski v. Comm'r, 88 T.C.M.
(CCH) 336 (2004).

MC

No

IRS must remove nominee liens; TP also won
remand for IRS to consider OIC

Thorpe v. Comm'r, No. 6209-03S,
2004 WL 1658385 (T.C. July 26,
2004).

PL

Yes

Duplicate Relief: Innocent Spouse; TP won
remand

Zelaya v. Comm'r, No. 1614803S, 2004 WL 2727777 (T.C. Dec.
1, 2004).

ML

Yes

Court found TP's signature on duplicate refund
check to be forged; no liability

Harrell v. Comm'r, No. 4063-02L,
2003 WL 22137919 (T.C. Sept.
17, 2003).

PC

No

Remand to allow TP a second chance to accept
an IRS modification to proposed Installment
Agreement

Keene v. Comm'r, 121 T.C. 8
(2003).

PC

Yes

Remand to allow TP to record hearing

Rivera v. Comm'r, No. 2401-01L,
2003 WL 345341 (T.C. Feb. 14,
2003).

PC

Yes

Split; TP got remand for some years, not for
others

Tatum v. Comm'r, No. 1126-01L,
2003 WL 1918914 (T.C. Apr. 22,
2003).

PL

No

Remand to allow TP to contest liability

Erickson v. United States, No. C01-20798-JE, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8963 (T.C. Mar. 14, 2002).

PC

Yes

Remand for new hearing

Hoffman v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 140
(2002).

ML

No

SOL barred assessment of tax sought to be
collected

Moraldi v. United States, No. CVS-01-1296 RLH RJJ, 2002 WL
1482296 (D. Nev. May 10, 2002).

IL

No

Duplicative Relief: TP survived SJ; TFRP

Silver v. Smith, No. 01-CV-6193L,
2002 WL 31367926 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 5, 2002).

PC

Yes

Split; TP won remand for new CDP hearing on
one tax period; IRS got green light to collect
two others; like Rivera

Wright v. Comm'r, No. 6240-OIL,
2002 WL 31875118 (T.C. Dec. 26,
2002).

ML

Yes

Reduced liability; this case was vacated and
remanded by Wright v. Comm'r, 381 F.3d 41
(2d Cir. 2004)
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Tkac v. Comm'r, No. 3556-00S,
2001 WL 1922701 (T.C. Nov. 14,
2001).

ML

Yes

Split; TP got IRS to concede income tax
liability but not frivolous return penalties;
example of collateral benefit of court hearing:
IRS attorney reviews case

Mesa Oil, Inc. v. United States,
No. Civ.A. 00-B-851, 2000 WL
1745280 (D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2000).

PC

No

Remand for new hearing to produce a record
sufficient for court review

Meyer v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 417
(2000).

MC

Yes

Voided Collection Action; pre-Lunsford;
overruled by 117 T.C. 159 (2001); abrogated
by 117 T.C. 204 (2001)

MRCA Info. Servs. v. United
States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 194 (D.
Conn. 2000).

PC

No

Remand for new hearing with different Appeals
Officer

Figure 1 demonstrates that a higher proportion of CDP cases in Tax Court are pro
se compared to those that went to district courts. The main reason for this is that
district courts had jurisdiction over the employment tax cases where business taxpayers
are far more likely to be represented by counsel.
Figure 1: Pro Se Cases
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Although CDP is meant to protect taxpayers from abusive collection decisions, it
allows a taxpayer to contest a tax liability whenever the taxpayer did not have a prior
opportunity to do so. 336 The Tax Court, in Montgomery v. Commissioner,33 7 held that
even where the taxpayer had self reported a liability, the taxpayer could contest the
same in a CDP hearing because, by definition, the taxpayer had not had a prior
opportunity to contest it. Accordingly, it is not surprising to see many taxpayers
attempt to contest their liability either as the sole issue or in conjunction with a protest
about how the IRS is proceeding to collect it.

336. See I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B) (2000).
337. 122 T.C. 1, 36 (2004).
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Figure 2. Types of Issues Raised
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The following figure tracks how many of the cases decided in a given year were
appealed to a circuit court, which is not the same as the number of appeals lodged in a
given year. The data shows a decreasing number of CDP taxpayers taking their trial
court losses up on appeal. This decrease correlates with the decrease in tax protestor
cases.
Figure 3. Appeals to Circuit Courts of Appeal
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